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Title: Never at Home: Immigrant Integration in Denmark and Sweden 
 
 
My dissertation is a comparative analysis of immigration and integration policies 
in Denmark and Sweden. I compared these countries because they take different policy 
approaches to integration; Denmark uses assimilationist policies while Sweden takes a 
multicultural approach, but they are getting similar results. According to the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) in 2015, both countries had high 
poverty levels for non-Western immigrants relative to the native populations—a surprise 
considering that they have robust social welfare systems. Relying on more than 12 
months of fieldwork in Denmark and Sweden, the central goal of this study was to 
understand why the differences in policies produced a similar outcome of poverty levels. 
I did a historical analysis of the countries, I collected data using a survey questionnaire, 
and I did participant observations through field research. The findings from my research 
indicated connections between nation-building, belonging, historical myths, the 
perception of non-Western immigrants, and institutional barriers. I found that social 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
 
Modern technological advances have made it not only ideologically conceivable 
but concretely easier, faster, and cheaper to travel across the world today. According to 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2018 report, 3.4 percent (258 million) 
of the world’s population have resettled internationally—this is more people than ever 
before in history. Approximately 150.3 million people moved for labor opportunities, 
while 25.9 million were refugees and 3.5 million were asylum seekers. Immigration has 
become a central and contested issue in politics. In response to migration, states have 
implemented policies stipulating requirements for integration as a means to citizenship. 
Today, integration in Europe means the incorporation of immigrants and also their 
descendants in terms of their access to work, education, and social capital relative to the 
native population. However, the focus on integration has shifted recently to 
socioeconomic status and the physical location of immigrants (spatial residential 
patterns).1 This study examines the impact that integration policies have had on non- 
Western immigrants. 
Denmark and Sweden present a puzzle. Denmark adopted assimilation policies 
with extensive integration requirements while Sweden implemented multicultural policies 




1 T. R. Balakrishnan and Feng Hou, “Socioeconomic Integration and Spatial Residential Patterns of 
Immigrant Groups in Canada,” Population Research and Policy Review 18, no. 3 (1999): 201–17; Lina 
Aldén and Mats Hammarstedt, Integration of Immigrants on the Swedish Labour Market : Recent Trends 
and Explanations (Linnaeus University, 2014); Abdi Mohamud Hersi, “Concerning Immigrant 
Integration: A Critical Review,” European Scientific Journal, August 2014. 
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results with their immigrants. While both states have a commitment to integrating 
immigrants within their local communities, the states have different inclusion practices. 
In both Sweden and Denmark, integration policies generally apply to new arrivals and 
those who are first- or second-generation immigrants. The policies impact immigrants 
with origins from the Middle East, Asia, Africa, people with Muslim backgrounds and 
sometimes Eastern Europeans. In this dissertation, these groups are referred to as “non- 
Western immigrants” and “people from the global south.” The politicization of 
immigration in Denmark and Sweden is marked by three major concerns: the increasing 
number of migrants, the ethnic and geographical origins of immigrants, and the rising 
poverty levels of non-Western immigrants living in Europe. 
The integration literature classifies integration policies as either multicultural 
policies that supported diverse groups of people, or assimilation policies that promoted 
the host country's culture and language as the most important for social cohesion.2 This 
study departs from this understanding and presents that the type of integration policies is 
not important, but that practices and institutions have a larger impact on immigrant 
integration. Integration policies, therefore, might not adequately indicate that a country 
has successfully managed ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. For instance, Sweden 
has consistently been ranked highly by the Migration Policy Index (MPI) since the early 
2000s for their integration policies; however, the 2015/2016 refugee crisis in Europe 






2Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration (Guilford Press, 2003). 
3  
language problems, and segregated suburban communities—similar problems to 
countries such as Denmark and France, with assimilationist policies. 
The problems in Sweden indicate that there are gaps in Sweden’s integration 
policy goals and outcomes.3 Sweden's policy goals have consistently ranked number one 
in the world compared to all other OECD countries according to most policy indexes; 
however, the outcome in Sweden is one of the worst in terms of the relative poverty of 
immigrants and their descendants. If successful integration is measured along the lines of 
income level, education obtainment, employment status, and desegregated 
neighborhoods, Sweden is not achieving its goal of integration, which is the case for 
other countries in the EU. This is why scholars are paying even closer attention to the 
goals and outcomes of integration policies, which is where this dissertation fits in the 
scholarly literature. This study suggests that the development of national identity is 
linked to historical myths and that integration policies are a reflection of national identity. 
It also suggests that integration policies are trumped by institutional barriers and practices 
that kept non-Western immigrants at a lower socioeconomic status in Denmark and 
Sweden. 
The number of immigrants in Denmark (660,000) and Sweden (1.7 million) is 
small relative to countries like the United States (50 million), Germany (12 million), the 
United Kingdom (9 million), Canada and France (8 million); however, the Nordic 
countries have an essential story to tell. Denmark and Sweden are small countries, but 
currently, more than 15 percent of people living in the territories were born in a different 
 
3 James Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, and Pia Orrenius, eds., Controlling Immigration: A Global 
Perspective, Third Edition, 3 edition (Stanford University Press, 2014). 
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country. This number does not include descendants of immigrants, including them the 
numbers can go up to 20-30 percent. These migration trends have challenged robust 
welfare states such as Denmark and Sweden that are in the early stages of becoming 
culturally, ethnically, and religiously diverse. Initially, non-Western migrants moved to 
Denmark and Sweden to work in factories in the 1960s; however, the majority of non- 
Western immigrants from the 1970s onwards came for humanitarian reasons and family 
reunification. Sixty percent of immigrants in Denmark and 80 percent in Sweden came as 
refugees and asylees.4 Diverse populations are a reality in Scandinavia, and policies 




DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION LITERATURE 
 
 
The theoretical foundation of this dissertation accepts that issues of nationhood, 
state power, belonging, institutional barriers, and issues with identity politics have eroded 
the integration process for non-Western migrants in Denmark and Sweden. Scholars Peter 
Katzenstein (1985) and Ernst Gellner (1983) argued that common background and 
identity in homogenous societies such as Denmark and Sweden enhanced the ability of 




4 Grete Brochmann and Anniken Hagelund, “Migrants in the Scandinavian Welfare State,” Nordic Journal 
of Migration Research 1, no. 1 (August 1, 2011): 13–24. 
5 Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, Cornell Studies in 
Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); John L. Campbell and John A. Hall, 
“National Identity and the Political Economy of Small States,” Review of International Political Economy 
16, no. 4 (2009): 552. 
5  
shared identity helped mobilize citizens towards solutions more quickly and created a 
strong national identity and institutions that could protect the small states from 
international pressures.6 If this understanding of small homogenous societies is true, then 
institutions in small homogenous societies were established to maintain the dirty work of 
“boundary maintenance,” according to Adrian Favell (1999). Also, the politics of 
belonging are manifested in the welfare states by institutional practices that keep the 
“out-group” out while supporting the “in-group.” 
As Nira Yuval-Davis (2006) writes, the politics of belonging is sometimes 
physical, but more often symbolic and separates people into groups of “us” and “them” 
and into what Benedict Anderson (1991) called imagined communities.7 Belonging and 
the politics of belonging is similar to integration, but focuses on groups excluding new 
members and also on how comfortable or attached new arrivals feel to a host country. 
The politics of belonging involves not only members of the community creating 
boundaries by using political power and institutions to maintain their advantage, but also 
by the resistance and contestation to change presented by other agents or groups.8 
Belonging, on the other hand, suggests that people have different ways of attachment to a 
host society that can vary from feeling attached to one person to an entire country, 
belonging can be concrete or abstract, and is always a dynamic process. Furthermore, 
belonging is complex, multilayered, and can relate to social and political belonging, 
 
 
6 Ernest. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, New Perspectives on the Past (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983). 
7 Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London; New York: Verso, 1991). 
8 Nira Yuval-Davis, “Belonging and the Politics of Belonging,” Patterns of Prejudice 40, no. 3 (July 1, 
2006): 197–214. 
6  
economic belonging, emotional attachment, and a person’s identification and emotional 
attachment to a group.9 The politics of belonging maintains distinctive in and out groups 
and buttresses against feelings of belonging for newcomers. 
Non-Western immigrants in Europe have become controversial as they try to find 
a home or find belonging. Many scholars suggest that race is not a factor in how non- 
Western immigrants are treated, while other scholars outline the connection between 
racism and perceptions about non-Western immigrants having difficulty integrating into 
Western societies.10 Anti-immigrant sentiments, linked directly to the politics of 
belonging, have shifted away from issues related to the ethnic background of immigrants 
to the threat of Muslims as terrorists and people from the global south whose values are 
supposed to be fundamentally different from western Europe.11 The “threat” of new 
immigrants and their descendants was first recognized in Europe with the movement of 
the Poles to Germany, the Irish to England, and the Italians to France; however, when 
looking more closely at integration of these groups, historically Poles, Italians, and Irish 
were present in the receiving countries for centuries and often it was not just the 
immigrants who moved but also borders that shifted placing “immigrants” in new 
territories.12 Globalization has caused a new wave of migration that allowed people to 
move to entirely different continents. For example, it has only been in the past 50 years 
 
9 Ulf Hannerz, Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places (Taylor & Francis, 2002); Marco 
Antonsich, “Searching for Belonging – An Analytical Framework,” Geography Compass 4, no. 6 (2010): 
644–59; Yuval-Davis, “Belonging and the Politics of Belonging,” 5. 
10 David Theo Goldberg, “Racial Europeanization,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 29, no. 2 (March 1, 2006): 
331–64; Willem Schinkel, Imagined Societies: A Critique of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe, 
2017; Alana Lentin, Racism and Ethnic Discrimination (The Rosen Publishing Group, 2011). 
11 Leo Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe 
since 1850 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005). 
12 Lucassen. 
7  
that large populations of Eritreans moved to Sweden and Iraqis moved to Denmark. 
Migration today is marked more distinctly by the ability of more low-income earners 
from the global south with different cultures and religions to move north. 
This study aligns with bodies of work from Goldberg (2006) and Schinkel (2018) 
who illustrated how Europe has become an object of visibility where concepts of who is 
European is made-up by the statements that express it. “European” is linked to whiteness 
and Christianity when historically Europe has encompassed diverse groups of people, 
including Muslims, Africans, Jews, etc.13 Europe did not see itself as a collective group 
of people until after the atrocities of the world wars that led to the development of the 
European Union (EU).14 The creation of a European identity was positioned against 
others who were not European—particularly Muslims and North Africans. The terrorist 
attacks in the United States in 2001 and subsequent attacks in Spain and the United 
Kingdom in 2004 only exasperated tensions between Muslims, North Africans, and the 
EU.15 As more European countries joined the EU and gained access to move freely to 
other EU countries, North Africans and people from the Middle East became more 
limited in their ability to live and move freely in the EU due to their countries of origin.16 
 
 
13 Houssain Kettani, “History and Prospect of Muslims in Western Europe,” Journal of Religion and 
Health 56, no. 5 (October 2017): 1740–75. 
 
The Moors ruled Europe for 700 years from the early 8th century to the late 15th century. Moors was a term 
associated with African Berbers, Arabs, and European Muslims. Furthermore, the Roman Empire 
extended from England to all North Africa countries along the Mediterranean Sea and went to modern- 
day Syria and Iraq. 
14 Goldberg, “Racial Europeanization.” 
15 Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe and Global Salafi Jihadis,” in Jihadi Terrorism and the 
Radicalisation Challenge in Europe, ed. R. Coolsaet (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2008), 69–84. 
16 Kelly Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy, 1 
edition (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2010). 
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The governments and the local populations hotly debate immigrant and 
integration policies in Denmark and Sweden as the countries contend with accepting 
diverse groups of people and promoting its distinct culture and religious history—this is 
the politics of belonging that immigration scholars discuss regularly.17 Integration 
traditionally meant access to a country through language acquisition and cultural 
knowledge tests. Today, integration has developed to mean policies that address social 
and economic disparities present in immigrant majority communities.18 A central 
assumption in the integration literature is that integration is linked to the social and 
economic success of new arrivals.19 Many reports from the European Union, United 
Nations, and Denmark and Sweden’s national statistic agencies indicated that immigrants 
from the global south and their descendant have higher and longer term instances of 
poverty and unemployment relative to the native population in the countries. Denmark 
and Sweden, despite being successful robust welfare states that provide safety nets for 
their residents and citizens, are failing when it comes to socioeconomic integration of 
 
17 Adrian Favell, “The Development of E.U. Immigration Policy: Supranationalisation and the Politics of 
Belonging,” in Dialogues on Migration Policy (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 45–56; Natalie 
Masuoka and Jane Junn, The Politics of Belonging: Race, Public Opinion, and Immigration (Chicago ; 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Yuval-Davis, “Belonging and the Politics of Belonging”; 
Andrew Geddes, “The Development of E.U. Immigration Policy: Supranationalisation and the Politics of 
Belonging,” in The Politics of Belonging: Migrants and Minorities in Contemporary Europe, ed. Andrew 
Geddes and Adrian Favell (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1999), 176–91. 
18 Anthony B. Atkinson and Jakob Egholt Søgaard, “The Long‐Run History of Income Inequality in 
Denmark,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 118, no. 2 (2016): 264–291; Balakrishnan and Hou, 
“Socioeconomic Integration and Spatial Residential Patterns of Immigrant Groups in Canada”; 
Balakrishnan and Hou; Thesia I. Garner and Kathleen S. Short, Measurement of Poverty, Deprivation, 
and Economic Mobility (Research on Economic Inequality), Research on Economic Inequality, Book 23 
(Portland, Oregon: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015); Taryn Ann Galloway et al., “Immigrant 
Child Poverty in Scandinavia: A Panel Data Study,” in Measurement of Poverty, Deprivation, and 
Economic Mobility, ed. Thesia I. Garner and Kathleen S. Short (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited, 2015), 185–219; George J Borjas, Labor Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013). 
19 Hersi, “Concerning Immigrant Integration: A Critical Review”; Aldén and Hammarstedt, Integration of 
Immigrants on the Swedish Labour Market; Balakrishnan and Hou, “Socioeconomic Integration and 
Spatial Residential Patterns of Immigrant Groups in Canada.” 
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non-Western immigrants. This dissertation seeks to illuminate the potential causes of the 
failure of non-Western immigrants to integrate socioeconomically by examining both 
countries’ immigration and integration policies. 
This study provides a ground-level view of the connections between immigration, 
integration, and poverty. It examines the first- and second-generation immigrants in these 
countries to understand and analyze their integration experiences. It does so by 
employing both an original survey instrument as well as ethnographic fieldwork, and in- 
depth interviews. This study moreover probes the history of political attitudes towards 
immigration to Denmark and Sweden, the settlement of immigrants, and the parallel 
development of integration policies. The theoretical debates about integration in this 
study are grounded in the notion that nation-states are responding to and contending with 
cultural and religious diversity in a world that has become ever more diverse.20 The focus 
here is to provide a probable historical context for integration policies and to illuminate a 
possible connection to the resurgence of nationalism in response to growing immigrant 
populations in Denmark and Sweden. This project connects to broader debates about 
migration to Europe from the global south. It looks at how Europe can properly integrate 
new arrivals while also respecting the diverse cultural and religious backgrounds that 
non-Western immigrants bring with them. 
 
DENMARK AND SWEDEN CASE STUDIES SELECTION PROCESS 
 
In developing the study, significant thought went into which case studies to use to 
examine immigrant integration in the context of twenty-first-century Europe. At the time 
 
20 Hersi, “Concerning Immigrant Integration: A Critical Review.” 
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of this project, Denmark and Sweden had chosen entirely different stances in the 2015/16 
refugee crisis. Denmark decided to implement restrictive immigration policies that 
limited the inflow of migrants and refugees into the country, while Sweden allowed in the 
largest number of refugees and migrants in the EU compared to its population size, which 
was about 163,000 people. After further probing I learned that the countries also took 
very different integration strategies with immigrants; Denmark had extensive integration 
requirements before individuals could get residency or citizenship and Sweden had no 
integration requirements for residency or citizenship. The nature of this project seeks to 
examine differences in integration policies and control for other factors that could impact 
integration, such as differences in culture, history, and language. Comparing similar 
countries that have vastly different integration policies, illuminated previously hidden 
issues, and provided a means to understand integration problems with greater clarity.21 
Most case studies look at outliers or countries on opposite ends of a spectrum to 
understand a phenomenon. Often France is pivoted against Germany or the United 
Kingdom for comparative analysis because of the large immigrant populations who have 
moved there and the differences in their immigration and integration policies. There is an 
abundance of rich scholarly information about France, the United Kingdom, and even 
Germany.22 Instead, countries in Scandinavia provided a reliable comparison that 
controlled for history, language, and culture. These countries used different types of 
 
 
21 Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius, Controlling Immigration. 
22 See Rogers Brubaker’s Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A 
Comparative Historical Analysis (1990); Yasmin Soysal’s Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and 
Postnational Membership in Europe (1994); Adrian Favell’s Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and 
the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (2016); Christian Joppke’s Immigration and the Nation- 
State: the United States, Germany, and Great Britain (1999) 
11 
 
integration policies (assimilation and multiculturalism), yet neither have successfully 
integrated many immigrants with non-Western backgrounds—a puzzle this project 
discusses. 
The divergence in Denmark and Sweden's immigration and integration 
approaches began in 1998 when Denmark elected the Danish People's Party (DPP), an 
anti-immigrant right-wing party, into parliament in response to the refugees from the 
former-Yugoslavia and the Danes aligning themselves more closely to the United States 
in the War Against Terror in 2001. Since then, immigration and integration have become 
hugely politicized in Denmark, and policies gradually changed to be restrictive towards 
immigration with expansive integration requirements.23 The conservative government 
gained a majority votes in 2011 that they have maintained until today.24 
Sweden, on the other hand, continued with a multicultural integration approach 
and an open immigration policy until most recently. They made changes to their 
integration policies in 1990, 2007, and in 2011, but all of those changes supported 
multiculturalism and expanded resources to immigrants. It was only in 2018, a few years 
after the refugee crisis that overwhelmed Sweden's native population and immigration 
system, that a conservative right-wing party (Swedish Democrats) gained substantial 
parliamentary seats in government. Nonetheless, the liberal party, the Social Democrats 
(SD), have maintained majority seats in parliament. The policies in Sweden remain very 
 
 
23 Per Mouritsen and Christine Hovmark Jensen, “Integration Policy in Denmark,” 2014. 
24 Denmark’s liberal party (Social Democrats) in the past two years adapted anti-immigrant policies as well 
in an effort to gain control over the government. It worked, and in June 2019 the Left and Central Left 
parties gained control over the government again. The current Prime Minister is Mette Frederiksen the 
head of the Social Democratic Party. 
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liberal and multicultural towards immigrants, meaning that language or cultural 
competency has not become a requirement for immigrants to obtain citizenship or 
permanent residency. However, cultural competencies, language exams, and education 
are all required for access to the job market in Sweden since at least 2007. By taking the 
integration debate away from multiculturalist versus assimilationist policies and 
switching it to examining possible barriers in the introduction programs, as in the case of 
Sweden or integration programs as in the case of Denmark, I can illuminate other long- 
term social effects such as poverty for non-Western immigrants. 
FIELDWORK: POPULATION, PARTICIPANTS, AND PROCEDURE 
 
The project draws from methods used by political scientists, sociologists, and 
anthropologists.25 It used three different methods to study immigrant integration: 
historical analysis, a survey questionnaire, and participant observations. The historical 
research examined the development of national identities in Denmark and Sweden to 
understand how the countries developed their immigration and integration policies. It 
looked specifically at first and secondary sources such as written laws, policy documents, 
history books, newspaper articles, blogs, and journal articles to gather information about 
the countries’ policies. The survey questionnaire asked participants questions about their 
perception of integration policies in Denmark and Sweden—the goal of the survey was to 
collect opinions and experiences from the general population. The data were then 
 
 
25 I developed my case study analysis from George and Bennett, who are two leading scholars in case study 
research. I used the KKV method to understand and design scientific inquiry in qualitative research. See the 
following Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, ed. Steven E. Miller and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Fourth Printing edition (Cambridge, Mass: The 
MIT Press, 2005); Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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analyzed using modern data analytical methods. The participant observations involved 
interviews with immigrants, policymakers, and community leaders, along with my own 
documented experiences as I became a member of the communities I was studying. I 
used participant observations to collect data from non-Western immigrants and also to 
understand integration issues firsthand. 
The 12-month field research occurred primarily in Stockholm and Copenhagen 
municipalities because these cities and the surrounding suburbs have the largest number 
of people with immigrant backgrounds in both countries. The districts of particular 
interest were Mjolnerparken in Copenhagen and Rinkeby in Stockholm. The Danish and 
Swedish integration ministries consider these areas as places with large immigrant 
populations, high poverty, and high crime rates. Mjolnerparken is in North Copenhagen, 
where approximately 2,500 people live and represent 38 different nationalities from 
predominately Africa and the Middle East. The area has 98% non-ethnic Danes. Rinkeby 
is a suburb in North Stockholm that houses 15,051 residents of which 89.1% have an 
immigrant background from Africa and the Middle East. Mjolnerparken and Rinkeby are 
the most segregated neighborhoods. 
The research looked at the implications from integration theories, tested the 
implications against empirical measurements, and used the results to draw inferences 
about how to best modify the integration theories tested.26 By selecting just two cases 




26 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, ed. Steven E. Miller and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Fourth Printing edition (Cambridge, Mass: The 
MIT Press, 2005), 35. 
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conditions and procedures that were linked to successful or failed outcomes related to 
immigrant integration. Moreover, scholars, today are training in more than one research 
methodology, or at least have exposure to more than one methodology, to avoid 
limitations related to different social science methods, e.g., a very narrow view or a birds- 
eye view of the topic.27 The significance of the results from this study could help 
countries understand the gap between their integration policies’ goal and the outcomes on 
immigrant communities. 
This dissertation takes into account the history of Denmark and Sweden because 
the countries' native population's interactions with and perception of immigrants reflect 
these countries’ shared history. The study explores the constructed meanings of being 
Danish and Swedish and “belonging” that have been passed down through storytelling 
about national identity. I recognize that these research findings are interpreted based on 
opinions of immigrants, those who work with immigrants on integration, ethnic Danes, 
and ethnic Swedes who completed the surveys, and my personal experiences in the 
countries. Having this in mind, I consider that the engagement immigrants have with 
policies and their experiences are also shaped by their interactions with the media, their 
engagement with other immigrants, international politics in their native countries, and, 
surprisingly, domestic political issues happening in the United States. How people 
interact with policies is complicated, and I do not claim that this study answers all 






27 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
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integration literature by looking more closely at the implication of national myths, 
history, national identity, institutions, and the politics of belonging on policies. 
Defining Important Terms 
 
Admittedly words like immigrant and integration are complex words. For this 
project, these terms are defined using the EU's institutional organization's definitions as a 
basis.28 Immigrants, according to the EU, are individuals who migrated to a new country 
(first-generation) and individuals whose parent(s) migrated to a new country (second- 
generation). It refers to individuals regardless of their legal status as refugees, asylum- 
seekers, or citizen (if at least one parent was born abroad). The term "immigrant" can also 
be linked to a racialized word that refers to people who are not considered "white" such 
as Muslims and people from Africa, the Middle East, South America, Asia, and 
sometimes Eastern Europe.29 The word in nonracial terms signifies that someone is “not 
originally from here” in the context of Western Europe. The phrases “non-Western 
immigrant” and “immigrants from the global south” refer to individuals with origins from 
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, South America, and Eastern Europe and are used regularly 
and interchangeably in this dissertation. 
There is no consensus on a single definition for immigrant integration. 
 
Nevertheless, immigrant integration is broadly defined according to a process during 
 
 
28 The EU's definition is most relevant here because it can apply to a broad set of governments in the EU. 
Each country in the EU has its nuances, so by using a broad definition, I can apply it to a broad set of 
governments and institutions like both Denmark and Sweden. 
29 Steve Garner, “The European Union and the Racialization of Immigration, 1985-2006,” Race/Ethnicity: 
Multidisciplinary Global Contexts 1, no. 1 (2007): 61–87. 
The use of "immigrant" admittedly fails to capture accurately the generation of people born and raised in a 
country; however, it is an analytical word that describes not just a migratory past but also a category of 
people who are not perceived to be native to a territory. 
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which immigrants and minorities are incorporated into the social and economic structure 
of the host society.30 It is the process when immigrants “become accepted into society, 
both as individuals and as groups [integration] refers to a two-way process of adaptation 
by migrants and host societies [and implies] consideration of the rights and obligations of 
migrants and host societies, of access to different kinds of services and the labor market, 
and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind immigrants and host 
communities in a common purpose.”31 The specific emphasis in this project is related to 
social and economic integration for non-Western immigrants. 
I recognize that the use of "immigrant" admittedly fails to capture precisely the 
generation of people born and raised in a country; however, it is an analytical word that 
describes not just a migratory past but also a category of people who are not perceived to 
be native to a territory. I also acknowledge that discussing integration processes for non- 
Western immigrants, as Schinkel (2018) argued, is bounded in neocolonial forms of 
monitoring and resurgences of power dynamics; in this case, the subjected are monitored 
based on their ability to conform to the subject.32 Discussing integration processes for 
people who were born and/or raised in a territory is ludicrous as most of them have lived 
their entire lives in the country and are fluent in the language and know the culture. I use 
the word integration, in a similar way that I use immigrant, as an analytical term that 
describes a process of being fully incorporated into a society or belonging. I am 
 
 
30 Richard Alba and Victor Nee, “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration,” The 
International Migration Review 31, no. 4 (1997): 5. 
31 IOM International Organization for Migration, “Glossary on Migration,” International Migration Law 
(International Organization for Migration, 2011), 51. 
32 Willem Schinkel, “Against ‘Immigrant Integration’: For an End to Neocolonial Knowledge Production,” 
Comparative Migration Studies 6, no. 1 (September 25, 2018): 31. 
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examining the integration policies in this project and suggesting that integration policies 
have barriers to them that can be more limiting for non-Western immigrants than helpful. 
 
Understanding Integration Barriers in Immigrant Communities 
 
The findings from this study are a compilation of themes collected from the 
survey data, interviews, and participant observations. When I returned from a year 
abroad, I decided to first look at the trends from the survey data. I had already done 
extensive research on secondary sources and journal articles about the history of both 
countries and notes about integration, but I wanted to investigate significant themes from 
the survey responses after analyzing the surveys with Microsoft Excel, SPSS, and 
Qualtrics data analysis software. I also compared the survey findings to the observations I 
made from visiting immigrant communities and my historical analysis of the countries. 
The general finding was that policies do not often reflect their purpose and that 
policies can be trumped by practices in a society and that socially constructed ideas and 
institutions are important to integration. The study revealed five themes related to 
integration. The first was that there was not a significant difference in the perceived 
integration of immigrants in Denmark with immigrants in Sweden. Specifically, whether 
the country used a multicultural or assimilation policy did not matter or impact how 
immigrant integration was perceived. Building upon this idea that the types of integration 
policies was not important, I then examined the development of integration and migration 
policies in both countries. 
The second theme was that historical legacies and myths illuminated trends to the 
governments’ and the native populations’ responses to immigrants with non-Western 
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backgrounds. This substantial loss of power and landmass in Denmark throughout the 
middle ages could be linked to assimilation integration policies. The country, therefore, 
tends to focus on protecting it’s linguistic and cultural diversifying world.33 The Swedish 
monarch was exiled for losing Finland to Russia in 1809, and the King was replaced by a 
French military officer. The new monarch, whose line is still in power today, played a 
crucial role in building Swedish neutrality. This neutral approach has impacted modern- 
day trends in Sweden's multicultural policies and immigration policies; specifically, 
Sweden is more inclusive of diverse groups of people by not requiring integration tests. 
However, although Sweden was very neutral, it had social policies of conformity for 
refugees and asylees. 
The third finding from this project was that most respondents from the surveys 
and the interviews believed that poverty relates to structural issues in the integration 
system in Sweden, while in Denmark poverty was linked to the immigrant's cultural and 
religious background. The policies in Sweden are multicultural and support diverse 
cultures; however, the institutions and social policies required them to conform to 
Swedish cultural practices. The law of Jante (Swedish Jantelagen/ Danish Janteloven) in 
Nordic countries is a code of conduct that requires people to be modest, not be overly 
ambitious or do things out of the ordinary—anyone who does not fit the model finds it 
difficult to belong. Institutions in Sweden have this notion of conformity built into in 





33 Per Mouritsen, “The Resilience of Citizenship Traditions: Civic Integration in Germany, Great Britain 
and Denmark,” Ethnicities 13, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 86–109. 
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immigrants nonetheless must go through a government program or institution, which 
forces conformity. 
The fourth finding from the project indicates that integration barriers are 
perceived differently by immigrants and the native ethnic populations, specifically in 
Denmark policy initiatives did not always match the integration issue it was trying to 
solve. The new integration programs are problematic not only because they target people 
in specific communities, but because the policies also assume that immigrants in these 
communities are not integrated and cannot speak Danish. The survey questionnaire 
further revealed that immigrants in Denmark saw barriers to integration as related to the 
race/ethnic background of the immigrant, while the majority of ethnic Danes interpreted 
the barrier as immigrants not understanding Danish culture/values and language. In 
Sweden, the survey revealed the opposite. Immigrants said that race/ethnic background 
was not as big as a factor for immigrants as that of understanding Swedish culture and 
language. While, ethnic Swedes said that racism and discrimination was a huger barrier 
to integration for immigrants. 
The fifth theme came mostly from the interviews and suggested that successful 
integration in Denmark and Sweden was available for non-Western immigrants who 
believed in themselves or had someone else who motived them to accomplish their goals 
to go beyond limitations or structural barriers in the host societies. They practiced Jante 
Law or at least understood it enough to function in mainstream society and had a sense of 
belonging to the society. The people I interviewed were generally refugees or children of 
refugees, and they had a certain level of respect for the Danish and Sweden social welfare 
systems and governance practices. They genuinely were happy living in these countries 
20  
and bought into the ideas that Denmark and Sweden were one of the best countries to live 
in the world. They tended to take advantage of the opportunities associated with the 
universal social welfare system (i.e., universal education, and healthcare) to help them 
succeed in the host societies and in many cases beyond the capabilities of the native 
population. The findings in this study are fascinating and are detailed throughout the 
chapters of the dissertation. 
 
WHAT’S TO FOLLOW 
 
The moment immigrants move to a new society; they have to establish themselves 
in their new home. This is not only related to their physical needs of shelter and food but 
also in a cultural and social sense. How immigrants become successfully integrated into 
host societies is crucial as more than ever, people are moving and settling in different 
regions from which they were born. This project speaks to these issues of integration in 
host societies that are contending with new cultures and religions in their borders and also 
preserving the host society's traditions. The Welfare States such as Denmark and Sweden, 
in most recent years, have had to adapt to these cultural changes. New arrivals and their 
descendants face barriers to integration, particularly those coming from the global south. 
This dissertation is organized in six chapters--three chapters that discuss the background, 
framing, and conclusions of the study and three chapters that are separated by the 
research methods. 
The first chapter introduced the study, outlined the research question and terms, 
briefly described the integration literature, and concisely provided the theoretical 
grounding for the project. Chapter two explores the theoretical framework for the study 
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and describes how the project relates to prior integration and immigration research. It 
shows the relevance of the research problem to current debates about immigration and 
integration. The remaining three chapters are divided by the methods used in the study. 
Chapter three provides a historical background of the countries using secondary sources, 
government policies, and statutes to investigate integration policies from a historical 
perspective. Chapter four presents the survey data collected from participants and 
outlines in detail the findings from the surveys. There are charts, tables, and statistical 
analyses presented in this chapter of the study that discusses results from the survey 
questionnaire. Chapter five changes gears from the statistical analysis and relies heavily 
on interviews and observations I made using the participant observation method. Lastly, 
chapter six summarizes the main findings from Denmark and Sweden, and it discusses 
the implication of the results for integration in Europe and suggests policy changes. I end 
the last chapter on a positive note with the hope that immigrants in Denmark and Sweden 
will be fully incorporated into their host societies. 
Using an impressive multimethod approach, this study looks at public perceptions 
and opinions on immigration from the perspective of the host society and immigrants. 
Rather than attempting to categorize the host population as racist or nationalist, this 
dissertation argues that issues about integration policy are best understood through 
questions of who belongs to the nation and political membership. As Natalie Masuoka 
and Jane Junn (2013) highlight in their book, the relationship between citizenship, 
race/ethnic, religion, and immigration is important to the politics of belonging. The 
central aspect of understanding perceptions about immigrants begins with understanding 
the development of opinions about immigration that is embedded in the history of the 
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countries.34 Beginning with a historical analysis, the dissertation documents why 
opinions exist in Denmark and Sweden about immigrants and immigration policy, 
institutional practices, the formation of laws, and integration policies. Then, through an 
analysis of perception about immigration and integration policies among the native and 
immigrant populations, the study examines ethnic and racial identity in relation to 







































34 Masuoka and Junn, The Politics of Belonging. 
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This chapter details the theoretical framework from which the study is grounded. 
 
This dissertation takes the state as central actor and examines the development of 
integration policies in Denmark and in Sweden through theories about nation-building, 
cultural myths, and national identity. Katzenstein (1985) and Gellner (1983) argued that 
small cultural homogeneous societies have an institutional advantage to build strong 
economic systems that helps them cooperate in ways that larger societies find it difficult. 
They found that diversity such as class, ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences 
prevented social mobility prior to industrialization in small societies. The central idea for 
Katzenstein and Gellner was that a common background and identity enhanced the ability 
of people to have a strong national identity absent of cultural cleavages. This shared 
identity helped mobilize people to solutions in society more quickly and create a strong 
national identity that could protect the small states from international pressures.35  This 
led to the creation of institutions that helped small countries deal with their 
vulnerabilities—this are institutions that facilitate cooperation, sacrifice, flexibility and 
rigorous state action in the national interest. 
I suggest that with the recent demographic shifts in Denmark and Sweden in the 
past 50 years, the idea of a homogenous society to fuel economic growth no longer fits as 
a model for the countries. In fact, the institutions implemented when both countries were 
homogenous societies has become a barrier to integration for non-Western immigrants. In 
 
35 Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe; Campbell and Hall, “National 
Identity and the Political Economy of Small States,” 552. 
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other words, the same institutions that helped facilitate economic growth for the 
homogenous societies are now creating barriers and social cleavages for the diverse 
populations that undeniably exists in the countries today. The institutions that facilitated 
sameness are now placing non-Western immigrants who cannot [or do not want to] 
assimilate to the host cultures at a socioeconomic disadvantage. These diverse individuals 
who are now citizens or at least permanent legal residents and have rights in the host 
nations and a say in institutions. The topic of immigrant integration has become 
extremely important in Scandinavia as countries such as Denmark and Sweden have 
received the majority of their diverse population in the past 50 years. 
Institutions in Denmark and Sweden have created certain patterns of behavior 
related to the countries’ responses to immigrants that has been socially constructed as a 
result of shared experiences in the culture and history. Denmark and Sweden are small 
welfare states that have extensive universal welfare programs, strong economies, and a 
strong sense of equality embedded in their notion of statehood. They have similar 
histories of immigration and egalitarianism, yet they have taken on very different 
integration policies. Denmark has one of the most restrictive integration policies in 
Europe, while Sweden, although recently introduced a limit on refugees, has maintained a 
very liberal multicultural integration policy. Their differences in approach, however, has 
not yielded differences in integration for non-Western immigrants. In fact, non-Western 
immigrants in both countries are the poorest in the European Union (EU) relative to the 
native populations. This dissertation examines the integration policies in Denmark and in 
Sweden to understand why both types of policies (assimilationism and multiculturalism) 
are failing in the countries. 
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The deviation in integration policies began in 2002 when Denmark slowly made 
changes in their immigration and integration policies that tightened asylum and marriage 
laws and initiated required integration requirements for the first time in their history. 
From 1994 through today, Sweden's policies have remained mainly liberal in terms of no 
required language or cultural knowledge tests. Only after the 2015/16 Refugee Crisis has 
Sweden introduced slightly more restrictive refugee policies that limited refugees to 
5,000 as concern grew that the country had overextended itself. Given these two different 
approaches and that these are robust welfare states, it comes as a surprise that immigrants 
in both countries, particularly non-Western immigrants, are the poorest relative to the 
host population and they are the largest unemployed group in both countries. This 
primarily marks integration policies as a failure in the states as integration in Europe has 
come to mean the ability of an individual to work to earn an income, which is associated 
with lower poverty levels, education attainment, and language ability. 
Given that non-Western immigrants are the poorest in both countries, other 
factors should be considered to examine integration issues, not merely the policies the 
states have implemented. Throughout this chapter, I discuss the current debates about 
integration policies which include multiculturalism versus assimilationism, the shift to 
integration tests, and lastly, I discuss the role race/ethnicity plays in perceptions about 
immigrant integration processes. A central position here is that race/ethnicity should also 
be included in the discussion of integration because the people who are impacted mainly 
by the policies and who are the poorest in the countries are not western Europeans and/or 
Christians—the majority come from the global south. I also discuss barriers that the 
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integration policies and institutions themselves might be presenting to diverse 
populations in Denmark and Sweden. 
Immigrant Integration in Denmark and in Sweden 
 
The immigrant integration literature in Western Europe is vast; therefore, 
everything cannot be reviewed in the course of this dissertation. There are three 
interlinked areas of research that are built upon in relation to the research question. The 
literature examined here addresses the current debates about multicultural versus 
assimilationist integration policies, the transition to integration tests, and the role race 
plays in perceptions about immigrant integration processes in the context of Europe. A 
central position here is that integration in Denmark and Sweden is racialized, where the 
primary issues are race/ethnicity because the people who are impacted mainly by the 
policies immigrated from the global south and are non-Europeans and non-Christians. 
Furthermore, this research demonstrates that non-Western immigrants are subjected to 
systemic barriers in the integration process irrespective of the multicultural or 
assimilationist policies. I present here that due to institutional barriers that attempt to 
downplay or exclude diversity in both countries non-Western immigrants are often 
excluded when they cannot at least adopt Scandinavian ideology or way of life. 
Katzenstein and Gellner called homogeneity important to socioeconomic success of small 
countries, but it is also important to understand how this practice has become a barrier. 
Integration for many European politicians is the inclusion of first-and second- 
generation (and sometimes third- generation) immigrants into mainstream society. 
Integration and immigration policies are intertwined as both are the plans countries 
 
develop to incorporate new arrivals into their community. Integration has also come to 
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mean a plan of action to include descendants of immigrants with non-Western 
backgrounds socioeconomically into European society. The issue in Europe might not 
simply be the citizenship tests or the type of integration policies that a country 
implements (e.g., assimilationist or multiculturalist) but integration issues stem from 
ideas of who belongs and who does not belong in Europe. There are specific barriers that 
poor non-Western immigrants encounter from integration requirements that other 
Western immigrants and high-wage earning immigrants do not face, especially as it 
pertains to language, education, and access to higher-wage jobs. Immigration scholars 
rarely examine how integration can be achieved from the immigrant’s perspective by 
highlighting factors that contribute to barriers. 
Denmark and Sweden integration policies are evaluated in this study because they 
exemplify opposite approaches in Europe that are yielding the same results. At first 
glance, Sweden’s immigration and integration policies are the simplest in the European 
Union (EU) because there are no tests or language requirements associated with obtaining 
citizenship or residency. However, Sweden has integration requirements such as language 
classes, educational programs, cultural immersion classes, which are prerequisites for 
refugees and asylees to obtain access to the workforce. See Table 1 below. Immigration 
and integration policies are reflective of each countries’ historical, political, social, and 
economic conditions, which is the reason countries’ policies vary. 
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Yes, everyone must attend for 
residency and citizenship. Linked 
to benefits for refugees, aslyees, 
and their family members. 
Administered by the Danish Ministry 
of Integration. 
No, only refugees, asylees, and 
their family members. The program 
is voluntary, but allowance is linked 
to the program.  Administered  by 









Required for everyone. B2 Level, 
takes 2-3 years, max 5 years 
(exceptions for parental leave and 
illness). 
Voluntary for everyone, required for 
people who receive a government 
"adjustment allowance".  SFI 
courses provided  for  2-3  years, 
max 3 years  (exceptions  for 









25 questions, 20 correct to pass, 
exam is in Danish. 
 
Cultural classes and cultural 
activities if necessary. Agreements 















After program should have a job or 
attend school. If not, can attend a 
work program offered to  all 
residents and citizens. 
* Information from Denmark and Sweden government’s website for immigrants. 
**Policies are not required in Sweden, but they are linked to the adjustment allowance. 
 
INTEGRATION THEORIES ARE COMPLEX IN EUROPE 
 
The study of integration as a discipline derived initially from debates about 
immigrants who were moving from Eastern Europe to Western countries during and after 
the World Wars and the Cold War. Essential questions about citizenship came out of 
Hannah Arendt's work on human rights and the study of totalitarianism.36 Arendt posited 
that granting individuals citizenship gave them full civil and political rights in the name 






36Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1 edition (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 
1973). 
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origin or birth.37 She argued that by virtue of citizenship, stateless individuals were 
invisible because if they lost their citizenship, they could not acquire a new one.38 The 
underlying premise of this stance was that citizenship and national belonging are closely 
linked together, as citizenship marks one’s membership in a political community and 
therefore, citizenship needed to be extended to immigrants and refugees.39 
Integration policies came out of this understanding of citizenship as national 
communities wanted introductory programs to assist new arrivals adaption process in the 
host society. Some scholars argued that societies needed to be more inclusive of diverse 
groups of people and promoted multiculturalism, which pivoted foreign cultures as just as 
valid as the host culture. Others took a more traditional view and promoted the 
importance of the host culture and that newcomers needed to assimilate. The debates 
about which practice was the best for successful integration has dominated the discussion 
about immigration for the past 30 years. The first integration debates centered on 
assimilation versus multiculturalism policies. Multiculturalism is the political philosophy 
that maintains cultural and religious distinctiveness as important values to a host society. 
Multiculturalism is a "salad bowl" and "cultural mosaic" method of mixing groups 
together; each diverse member maintains its own cultural practices.40 An example of 
multicultural societies would be Canada and the United Kingdom. Assimilation, 
 
37Patricia Mindus, “The Contemporary Debate on Citizenship. Some Remarks on the Erased of Slovenia,” 
Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija Za Ustavno Teorijo in 
Filozofijo Prava, no. 9 (January 1, 2009): 29–44. 
38Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
39Peter J. Spiro, Beyond Citizenship: American Identity After Globalization (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
40Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press, 1995); 
Steven Vertovec, “Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities,” International 
Social Science Journal 50, no. 156 (June 1, 1998): 187–99. 
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however, is the opposite of multiculturalism and means that the immigrant fully adapts to 
the host country. Assimilation emphasizes the process of one-way adaptation; therefore, 
newcomers have to give up their linguistic and cultural practices to be a member of the 
new society.41 An example of the assimilationist approach is France, whereby citizens 
have a French national identity and nothing more. Assimilation means that immigrants 
should fully integrate themselves into a host country and lose most, if not all, of their 
cultural heritage in the process. Debates about which method was the best for integration 
dominated integration and migration literature from the late 1980s and into the mid-2000s 
and present day. 
How a country perceives its national identity is exemplified in policy 
requirements (multicultural or assimilation) to obtain citizenship. Countries like Sweden 
maintain that citizenship should be inclusive and relatively easy to acquire, while 
countries like Denmark put higher demands on people who want to become citizens.42 
Citizenship is, therefore, a proxy for national identity and self-understanding in some 
countries—obtaining citizenship becomes a defining factor as to whether a country is 
inclusive or exclusive towards outsiders.43 The higher the demands on the new arrival the 
greater chance that national identity is a privileged status saved for the native ethnic 
population and those who are able to assimilation—societies who implement 
assimilationist policies, therefore, extend rights to people who can pass integration 
 
41Chantal Lacroix, Immigrants, Literature and National Integration (Springer, 2010), 8. 
42 Chapter three outlines specifically why Denmark and Sweden take these different approaches to 
citizenship; Denmark, because it once was a powerful state in Northern Europe and now is the smallest 
country, is protecting its culture and language by requiring assimilation policies, while Sweden, a country 
that has become neutral because of the current French dynasty that pacified surrounding power, took on a 
multicultural policy. 
43Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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markers. Multicultural societies, however, are based on equality through rights that come 
with citizenship, not on the ability of people to integrate.44 
Both assimilationist and multiculturalist policy initiatives existed throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s. Most countries used assimilationist policies and shifted after the 
end of Communism when more Eastern European countries began joining the EU in 2004 
and again in 2007.45 Multicultural policies gave intrinsic value to racial and ethnic 
equality that was linked to human rights and democratic citizenship. Ethnic and racial 
identity was a central point for immigrants, which can be traced back to the atrocities 
committed by the Nazis during WWII. The Holocaust and the displacement of millions of 
people in Europe motivated the United Nations to create the Commission on Human 
Rights 1946,46 Which eventually became the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in 2006. The UNHCR acknowledged the right of people to move 
across national borders and seek asylum from persecution.47 The immigrant-focused 
human rights perspective expressed a clear view that the immigrant’s cultural heritage 
needed to be respected and that they should have equal access to become a citizen in a 
territory as part of their human right. The underlining perspective was that all 
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fundamental civil and political rights would allow individuals to express their culture 
without being persecuted. 
Multiculturalism was revered as the best type of integration for many years 
because it assumed and hoped that all cultures could co-exist under one nation-state. 
Immigrant communities could develop cultural centers funded by the government, dual 
citizenship was permissible, and there was affirmative action for disadvantaged groups.48 
Most countries implemented modest forms of multicultural policies, with the exception of 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, where extensive multicultural 
policies were implemented. However, in 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
British Prime Minister David Cameron said that multiculturalism had failed in their 
countries because of the numerous terrorist attacks committed by European citizens with 
immigrant backgrounds.49  As a result, Europe has become more obsessed with 
integration tests, and the tests became a precursor to membership.50 The tests ranged from 
naturalization procedures that led to the immigrant giving up their previous citizenship, to 
migration control procedures that included tests before they could have legal and long- 
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The Shift from Multiculturalism and Assimilation to Integration Indicators 
 
In most recent years, the multicultural strategies and the assimilationist strategies 
across Europe were rendered obsolete. The focus has shifted to center on “integration” 
policies that promote aspects of assimilationism. Multicultural societies were said to have 
created ethnic enclaves that left immigrants and their descendants not only open to 
radicalization but with terrible education systems, scarce work opportunities, and high- 
crime areas.52 Immigrants and the native populations were said to have lived parallel lives 
and never fully integrated with one another. There has been a resurgence of 
assimilationist policies as a result of terrorism, and the rise of right-wing parties in 
Europe and countries are making immigration policies more restrictive and requiring 
more language and cultural tests.53 Multiculturalist and assimilationist debates shifted to 
integration indicators that mark when a new arrival is successfully integrated and able to 
participate in a host society fully. 
The trend in Europe has been to adapt integration tests that examines an 
immigrant's ability to speak the language, retain the knowledge of the culture and history 
of the host country, and participate in the labor market. According to a study by Carrera 
and Wiesbrock in 2009, language tests had become widespread in Europe (26 of 33 
countries use them), but some countries like Sweden, Ireland, Cyprus, Italy, Belgium, and 
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Poland did not have language requirements.54 Cultural knowledge, assessed through civic 
tests, was required in 17 out of 33 countries. Countries like Denmark and France 
increased the difficulty of their language and country knowledge tests, in 2012 and again 
in 2016, after the various terrorist attacks in Europe and the immigration crisis in 2015.55 
Integration tests have rendered immigrant access to membership (e.g., resident, 
permanent resident, citizen) contingent on their language acquisition, cultural knowledge, 
and economic self-sufficiency.56 The integration tests show that Europe is coming to 
terms with non-Western immigrants staying; however, the tests reflect the general belief 
that integration is not just a factor of political citizenship but also a condition for societal 
membership.57 The general belief in many countries today in Europe is that to keep 
societies, integrated immigration policies must have cultural requirements linked to it 
from the start. Therefore, to have cohesive communities devoid of terrorism or ethnic 
enclaves, newcomers must adapt before obtaining residency. 
Counter research on integration tests has questioned if these efforts to test 
 
immigrants’ knowledge of host country history and practices have been successful. There 
is evidence that shows native-born citizens know less about their home countries than the 
new arrivals. In 2011, a study in Canada indicated that immigrants to Canada had more 
knowledge about the country’s history than the native-born citizens and that native-born 
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citizens would fail the knowledge test.58 Furthermore, integration tests cannot indicate 
how integrated a person could become or if they have the propensity to become 
radicalized. The same concerns applied to language tests, which many argued was a 
crucial aspect of integration. In 2008, the Finnish Minister of Migration and European 
Affairs raised concerns about the level of language proficiency that was required to be 
successful in society because, in Finland, applicants could fail the language exam and 
still be proficient enough in Finnish to succeed in their daily lives. Many argued that 
integration tests were designed to limit access to the host country.59 Nonetheless, 
integration tests still dominate immigration and integration strategies in Europe today. 
Citizenship tests, some scholars argued, were a resurgence of nationalism and 
cultural traditions, implemented by the state to assimilate newcomers into the host society 
via language, cultural knowledge, economic sufficiency, and allegiance tests.60 Tools that 
measured successful integration essentially became a means of integration—so 
citizenship or residency became the reward for successful integration after immigrants 
met specific requirements.61 Citizenship requirements could be assimilation requirements 
because they are an extension of policy legacies, citizenship traditions, and philosophies 
about newcomers.62 If a newcomer does not meet these requirements, the state has the 
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right to deny them settlement and to repatriate them into their country of birth.63 Some 
argued that these tests could be in violation of human rights laws because they place an 
intrinsic value of one culture over another, which creates cultural hierarchy systems.64 
The liberalization of immigration policies created a significant move towards universal 
personhood, many scholars thought, until a closer examination of integration policies 
revealed that they were grounded in nationalism and cultural hierarchy. 
Who are Integration Policies Targeting? 
 
With the establishment of the Schengen Agreement in 1995, concerns about 
immigrant integration have been on the political agendas of EU countries for the last 
twenty-five years. The expansion of the EU to Eastern Europeans, globalization, and the 
increasing number of migrants in Western Europe has caused significant concerns for the 
countries. Most recently integration has become a topic connected to the growing diverse 
urban communities across Europe’s major cities that have increasing poor populations 
with rising instances of gang violence, drug, and human trafficking, and homegrown 
terrorism.65 As Europe’s major cities became more diverse and globalized, multicultural 
policies that promoted specific group identities and assimilationist policies that proposed 
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a clear national identity have become challenging to achieve. Instead, a focus on the 
generic term "integration" has developed to mean learning the host country language and 
joining the workforce. The most recent integration initiatives target specifically non- 
Western immigrants and their descendants, who are statistically the poorest in Europe.66 
The European Commission conceptualizes integration as a mutual process 
whereby the immigrants and the host population participate in the process of change, but 
most of the adaptation is expected to be undertaken by the immigrant.67 Integration, 
therefore, is a complex process related to participation, and personal and social change–– 
all of which were connected not only to the newcomer adjusting to the host society but 
also to the host society adjusting to the newcomer.68 The labor market, the employer, and 
the other colleagues play a significant role in the immigrant adjusting to the new 
society—immigrants will likely learn the host language and learn about the host culture 
at work.69 Therefore I argue that integration research needs to address the native 
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government offices, workplaces, etc.) that receive newcomers. Comparative immigration 
policy rarely speaks to adjustments institutions go through to accommodate new arrivals. 
Institutions (formal and informal) play a significant role in the immigrant 
integration process. When large populations move to a new country, typically these 
immigrants are impacted by and impact labor unions, political parties, educational 
systems, etc.70 The OECD and the EU have an annual report that examines immigrant 
integration in all of these areas and most recently focused on relative poverty levels of 
immigrants in comparison to the native populations. The results are not good, particularly 
for social welfare countries such as Denmark and Sweden. They both have higher poverty 
rates compared to other OECD countries. See Figure 1 below. The rise in poverty 
amongst non-Western immigrants across Europe has motivated the EU to focus on 
reducing poverty and enhancing job opportunities for immigrants residing in member 
countries. Integration was aimed at helping newcomers adjust to their host societies; 
however, overtime integration had developed to mean incorporating non-Western 
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FIGURE 1. MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY INDEX 2015 
 
*Taken from www.mipex.edu/sweden and www.mipex.edu/denmark on February 17, 2017. 
 
Remarkably, although Sweden ranked number one for their integration policies 
according to MIPEX in 2015, a recent OECD report also in 2015 showed that 31% of 
immigrants in Sweden live in relative poverty compared to the host population while 
22% of all immigrants in Denmark live in relative poverty compared to the host 
population. Looking even closer at the percentage of non-Western immigrants in the 
countries, poverty rates rose to 25% in Denmark and an eye-popping 36% in Sweden, see 
Figure 2 below. This suggests that the actual practice of integration, at least economic 
integration for non-Western immigrants, is at stake. Denmark and Sweden ranked very 
high when it comes to overall poverty for non-Western immigrants compared to other 
OECD countries. For instance, the United States spends the least on universal social 
welfare of most OECD countries and has a 32 percent poverty rate for its immigrant 
population compared to its native-born population of 24 percent while Sweden ranked 31 
for all of its immigrant population and 36 for its non-Western society. The disparity 
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between immigrants and non-Western immigrants in Sweden and their native population 
(16% and 21% respectively) is much higher than the difference between immigrants in 
the US and their native population (6% difference). Denmark also has a very high 
percentage difference between its total immigrant population poverty levels and their 
non-Western immigrant poverty levels (9% and 12% respectively) compared to the 
United States. See Figure 2 for more details. This is an unexpected outcome because 
Denmark and Sweden’s universal welfare systems provide education, healthcare, and 
parental leave as human right for all of its residents to safeguard them from poverty. 
 










Denmark 22 18 25 13 
Sweden 31 21 36 15 
United States 32 -- -- 24 
*In percentages of the poverty rate of the population aged 16 years and over. 




A contributing factor to the high percentage of poverty rates for non-Western 
immigrants has been credited to the increase of uneducated or low-educated refugees and 
asylees who moved to the two countries since the 1990s. About 40 percent of the 
refugees and asylees came from Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan—countries whose 
educational systems had been destroyed by war.71 Many refugees and asylees arrived in 
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Denmark and Sweden without the ability to read and/or write in their native languages, 
let alone in a foreign language.72 Furthermore, the people who obtained a higher 
education from those countries could not prove their credentials because the educational 
institutions and/or government records in many cases had been destroyed. When they 
arrived in Denmark and Sweden, they not only had to meet specific language 
requirements to work in the countries, they also had to take or retake basic educational 
classes (e.g., math, writing, and reading) so that they could function in a work 
environment. This set the refugees and asylees back at least a decade before they could 
work in a basic cleaning job. Denmark’s integration process was 8-9 years long, so the 
time it took them to obtain citizenship correlated to the time it would have taken them to 
get permanent residency. 
Studies today focus on economic and labor-market access to measure integration 
because of the high poverty rates of non-Western immigrants in Europe; however, these 
factors alone do not adequately describe a picture of successful integration because none 
of these factors are mutually exclusive. For example, an immigrant child who grew up in 
a poor, segregated neighborhood could be impacted by the quality of their education, 
which can later change their access to higher education and employment prospects.73 
Failures for integrating into one domain could easily cause failures in other domains.74 
Lastly, having a job typically protects people from poverty, but this is not the case for 
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non-Western immigrants. According to the OECD's 2015 report, twenty percent of 
immigrants who are employed lived below the poverty line in Denmark and in Sweden, 
which is twice as high as the native populations. About half of all immigrant children 
lived below the poverty line, and their parents had an annual income of about 20,000 
euros ($22,225) in both countries. 
DEBATES ABOUT IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 
 
The goal of this section is to examine the policies in Denmark and Sweden to 
understand why they are getting similar integration results when the policies are very 
different. Integration policies in Denmark and Sweden were quite similar until the 2000s. 
The early onset of these changes occurred when the anti-immigrant political party, 
Danish People’s Party (DPP), was elected into government in 1998 in response to the 
many immigrants from Eastern Europe and refugees and asylees from the former- 
Yugoslavia moving to Denmark throughout the 1990s.75 The DPP, following the 2001 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon in the US, aligned 
themselves more closely with the US—Denmark was the only Scandinavian country to 
approve the US invasion of Iraq in 2002. Denmark sent troops to invade Afghanistan 
with the US in 2002, and Denmark continues to support the US's mission in 
Afghanistan.76 Immigration policies in Denmark gradually became more restrictive with 
expansive integration requirements, while policies in Sweden generally remained the 
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same. To establish a clear picture of the policies, the history of migration to these 
countries must be reviewed. 
The migration histories of both Denmark and Sweden are the same in many 
respects. During the 1950s, there was a significant push to recruit laborers to help in the 
various manufacturing industries in both countries. Sweden hired laborers primarily from 
Finland, Italy, the former-Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey; laborers in Denmark came 
mainly from the former-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Morocco. Open labor 
migration laws ended in Scandinavia by1975 as the international market retracted with 
the 1973 Oil Crisis. After 1975, labor migration ended, and immigration shifted to family 
reunification and refugees/asylum seekers.77 The groups who came were asylum seekers 
and refugees primarily from the former-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia 
according to the Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2012. The movement of people from these 
countries to Scandinavia was a result of the changes to the UNHCR’s policies in 1967 
that removed both the “temporal and geographic” restrictions of “refugee status” from 
groups outside of Europe.78 Scandinavian countries received the majority of their diverse 
populations from refugees and asylees who primarily immigrated just 50 years ago. 
Policies in Denmark and Sweden were very generous to immigrants, but as the 
economies experience market stresses and international security issues became prevalent, 
immigrants presented a real threats to the countries national security and Denmark and 
Sweden’s policies started to diverge. 
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The divergence in immigration policies in Denmark and Sweden was most 
noticeable when in 2002 the newly conservative Danish government stopped family 
reunification for spouses under 24 years old.79 This rule came along with a law that 
required the couple to have a combined connection to Denmark that exceeded any 
attachment to another country. The Danish resident also had to have the financial means 
to provide for arriving family members. The government collected collateral (the most 
recent amount in 2019 is 102,000 DKK equivalent to $15,334) from the couple to put in 
an escrow just in case the foreign spouse needed financial assistance from the 
government.80 The 24-year rule applied to all residents in Denmark who were seeking 
residency for a foreign partner based on family reunification; however, it 
disproportionately impacted non-EU and non-EEC (European Economic Community) 
immigrants who had been in Denmark compared to native-born residents and also 
individuals who could not afford that financial collateral for the government. As a result 
of the policy changes, there was a drastic reduction in the number of marriage immigrants 
to Denmark and also asylum and refugee applications.81 While Denmark was becoming 
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Integration policies in both Denmark and Sweden were also largely the same until 
the early 2000s. It became apparent that the newer non-Western immigrants were not 
succeeding in the Danish and Swedish labor markets. Debates ensued as to why this was 
occurring in welfare states that had high social assistance programs. The research found 
that immigrants' low employment rates, coupled with their high dependence on 
government subsidies, created high situations of poverty.82 As a result, questions 
developed throughout Scandinavia about welfare rights and work incentives for 
immigrants. Three essentials ideas emerged from this time, which included: changing 
benefits systems for immigrants to incentivize them to work, creating training programs 
for immigrants, and facilitating better language acquisition programs.83 The programs 
targeted both immigrants and refugees/asylees who were already in the countries and 
future newcomers. Denmark implemented all of the policy initiatives while Sweden 
implemented voluntary language and training programs. 
Significant divergence in integration policies between the two countries occurred 
when Denmark implemented a Start Help allowance for refugees and asylees. The Start 
Help program was introduced in Denmark in 1999 with the new Integration Act. This 
program created a mandatory introduction program for all non-EU immigrants, and the 
program provided a government allowance specifically for immigrants at a value below 
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the social allowance benefits for Danish citizens.84 They did not succeed, and the 
previous program for immigrants was restored a year later. In 2002 the Start Help benefit 
was re-introduced, and it again reduced the government allowance for immigrants to 35% 
below the subsidy given to Danish citizens—and as of 2019, the percentage has reduced 
further to 50% compared to what Danish citizens in need receive as a cash benefit.85 In 
comparison, Sweden implemented a social benefit allowance program in 1994 
specifically for refugees and asylees, however, it was the same cash benefit that Swedish 
citizens received. Interestingly, although immigrants in Denmark and Sweden received 
different allowances, the poverty level for immigrants are the same. Therefore, the 
difference in the allowance for immigrants versus citizens does not account for poverty 
levels in the countries. 
The only similarity between the integration programs in Denmark and Sweden 
was the contents of the work training requirements, the dependence of non-Western 
immigrants on the low government stipend, and the language requirements for 
integration. A major difference was that the integration program was mandatory for all 
immigrants in Denmark and voluntary for immigrants in Sweden. Although Sweden still 
does not have integration requirements to obtain citizenship or residency, it does continue 
to have integration requirements that new arrivals can voluntarily undertake, which are 
highly suggested and linked to social allowances for refugees and asylees. The content of 
both integration programs in Denmark and in Sweden required 2-3 years of full-time 
 
 
84 Brochmann and Hagelund, “Migrants in the Scandinavian Welfare State.” 
85 Peder J. Pedersen, “Immigration and Welfare State Cash Benefits: The Danish Case,” International 
Journal of Manpower 34, no. 2 (2013): 113–25. 
47  
participation in language courses, cultural knowledge courses, and work-related 
training.86 The difference in the programs from a government administrative perspective 
was that it was mandatory for the municipalities in Denmark to implement the integration 
programs by the central government with full funding whereas in Sweden the central 
government made it voluntary for the municipalities to do integration programs and 
provided general guidelines and very little funding from the central government.87 The 
Swedish government also gave more control to the local municipalities while the Danish 
governments heavily regulated requirements for the program. Nonetheless, the way the 
programs were administered and the voluntary nature versus the required nature of the 
programs did not have a significant impact on immigrants because the countries’ 
socioeconomic integration yields similar results. 
Factors that contributed to long-term poverty was the length of time it took to 
complete the integration programs. Although the government provided stipends for 
immigrants, those stipends met the basic living costs of people who received them. I go 
into more detail about what social allowances cover in Chapter 3. To mention briefly, 
government allowances in both countries provide the minimum costs it takes to live in 
Denmark and Sweden. Furthermore, immigrant women with children were more 
negatively impacted by integration policies than immigrant men. This is because women 
and children were subjected to lower incomes longer than men. For instance, women in 
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Denmark and in Sweden have a right to take parental leave for up to 50 weeks (11.5 
months) in Denmark and 480 days (16 months) in Sweden per child. Since newly arrived 
immigrant women typically do not have an extensive work history in the host countries, 
they are likely to receive the governments' minimum allowance for parental leave longer 
placing them and their children in situations of long-term poverty. They also need to meet 
the integration requirements, so it will take them one or two years longer per child to 
achieve all integration requirements. In fact, immigrant women are the poorest 
demographic in Denmark and Sweden.88 The new integration strategy implemented by 
both countries in 2019 is trying to tackle the disparity amongst immigrant women from 
the global south. This discussion highlighted that there are barriers to integration for 
immigrant women. 
THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
The theoretical starting point of this analysis begins with the understanding that 
integration is often linked to labor market performance for immigrants, which is impacted 
by language ability and educational attainment. In addition, institutional structures and 
perceptions about diverse groups in the host society are essential barriers to labor market 
mobility.89 This concept of barriers is particularly crucial in host countries that have not 
historically been exposed to large non-Western groups of people. The underlying 
assumption of institutional barriers theory is that policies, procedures, and/or situations 
systemically disadvantage certain groups of people over other groups of people and exist 
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when there is a situation of majority-minority group dynamics.90 When an initial 
population is very similar, systems naturally emerge to meet the needs of that population; 
however, when there are changes in the population, and the systems do not change to 
meet the needs of the new demographics, the old policies can hinder the success of the 
new members with different needs. The central position here is that integration policies in 
Scandinavian countries have not met the requirements of the actual demographics of 
people it is intended to serve. Instead, the policies have helped to become barriers to 
integration, specifically with the length of education and language training programs, 
performance-based integration programs linked to social welfare, and housing placement 
programs. By examining the policies more closely, one could outline the various 
hindrances to socioeconomic integration. 
Institutional barriers theory typically applies to theories related to path 
dependency and the resistance to change in public and private organizations.91 It has also 
been applied to institutional barriers based on gender, sex, race/ethnicity, religion, and 
age. Rarely are integration issues discussed in terms of the obstacles that integration 
policies might present to new arrivals in Europe who immigrated from non-Western 
backgrounds. There are theories that explain barriers to immigration which are based on 
preventing certain groups from migrating from or entering another country based on a 
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government’s policies, but rarely are integration policies discussed in light of barriers that 
they present to certain groups of people. As discussed in the previous section, the 
consequences of stricter integration policies in Denmark since 2002 has not created 
significant change in the immigrant (particularly refugee and asylee) participation in the 
labor force.92 The integration policies in Sweden, which were voluntary and not 
restrictive, also did not positively impacted immigrants’ access to the labor market and 
higher incomes. 
Structural issues in the incentivized programs in Denmark and in Sweden could 
have impacted integration chances for refugees and asylees. Economic theories suggest 
that restricting government social allowance will help improve immigrants' access to 
employment. However, when Denmark implemented these policies, it had minimal 
impact on the socioeconomic status of non-Western immigrants. The central aim of 
Denmark's integration policies has consistently been to decrease non-Western 
immigrants' dependence on social allowance and increase their role in the workforce.93 
Denmark succeeded in this endeavor as non-Western immigrants have higher 
employment rates; however, the integration policies rushed to place non-Western 
immigrants into any job, which happened to be low-wage work such as cleaning and 
caregiving.94 The integration policies inadvertently pigeon-holed non-Western 
immigrants into low wage jobs that provided relative lower earnings compared to the 
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native population. In some cases, the low-wage salary was the same as the social welfare 
allowance from the government; therefore, there was no real incentive to work, and 
working did not necessarily reduce poverty levels.95 The requirements of the integration 
programs were also hindrances to the non-Western immigrants in Sweden. 
Since 1968, Sweden implemented policies that gave immigrants access to the 
welfare state on the same basis as the native population. The idea was that allowing new 
arrivals access to the Swedish system would promote egalitarianism, which is a core 
principle of Swedish neutrality and social welfare model.96 By 1975 the Sweden 
Parliament unanimously approved the Government Bill 1975/76:26 that promoted 
equality, freedom of choice, and partnership. Sweden supported rights-based citizenship 
based on belonging to a national community, not a racial/ethnic or religious group.97 The 
integration requirement in Sweden supported full membership in Sweden and also 
created the expectation that immigrants would be self-sufficient. Social welfare programs 
for immigrants were explicitly linked to the goal of full employment and economic 
growth.98 Government allowances were linked to integration measures and participation 
in the workforce.99 Sweden maintained multicultural policies that supported immigrants 
maintaining their cultures and language with funding from the government. 
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Immigrant introduction programs were introduced in Sweden in 1994, and they 
offered language and educational programs. If new arrivals did not participate in the 
programs, their government allowance could be reduced or withdrawn. In 2010, the 
integration policy became mandatory in order to receive government assistance with the 
introduction of the Government Bill 2009/10:60 that transferred the responsibility to the 
central government to enforce the law, not simply the municipalities.100 The integration 
program was required if immigrants received government assistance; otherwise, the 
actual program was not mandatory. The program primarily referenced refugees and 
asylees who typically came to Sweden with minimal means and needed government 
assistance. Therefore, in effect, the plan was mandatory for refugees and asylees who 
moved to the country with no financial means to support themselves. In the same way 
that the labor policy negatively impacted the Danish population, it had a negative impact 
on the Swedish population because non-Western immigrants once again were shuttled 
into low-wage jobs such as cleaner, gas station attendants, and caretakers. 
Although many countries in Europe were moving towards integration that 
promoted civic integration (often called assimilation),101 Sweden’s model was different 
because it did not require participation in an integration program as a prerequisite to 
citizenship or residency. The requirement for residency and citizenship in Sweden has 
been stipulated at 5 years since 1975, and in 1991 Sweden liberalized its policies to allow 
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sanguinis).102 The integration in Sweden, in terms of the set requirements for access to 
citizenship, continues to be the complete opposite of Denmark that demands integration 
requirements linked to residency and citizenship rights as demonstrated in Table 2. Their 
citizenship and residency requirements did not hinder socioeconomic integration like 
their actual integration policies. 
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One of the significant ways that non-Western immigrants were limited in Sweden 
was through their housing resettlement policy for refugees. Humanitarian, residential 
placement programs for refugees and asylees systemically placed immigrants in low- 
income areas with larger communities of low-wage earners and people on government 
allowances. More than half of a million people in Sweden live in low-income areas 
around the country, and the majority of them are immigrants and their descendants.103 
Similar parallel societies exist in Denmark—as more than 50 percent of people living in 
low-income areas are non-Western immigrants and their descendants, and at least 40 
percent living there are unemployed.104 The integration programs placed refugees and 
asylees into neighborhoods that had been traditional hubs for low-income earners (even 
Danish and Swedish citizens) and places that had a high proportion of non-Western 
immigrants since the 1980s.105 The residential restrictions have been linked to major 
structural, systemic issues as non-Western immigrants largely lost opportunities to 
develop interethnic social contacts with the native populations,106 and, they had lower 
standards in elementary and high school educational achievements.107 As a result of 
lower education attainment, refugees and asylees had less access to higher education, 
which impacted jobs that they could get in the future. This is not to say that immigrants 
did not choose to live in neighborhoods that reflected their diverse culture and religious 
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values, as is often the case with immigrant groups, nor that ethnic communities are not 
integrated. However, the role of the government in settling groups in similar areas also 
influenced spatial segregation, and education and income levels tend to be lower in these 
areas, which influenced integration. 
The Danish and Swedish integration policies were similar in that they provided 
economic incentives to new arrivals to participate. The similarity suggests that the 
connecting factor hindering integration is the integration programs themselves and the 
economic incentives presented by the governments. The biggest systemic issue with the 
programs is that they disproportionately placed immigrants in low-income housing and 
therefore, poor-performing schools. The Danish and Swedish labor markets are not good 
at absorbing large numbers of low-wage low skilled workers because jobs of that nature 
simply do not exist in large quantities in the countries. There are few jobs for people who 
do not at least have a high school diploma, and the mid-income jobs are typically guarded 
by unions. This creates a problematic situation for non-Western immigrants who are not 
highly qualified to get into the job market. Some people blame racism/discrimination, and 
others say that it is the lack of cultural integration. Both of these factors might be at play 
to some extent, but the systemic structures in government and societies are often difficult 
to fix. One cannot simply dismiss the economic systems and structures that have been 
instrumental in dismantling poverty for the majority of people dwelling in those 
countries. The point of this dissertation is to highlight how boundaries have been at play 
in both countries' integration policies. 
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The Role of Race/Ethnicity in Scandinavian Societies 
 
The previous survey of the different approaches to the study of integration 
highlights how current literature remains deafeningly silent about the role race/ethnicity 
plays in integrations policies. Most Scandinavians link racism to the US because of its 
history of slavery and Jim Crow laws and to South Africa because of a history of 
apartheid that separated people on the grounds of race. In fact, the issue of racism and 
discrimination seems to have disappeared from the history of most Europeans countries 
(with the exception of countries such as France and the United Kingdom). The only 
collective memory of racism in Europe is linked to nationalism in the early 20the century 
associated with Nazi-Germany when many Jews, Poles, and other minority groups were 
brutally murdered and displaced because of their ethnic and/or religious backgrounds.108 
Beyond this issue of nationalism, there seems to be cultural and historical amnesia across 
Europe, and particularly Scandinavia, associated with their role in the racial hierarchy 
and the slave trade. 
Most countries in Europe participated in the trade of human beings from Africa, 
South Asia, and South East Asia for labor, goods, and capital. Denmark and Sweden also 
joined in the slave trade. Denmark owned the U.S. Virgin Island that was called the 
Danish West Indies until 1917. Denmark agreed to end the trading of enslaved people in 
1792, but slavery did not end in the Danish West Indies until a major slave revolt 
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the US bought the Danish West Indies from Denmark and renamed it the US Virgin 
Island. The Danish Empire had colonies, forts, and trading posts throughout Europe, 
Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean which generally ended in 1917, but still exists in 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands.109 Sweden also had colonies in West Africa (Ghana, 
Butri, etc.), in the US (Delaware), and the Caribbean (Tobago and Saint-Barthélemy). 
The Swedish colonial system ended in 1878. Denmark and Sweden have similar histories 
of colonialization and slave trade to many other European countries; however, their role 
in the slave trade was not as expansive as other countries such as the UK, Spain, France, 
and Portugal. Therefore, the historical impact of slavery and racial hierarchical systems is 
often not recognized or understood by Scandinavians because the effects of colonialism 
and racism took place in the colonies themselves and not in Scandinavia.110 
Today, with the development of technology and the establishment of human rights 
laws, people from the global south have moved to Europe for economic reasons and for 
humanitarian reasons. The massive migration of people from the global south to 
Scandinavia has become a central issue because, for the first time in history, 
Scandinavians have large numbers of visibly different and non-Judeo-Christians in their 
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and Jews have not historically lived in Denmark and Sweden, but that Africans, Asians, 
and people from the Middle East have now moved to the region at higher numbers than 
ever before. As a result of these demographic shifts, Scandinavia has become more 
ethnically and religiously diverse, and questions of race and certain privileges ascribed to 
being European and Nordic arguably has begun to manifest.111 Institutions such as 
healthcare and education that once were thought to promote equality are now showing 
signs of discrimination at least for new arrivals who are not of European or Western 
descent.112 Denmark and Sweden historically eradiated their countries of inequalities 
related to socioeconomic class and rights for women, but race scholars from the region 
argued that the states now need to recognize their racialized past so that new arrivals 
from the global south have a better chance at integration.113 
It has been only in the past 50 years that Scandinavians have dealt with large- 
scale immigration from the global south; however, ideas about racial hierarchy was very 
prevalent in the region during the early twentieth century. Many of the ideas associated 
with racial hierarchy came from Scandinavia and specifically Sweden when it developed 
the first institute in the world that studied racial biology in 1922 under the leadership of 
Herman Lundborg.114 The National Institute for Race Biology gathered statistics and 
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photographs to categorize the racial-make-up of human beings and developed racial 
categories of people. Lundborg, however, was ousted from his position in 1926 because 
of his vision of Nordic white supremacy and his anti-semantic views.115 In the following 
years, the institute moved away from racial profiling and towards genetics. Eventually, 
the institute was integrated into Uppsala University where more than 63,000 people were 
forcibly sterilized. The majority of people sterilized were from the Sami indigenous 
group, Swedish Roma, and people with mental and physical disabilities. The institute no 
longer exists, but many Scandinavian scholars argued that the impact remains. 
A cornerstone to Nazism was the belief in the superiority of the Nordic race.116 In 
1937 Joesten highlighted that the Nazi conception of racial superiority was built upon the 
connection Nazi-Germans made to the Vikings from the Nordic region. Joesten’s article 
in Foreign Affairs said that the Nordic man was believed to "incarnate everything that 
was beautiful, strong, noble, and pure. He was of handsome stature and shape, with a 
straight nose and a square chin, dreamy yet steely blue eyes, blond hair, and a mailed 
fist." Although Scandinavia countries generally did not have hierarchal systems based on 
race and ethnicity in the countries with their strong social welfare models, the notion of 
racial superiority still existed in the general understanding of themselves in relation to 
other groups.117 Scholars have argued that racial superiority; however, has been replaced 
with the view that Europeans have cultural advantage over other groups. 
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Most recently, scholars have examined racism in light of immigration policy- 
making and gave particular attention to the ways that asylum-seekers have become the 
racialized group in Europe in the construction of national identity narratives.118 
Integration issues have been linked to the native population’s general negative attitudes 
towards outsiders who come from the global south, and these negative attitudes towards 
immigrants have increased with the number of terrorist attacks in Europe. 119 Since the 
early 2000s combating terrorism has dominated collective EU foreign policy as it 
concerns immigration.120 A big concern is that by providing sanctuary to Muslim 
immigrants, there is a potential to blindly support militants or people who might later 
become homegrown terrorists.121 Intertwined with these issues have emerged notions of 
cultural superiority, and that by way of liberalism everything Western is interpreted as 
superior to other cultures and systems.122 For instance, a university degree earned in 
Australia is perceived to be more valuable than a degree earned in Syria. 
It will take an immigrant from the global south more time, especially if they come 
from a poor background in their home country, to become integrated into Western 
countries compared to immigrants from western countries. Denmark and Sweden, and 
most Western countries have fast-tracked immigration and integration policies for people 
who meet income, education, and labor market demands. These individuals tend to be 
 
118 Garner, “The European Union and the Racialization of Immigration, 1985-2006.” 
119 Eduardo Bonilla‐Silva, "This is a White Country: The Racial Ideology of the Western Nations of the 
World-System," Sociological Inquiry 70, no. 2 (2000): 188–214; Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism without 
Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2006). 
120 Bleich, “Muslims and the State in the Post-9/11 West: Introduction.” 
121 Sarah K. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of 
Humanitarian Aid (Cornell University Press, 2005). 
122 McEachrane, “Universal Human Rights and the Coloniality of Race in Sweden.” 
61  
middle or high-income earners from the global north. Western immigrants are, therefore 
rewarded with easier integration policies while non-Western poor immigrants are not. See 
the integration requirements in Table 1 above. Immigrants in Denmark can apply for 
residency after 4 years if they meet certain income and education requirements while 
refugees and asylees can apply for permanent residency after 8 years. The policies in 
Sweden are more relaxed, but wealthier immigrants can apply for permanent residency 
after 4 years, and they do not have to meet integration requirements because they are not 
reliant on government subsidies. This points to issues surrounding superiority complexes 
if not based on race/ethnicity then on wealth and connectedness to western cultures.123 
In this brief discussion on race/ethnicity in Scandinavia, I wanted to establish that 
discrimination based on ethnic and/or religious backgrounds might be a barrier to 
integration. This does not negate the fact that humanitarianism has been the backbone of 
Scandinavian countries as they have provided generous aid to numerous countries around 
the world and have had extreme success in their social welfare programs. However, 
racism and discrimination should be considered when looking at the disproportionate 
number of non-Western immigrants living in relative poverty in Denmark and in Sweden. 
Chapter 4 goes into a deeper discussion of discrimination from the perspective of 
immigrants and the host societies to outline how the perspectives vary significantly 
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RESEARCH STRATEGY, DESIGN, AND PROCEDURES 
 
This section presents the design and specific procedures used to conduct the 
study. Political Science is a field that uses a variety of methods to explore questions about 
the world around us.124 To find a fuller and more detailed picture of this project, I 
employed both quantitative and qualitative research strategies. As a person who enjoys 
statistical analyses of large datasets, I also understand that large-N studies cannot 
generally provide the nuanced view that analyzing specific case studies can provide. With 
this project, I wanted to dig deeper and find the underlying structures, mechanisms, and 
processes of integration policies in Denmark and in Sweden. Therefore, I employed three 
different research methods deriving from political science, sociology, and anthropology. 
Often in research, the process of discovery is just as valuable as the research project in 
itself. A key aspect of this project are the diverse methods I used in the project. I used 
historical analysis, participant observation, and a survey questionnaire. 
The first stage relied on primary and secondary sources to support the preliminary 
background aspect of my emersion process and the second stage involved implementing 
my research plan and collecting data. I interviewed people with immigrant backgrounds, 
spent significant time in immigrant majority communities, and spoke to representatives at 
integration agencies and nonprofits to help structure my research questions and strategies. 
I participated in two summer schools that focused on integration after the refugee crisis in 
Europe; one was the Oslo Summer School in Comparative Social Science Studies at the 
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University of Oslo in 2016, and the other was a Faculty Seminar in Berlin, Germany 
called "Germany, Europe, and the Refugee Crisis." I learned extensively about the 
Refugee Crisis in 2015/2016. I further cultivated my knowledge of the region by 
analyzing the historical evolution of the integration and immigration policies in Denmark 
and Sweden and the politics that surrounded state-building and national identity in 
relation to immigrants. 
The second stage of this research process occurred when I spent an intensive year 
from 12-months in Denmark and in Sweden doing fieldwork on immigrant integration. I 
gathered information using interviews, survey questionnaires, and I embedded myself in 
the immigrant community. I spent the first rigorous six months (August - January) in 
Denmark and the last intensive six months (January-July) in Sweden. The data were 
collected with funding from the United States Fulbright-Schuman Program and the 
Diversity Excellence Scholarship from the University of Oregon. Data collection 
involved participant observation in the most significant immigrant neighborhoods in 
Copenhagen (Mjølnerparken) and in Stockholm (Rinkeby-Tensta). I used a variety of 
research techniques to gather data to discuss complex issues related to integration. This 
study is an exploratory story that uncovers trends in the effectiveness or ineffectiveness 
of integration policies. 
Fieldwork: Population, Participants, and Procedure 
The concept of integration, as discussed in this dissertation, is the ability for 
immigrants to establish themselves economically and socially in a host country to the 
same degree as the host country's native population. The concept of integration policy is 
different in Denmark and in Sweden. The Danish government sees integration as a set of 
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policies that helps immigrants adapt to Danish culture and values so that they can be the 
same as Danes or at the minimum accept Danish way of life as the most important in 
their transitional process. Accepting Danish culture means that displays of religion, 
culture, or traditional dress are secondary to showing allegiance to the collective identity 
of being Danish. The Swedish government interprets integration as a set of rights that 
provide equal opportunities for immigrants to establish themselves in Sweden at the same 
level as the native population. It is based on giving immigrants support in the form of 
rights associated with language training, education obtainment, and job placement to help 
them be successful in the country. It is a rights-based system in Sweden while in 
Denmark, it is a system to facilitate sameness. To get at the heart of perceptions related to 
integration practice and policies in Sweden and Denmark, I collected survey data and 
interviewed the general population. 
The interviews were done with people on various dates and times between 
September 2017 and July 2018. The interviews lasted approximately 60 minutes. The 
majority of interviews were conducted face-to-face in people’s homes or in their 
workplace with the exception of one phone interview and one Skype interview. Most of 
the interviews were audio-recorded. The interviews had semi-structured questions at the 
beginning of the interview and ended with a set of open-ended questions about 
integration practices. Open-ended questions were used to give the participants the ability 
to respond freely to specific themes related to their thoughts about integration and 
immigration policies. Policymakers were not included in the interviews as the purpose of 
this project was to get perspectives from people impacted by integration and immigration 
policies. Questions for the participants specifically focused on their experiences with 
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integration as a concept in their everyday lives in their communities. The only so-called 
elites interviewed in this study were community leaders, non-governmental organization 
(NGO) leaders, and people such as immigration attorneys, social workers, and language 
instructors who all worked directly with immigrants. They were asked their perspectives 
on the success of integration policies. The interview questions are in Appendix A. All of 
the respondents were living in Denmark or Sweden. 
The survey tool I created was based on observations, interactions, and interviews I 
had with various people in Denmark and Sweden. I wanted to get a broader look at 
perceived integration, so I used a survey questionnaire to gather a large amount of 
information quickly. The complete survey questionnaire is in Appendix B. The survey 
had 45 questions and took respondents 15 minutes to complete. The questions were 
available in English, Danish, and Swedish. Survey data were collected using Qualtrics 
Research Survey Software online. The survey respondents were first recruited using the 
snowball method, however, when I realized that the survey data collection process was 
going slowly, I purchased a sample of 500 respondents (250 in Denmark and 250 from 
Sweden) through Qualtrics from Survey Sampling International LLC (SSI).125 This gave 
me access to a panel of individuals in Denmark and in Sweden would be willing to 
complete the survey, with an incentive of award points towards their miles. Qualtrics sent 
my survey to the general population in both countries. The survey data collection process 
went from November 1, 2017, through December 20, 2017, and included 1039 
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participants, about 500 from each country and half of which were collected using the 
snowball method. The respondents used their personal computers or mobile devices 
(laptops, cellphones, etc.) to complete the online questionnaire. 
My personal experience in both Denmark and Sweden informed this project in 
many ways. I found myself welcomed in both countries by the immigrant populations to 
the extent that I felt like I truly belonged. I also felt embraced by Danes and Swedes who 
wanted to share their perspectives with me about immigrant integration. Chapter 5 
reflects my personal experiences. Most of which comes through in the references to 
specific interviews I did with various people. My research was informed by the 
participates and observations I made—including the survey tool I created. This project 
also reflects the experiences that I had and the experiences I saw displayed in front of me. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter featured the theoretical framework from which the dissertation is 
based. Like everywhere in the world, immigration in Scandinavia has become an 
important topic in recent years. Denmark and Sweden share important factors in how they 
respond to immigration in relation to the rest of the world. They both are small welfare 
states that have strong universal welfare programs and strong open economies embedded 
into their notions of statehood. They have similar histories of immigration and 
egalitarianism yet, despite this, they have taken on different integration policies. 
Denmark has introduced assimilationist policies while Sweden continues to have 
multiculturalist policies. Their different approaches have grasped the attention of 
scholars, politicians, and the media in the past decade. 
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As mentioned previously, the divergence in policies began in 2002 when 
Denmark made incremental changes in their policies that tightened asylum and marriage 
laws, and they introduced comprehensive integration policies. From the 1990s through 
today, Sweden's policies have largely remained the same. Only after the 2015/16 Refugee 
Crisis has Sweden introduced more restrictive asylum policies as concern grew over too 
many refugees and asylees in the country. Integration policies in both Denmark and 
Sweden have proven to be ineffective because immigrants in both countries, particularly 
non-Western immigrants, are the poorest relative to the host population and they are the 
largest unemployed group in both countries. Integration has come to mean the ability of 
an individual to earn an income, which is associated with lower poverty levels, education 
attainment, and language ability. 
Since immigrants are the poorest in both countries, the general belief is that they 
are not integrated at least socially and economically. This suggests that assimilation and 
multicultural integration policies might not be an essential factor in immigrant 
integration. The literature review examined current debates about integration policies: 
multiculturalism versus assimilationism, the shift to integration tests, and the role race 
play in perceptions about immigrant integration processes. A central position here is that 
race/ethnicity should also be included in the discussion of integration because the people 
who are primarily impacted by the policies and who are the poorest in the countries are 
not western Europeans and/or Christians—the majority come from the global south. 
Finally, I recognize that the research findings in this project are interpreted based 
on opinions of immigrants, those who work with immigrants on integration, ethnic Danes 
and Swedes who completed the surveys, and my personal experiences in the countries. I 
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understand that the way people interact with policies is complicated and I do not claim 
that this study answers all questions about integration; however, this study does 
contribute immigrant integration literature by opening the black box of the state apparatus 
to look at how human beings are impacted by foreign and domestic policies. The next 
chapters in the dissertation will further discuss the research findings in this study. 
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Denmark and Sweden share a history, they have a similar language and culture, 
but they both took distinctive paths towards their immigrant and integration policies. The 
history of Scandinavia tells the story of two dominant kingdoms, Denmark and Sweden, 
that united against the powerful Germanic groups spread across their territories. The 
union was facilitated by a woman, Queen Margarethe of Denmark, in 1387 and lasted for 
130 years. This was the first time in Scandinavia's history that the Viking clans and the 
royal families were not fighting for power. Under the Kalmar Union (1387-1523) 
Scandinavia had individual kingdoms, e.g., Danes, Swedes (Finns were part of Sweden), 
and Norwegians but they were all subject to the Danish Royal crown. Denmark became 
the most powerful kingdom in Northern Europe for almost one hundred and fifty years. 
Denmark lost its hegemon status to Sweden, which directed Denmark into a downward 
spiral of loss that eventually led the country to be occupied by Germany during the 
Second World War. The long history of loss and defeat caused Denmark to have a closed 
society towards foreigners and immigrants as a protection mechanism. 
Sweden rose to power as Denmark’s power dwindled over the centuries. Sweden's 
status as the most powerful country in Northern Europe was solidified with its military 
success against the Holy Roman Empire that led to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 
Sweden gained control of the Baltic Sea and additional territories in the Baltic region. 
Sweden remained the hegemon of the north until Russia began to make military gains in 
the 18th century. Ultimately, Russia annexed Finland from Sweden after a military defeat 
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in 1809. The military, aristocrats, and government in Sweden blamed the royal family for 
the loss and exiled them from the kingdom. They replaced the dynasty with Jean Baptiste 
Bernadotte the Marshal of Napoleon’s army. Jean Baptiste was renamed King Karl 
Johan, and his dynasty remains the ruling dynasty in Sweden today. King Johan led the 
way for Swedish neutrality as he had to manage international diplomatic relationships 
with the powerful nations at the time such as Russia, the United Kingdom, and Germany. 
As a result of the histories of Denmark and Sweden, this chapter presents that the 
countries developed a specific response to immigration based on their early modern 
history. Denmark has chosen an assimilationist approach to integration that required new 
arrivals to leave their cultural and linguistic backgrounds at the border to foster 
immersion into the state’s apparatus. Denmark's model reflects the country's desire to 
maintain its very existence because of the massive territory and influence it lost over the 
centuries. Sweden, however, supports multicultural integration by allowing new arrivals 
to maintain their own linguistic and cultural backgrounds and Sweden’s requirements to 
establish residency and citizenship is the shortest amount of time in Western Europe. 
Sweden’s multicultural policies reflect the neutrality that King Karl Johan implemented 
in 1810 as he was juggling his new role as king and his relationships with the dominant 
powers at the time. 
This is chapter highlights that the change in Danish and Swedish national 
identities shaped both countries' immigration and integration policies. This is similar to 
research by Katzenstein and Gellner, who looked at historical patterns to explain national 
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identity in small democratic societies today.126 They argued that small homogenous 
nation-states were successful in their economic policies and with building institutions 
because there were not ethnic cleavages to halt policy initiatives from contending ethnic 
and religious minorities. Within societies like Denmark and Sweden, socialism and 
capitalism could flourish together because the citizens al had the same ideas about 
governing themselves. History shows that this was very important in Denmark and 
Sweden—it also points to how integration policies got implemented in each country and 
developed into strong national principles. 
The findings in this analysis present that Denmark and Sweden’s historical 
response to changing demographics was different. Denmark’s national identity was 
associated with the history of loss; the need for Danes to protect their culture, language, 
and religion; and the notion that sameness means equality and therefore difference 
threatens the egalitarian society. Sweden’s integration policies are hindered by their 
“color-blind” multicultural policies that does not recognize racial tensions that existed in 
the society; the perspective that the state is the benevolent leader, and the overextension 
of the state. 
 
DENMARK: WHAT WAS LOST OUTWARD WILL BE FOUND WITHIN 
 
Denmark is a small country with 5.78 million inhabitants and a landmass of 
16,573 square miles, which is a little bigger than the size of the state of Maryland in the 
United States. Denmark ranks number 133 on the list of countries by landmass and is 
 
126 Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe; Ernest Gellner and John 
Breuilly, Nations and Nationalism, Second Edition (New Perspectives on the Past), 2 edition (Cornell 
University Press, 2009). 
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considered one of the wealthiest countries in Europe with a generous welfare system. 
Non-Western immigrants and their descendants are just 15% of the total population. The 
general population in Denmark tend to trust the government and the political process, and 
most people believe that politicians and the Royal Family are looking out for the common 
good of the people. The National Lutheran Church (Folkekirken) is a symbol of Danish 
culture as Denmark was one of the first countries to fully establish Lutheranism as the 
official religion of the country in 1849.127 The government, the Church, and the Royal 
Family emerged as crucial players in the establishment of the country in medieval 
history.128 Anything that threatens these institutions, such as massive immigration from 
non-Western European societies are often perceived to be threats to Danish national 
identity and very existence. 
As Sir James Mellon, the British Ambassador to Denmark in the 1980s noted, in 
his account of Denmark, "The Danes are not a nation…they are a tribe, this is the 
strength of their fellowship and the reason that they have an unshakeable trust in each 
other.”129 Ambassador Mellon found that the Danes had a significant concern for the 
weak in their group, a consensus for uniformity, avoidance of conflict, and a belief that 
the political process could yield results through open discussion and compromise rather 
than face-to-face conflict. He argued that these traits make Danes different from other 
Europeans and that the Danes operate within a “gated-community” structure with a high 
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level of social trust similar to that of tribal groups in Ghana.130 The average Dane is 
comfortable supporting poor Danes with their tax dollars, however, when the Danes do 
not identify with a social group, they are not as willing to pay high taxes to support the 
“outsider” who is perceived to be taking advantage of Danish social welfare.131 
Danish Early Modern History: A United Scandinavia 1397-1523 
 
The attempts of Denmark to preserve their cultural, ethnic, and linguistic 
background started with its ascension into becoming the hegemon of the Nordic region in 
1397. Nordic countries stood at a crossroads of modernization in the 14th century. Would 
the region become German by the powerful German Hanseatic trading towns sprinkled 
throughout the region? Would it get taken over by the budding Russians to the East, 
Great Britain to the West, or the mighty Holy Roman Empire to the South, or would it be 
destroyed by the internal fighting between the clans? The answer came from Queen 
Margareta of Denmark who gained control over Scandinavia with her strategic power 
plays. 
Queen Margareta came to power due to the misfortune of the men in her family. 
Her brother Christopher Duke of Lolland’s, heir to the Danish throne, died from wounds 
he suffered at battle in 1363. King Valdemar IV of Denmark, Queen Margareta’s father, 
lived another 12 years after his son died, but when the king eventually passed away, he 
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convinced that nobility to let their son be king so that they could unify Denmark and 
Norway against German Hanseatic forces in the region. The nobles named five-year-old 
Olaf heir to the Danish throne in 1375. Queen Margareta’s husband King Haakon of 
Norway unexpectedly died in 1380 before his son reached maturity, which effectively 
made young Olaf king of both Denmark and Norway at the age of ten. Queen Margareta 
became regent of both countries until he turned 15. Unfortunately, young King Olaf II 
died unexpectedly at the age of 17 in 1387 and Margareta was made the Regent of 
Denmark and Norway, which solidified her power. She agreed to help the Swedish 
nobility in 1389 rid themselves of their King Albert of Mecklenburg, who was unpopular. 
Queen Margaret successfully ousted him, and she became the "Mistress and true Lord" of 
all of Scandinavia.132 Queen Margareta merged Denmark, Sweden, and Norway together 
in 1397 under the Kalmar Union for 130 years. 
Despite Sweden and Norway being subjected to the Danish Crown, each kingdom 
had autonomous power to rule themselves. The Kalmar Union was effective because it 
protected Scandinavia from the influential Hanseatic German cities and the Holy Roman 
Empire to the South.133 It also helped establish stability among the Scandinavian clans, 
among families, and between the aristocrats and the crown. Nonetheless, the Kalmar 
Union tended to benefit Denmark over the other kingdoms because Denmark controlled 
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had an interest in dominating the Baltic trade route. Tensions between Denmark and 
Sweden led to about 90 years of civil wars and rebellion over who would control the 
Baltic trade route. Sweden left the Union on several occasions only to rejoin again after 
promises from Denmark for more autonomy. Despite the Union's success at unifying 
Scandinavia against Germanic influence, the Kalmar Union ended in 1523 when Sweden 
ultimately left. Sweden dissolved the Union after King Christian II of Denmark brutally 
beheaded 82 of the Swedish noblemen in 1520 in order to prevent Sweden from 
rebellion. In 1521, Magnate Gustav Vasa of Sweden led a rebellion that caused the 
nobility in Denmark to dethrone King Christian II, and two years later, Sweden exited all 
agreements with Denmark and established its autonomy as a separate kingdom, and 
Gustav Vasa was crowned King of Sweden. Norway remained united with Denmark, but 
the end of the Kalmar Union marked the period when Denmark began to lose its 
hegemonic status in the North. 
Sweden’s separation from Denmark led to about 200 years of fighting between 
the kingdoms. The wars were marked by three different phases. The first phase included 
the Nordic Seven Years War (1563-70) and the Kalmar War (1611-13), which were 
initiated by Denmark to force Sweden to reunite with them and reestablish the Kalmar 
Union. The two wars were unsuccessful, and Sweden remained independent from 
Denmark. The second phase started under Christian IV of Denmark, who reigned 
between (1588-1648). The countries entered into the Thirty Years War. During the war, 
Denmark lost some of their Norwegian territories: Jemtland, Herjedalen and Idre and 
Serna, and the Danish Baltic Sea islands of Gotland and Ösel to Sweden. It was obvious 
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by the end of the Thirty Years War that Sweden had become the strongest military power 
of the North and that Denmark was in threat of its very existence. 134 
The third phase of fighting were wars in which Sweden took control of the 
Northern part of the Øresund ("The Sound" in English), and the territory north of it called 
Scania in 1658. The Øresund is a strait (narrow passage of water) that served as the 
principal passage for trade between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea that goes to the 
Atlantic Ocean. Scania is territory directly north of the Øresund that encompassed 
200,000 ethnic Danes, which was a fourth of the Danish population in 1658.135 The loss 
of this area was a significant blow to Denmark, which inevitably led to new wars between 
Denmark and Sweden called the Scania War from 1675-1679 and the Great Northern 
War 1709-1720. Denmark never recovered the region. The people in Scania were brutally 
incorporated politically and culturally into Sweden to mitigate Danish influence in 
Sweden.136 Today, the Scanians view themselves as Swedish but maintain a culture that 
borrows from Danish and Swedish traditions. 
After Denmark lost Scania in 1658 King Frederick III’s of Denmark took control 
over all legislation, executive, and judicial powers; eventually, the King controlled the 
state finances, and he was the chief decision-maker for wars.137 The idea was that a 
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measurements were created and, the most substantial accomplishment was registering all 
agricultural land in the small territory, which was intended to allow the King's 
government to administer a unified and cohesive method to better tax landowners and to 
provide soldiers for the wars who were often tied to specific lands.138 King Frederick III 
replaced the Danish aristocracy with mostly German well-educated professionals who 
were loyal to him and who had the capacity to maintain the expanding government.139 
The Danish nobles, who had been in charge of government administration previously, 
lost their positions and by the beginning of the 19th century, less than 10 percent of the 
bureaucrats had a noble background.140 The professional bureaucrats' role was to collect 
taxes, administer the national army, and deal with implementing the nation's foreign 
policy. The King required civil servants to have unconditional loyalty to him and the state 
which was part of the Danish state-building process to solidify the king’s power as the 
hereditary sovereign. 
Denmark was unbeaten in establishing a precedent for a centralized government 
and a strong bureaucrat sector even though the king had absolute power. The King, as a 
result, gradually minimized corruption in government.141 Today, Denmark’s government 
and civil service workers are said to be the least corrupt in the world—Danes generally 
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have a high trust of the government, their politicians, and civil servants.142 With the King 
stabilizing the authority of the monarch in the early 17th century, he created an 
unwavering loyalty from bureaucrats and the peasants. The peasants and the merchants 
especially favored the monarchy because taxes were also collected from the aristocrats, 
which had not been the case previously. The monarchy over the years also created a 
wealthy bureaucratic middle class comprised mostly of ethnic Germans, because the King 
trusted them over the Danish nobility.143 Tensions between the crown and the aristocracy 
came because Denmark was an elective monarchy, meaning that the nobles an elected the 
King, prior to the establishment of the absolute monarchy. 
As Denmark began to grow its economy, hostilities developed towards the 
Germans in the royal courts who were also growing in power in the 18th century. The first 
documented instance of nationalism in Denmark was the Act of Citizenship in 1776. This 
law limited bureaucratic positions to ethnic and native Danes in response to the largely 
ethnic Germans bureaucrats who ran the kingdom.144 Under the new law, only ethnic 
Danes could have a position in government. Foreigners and their children who were not 
naturalized could work and live freely in Denmark with the same protections as citizens; 
however, they could not work in the government. Denmark operated under the principles 
of jus sanguinis or citizenship by blood—meaning that if one's parents were Danish 
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citizens, one had citizenship. This is opposite to the jus soli model in the United States 
were citizenship is granted if someone is born in the country or to parents. 
Denmark Loses More Land, People, and Influence 
 
Denmark suffered a tremendous financial loss during the Napoleonic Wars from 
1803–1812. After Napoleon’s defeat, the Danish king, because of his alliance with 
Napoleon, had to cede Norway to Sweden in 1814. This was a significant blow to 
Denmark’s national identity because Denmark and Norway had been united since the 
Kalmar Union of 1397. Denmark became the smallest Nordic country by population and 
landmass. In exchange, Denmark acquired the Lauenburg area (near Hamburg, Germany) 
which comprised mainly of Germans. This changed the ethnic composition of Denmark, 
making a third of the population ethnically German.145 The loss of Norway threatened 
Denmark’s internal balance structure because now there were just two dominant ethnic 
groups: Germans and Danes. With the loss of Norway, the geopolitical dynamics of 
Denmark changed, creating tensions in Denmark. 
Lauenburg, the territory Denmark acquired in 1814, was close to the Schleswig 
and Holstein region in Southern Denmark and had both ethnic Danes and ethnic Germans 
in the territory. Adding Lauenburg unbalanced the ethnic dynamics in Denmark. The 
problem developed because the majority of people in Lauenburg, Schleswig, and 
Holstein were ethnic Germans and did not want to be part of the Danish Kingdom.146 The 
Danish minority who were mostly in the mixed area of Northern Schleswig did not want 
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to be united with Prussia and instead wanted to remain part of Denmark. Denmark 
entered two wars with Germany over Schleswig and Holstein. The First Schleswig- 
Holstein war occurred between 1848-1850 and erupted when ethnic Germans, with 
support from Prussia, drove Danish troops out of the region. The war resulted in Prussia 
having to restore Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark. Denmark was not unbeaten in the 
Second Schleswig-Holstein War in 1864. Denmark lost both Holstein and Schleswig to 
Prussia in 1864.147 With the loss of Holstein and Schleswig, Denmark became a mostly 
ethnically homogeneous nation-state for the first time in its history. Their relationship 
with Germans grew more tumultuous and became a dominating factor in Danish foreign 
security policy in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
By the start of the first world war (WWI), Denmark was surrounded by dominant 
powers. The location of the United Kingdom to the West, Sweden, and Russia to the 
North, and Germany to the South placed Denmark in a vulnerable situation. Denmark 
scathed through WWI by declaring itself neutral and was very prosperous from trade 
profits across the Baltic Sea.148 Contrastingly, Denmark was not so lucky in the second 
world war (WWII). On April 9, 1940, Germany invaded Denmark and established a de 
facto protectorate over the country. By August 29, 1943, Germany placed Denmark under 
military occupation, which lasted until the end of WWII in 1945. Denmark maintained its 
government, and King Christian X was able to maintain his position as the leader of 
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Denmark although the government coexisted with Hitler’s government. Denmark’s 
leaders took the less heroic route and cooperated with their German occupiers to keep the 
peace in the country and to spare the lives of their citizens.149 Hitler's Nazi Germany 
viewed the Nordic people as superior and/or equal to them in terms of the Nazi racial 
hierarchy system, as opposed to people groups such as Africans, Slavs, and Jews, so very 
few Danes lost their lives in the German occupation.150 Nonetheless, Denmark was in a 
peculiar situation because its army, territory, and population were too small to fight the 
Germans. Its approximation to Germany and size made it an easy target for Hitler. The 
German occupation of Denmark solidified that Denmark was no longer a military power. 
The modernization of Denmark proved to be a long litany of loss and defeat. 
Denmark never regained its status as a dominant military power country in Northern 
Europe. The Danish leaders of the 20th century made a conscious decision to withdraw 
from the international boxing ring to cultivate their few resources and small territorial 
boundaries.151 The Danes embraced the idea that “Hvad udad tabes, skal indad vindes,” 
meaning, “What was lost outward will be found within.” This was written by famous 
Danish poet, Hans Peter Holst in 1811 and it became popularized by the Danish Health 
Society in 1914 as they restored coastal land in Jutland after the war that caused Southern 
Denmark to become a part of Germany.152 The restoration project represented Denmark's 
commitment to rebuilding its society by developing the government, society, and culture 
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from within. Modern Danish national identity is linked to the shrinking of the country's 
national borders, territory, and their dwindling international influence over the last 
millennium153 This coupled with their internalized desire to survive as an independent 
nation-state distinctive from Germany and Sweden has led the small country to feel 
endangered by large groups of people who visibly, religiously, or culturally do not fit the 
model of what it means to be "Danish.” Having a national identity with ties to a specific 
language, culture, and people-group shaped Denmark's current integration policies that 
force people to adapt.154 
The Crisis of Identity in Denmark, When Equality Means “Sameness” 
 
The concepts of equality related to sameness and equal treatment developed after 
Denmark lost massive territories and influence.155 Modern Danish society was built on 
the idea that people could trust their neighbors because their neighbor was paying taxes 
just like they were, and when anyone got sick, they all received the same treatment. 
Danes trusted that the government would provide the same social and economic 
opportunities irrespective of age, sex, income, family background for each person in 
society.156 Since Denmark was left largely homogeneous after WWII, this notion of 
sameness worked because everyone in Denmark had the same or nearly the same 
expectations from the state. 
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The connection between sameness and equality is reflected in both Denmark's 
immigration and integration requirements. Immigrants are not allowed permanent access 
to Denmark if they cannot meet specific benchmarks in language, cultural knowledge 
tests, and job obtainment, which are all reinforcements of the Danish national identity. To 
be perceived as wildly different in religion, ethnic background, physical dress, or in 
mentality is at odds with the Danish tribal notion of equality.157 The concept of equality 
in Denmark is related to an understanding that equality requires a degree of sameness. 
The more similar people are, the easier it is to support the notion of equality. 
 
To be equal in Denmark, therefore suggests that people are the same.158 This is 
also supported by the perception that Denmark is a culturally homogeneous society that 
has both egalitarianism and universalism as core elements to its constitution and social 
welfare system.159 The concept of integration hinges on the individual’s ability to give up 
any other cultural or religious background to become a Dane. Thus, when a person is a 
second-generation Palestinian practicing Muslim born and raised in the impoverished 
neighborhood of Mjølnerparken in Copenhagen, they are perceived to be foreign to 
Denmark. Their cultural and religious distinctiveness from Danish culture and religion 
marks them as a foreigner. Access to citizenship literally and figuratively is not granted if 
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arrival of immigrants with different religions, ideological perspectives, and ethnic 
backgrounds in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The political and public perspective in Denmark towards immigrants was 
generally positive. In the 1960s, most non-Western immigrants came to Denmark from 
Turkey, Pakistan, and Eastern Bloc countries on guest workers programs. Guest workers 
would help meet labor shortages in the manufacturing industries in Denmark and then 
return home to their native countries. This labor shortages in Denmark came as a result of 
WWII and the millions of people who died from across Europe and the industrial boom 
that followed. Most countries in Europe imported labor from Southern Europe, Eastern 
Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia.160 The immigration policies in the early 1960s 
were unrestrictive as labor migrants could move back and forth between Europe and the 
Global South to work then go home because there was not much permanent migration.161 
However, with the 1973 Oil Crisis, the price of oil sky-rocketed a recession hit most 
economies around the world. Massive layoffs occurred as Denmark no longer needed 
labor, so the government restricted guest workers programs.162 
The Danish government tried to send people back to their home countries, but it 
 
was nearly impossible because the roots that many of the men had established in 
Denmark were deeply set. Furthermore, the men wanted to stay, and they would have had 
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to go back to worse economic situations in their home countries.163 The government 
allowed them to remain in Denmark and to send for their wives and family members as a 
result of humanitarian laws adopted by the United Nations (UN) that allowed for family 
reunification in 1977. The UN also established the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in 1967 that allowed refugees from outside of Europe to be relocated 
to different regions of the world, prior to this refugee status and relocation was 
specifically for people who were displaced in Europe as a result of the world wars.164 
This meant that although labor migration to Europe was closed because of the economic 
strains, humanitarian laws provided another means of migration, people could leave 
impoverished, war-torn countries in the Global South for protection in the Global North. 
Due to this new international law, Denmark and the whole of Europe saw a steady flow 
of refugees and asylees starting in the 1980s. Today, Denmark has a diverse population of 
about 15 percent of non-Western immigrants dwelling in its territory. 
Widespread negative perceptions of immigrants in Denmark did not materialize 
until after the mid-1980s when larger refugee, asylum-seekers, and family reunification 
groups moved to Denmark in larger quantities. Most of the non-Western immigrants 
came from Turkey, Poland, Syria, Iraq, and Romania. Due to these large groups coming 
for family reunification Denmark changed its Aliens Act in 1986 making the asylum and 
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tightened in 1992. In 1998, Denmark was one of the first countries to develop an 
Integration Act to teach immigrants the Danish language and introduce them to Danish 
society. In response to the increasing immigrant population, the conservative anti- 
immigrant party, the Danish People's Party (DPP) was established in 1995.165 Under the 
DPP the government in 2001 required new arrivals to assimilate by language acquisition, 
pass an actual citizenship test, and live in Denmark at least nine years before Danish 
citizenship or permanent legal residency was granted. Denmark has chosen an aggressive 
integration policy for new arrivals and most recently developed an integration strategy for 
people living in poverty. 
The Danish integration policy is two-fold; it addresses new immigrants who 
desire to live permanently in Denmark and people who are already citizens or permanent 
residents in Denmark. The general perception is that the immigrants who arrived in the 
1980s and 1990s were not successfully integrated because the policies in place then did 
not require enough of them. For instance, when refugees and asylees first arrived in 
Denmark in the 1980s and 1990s, they received a government stipend, and they were not 
allowed to work until they mastered at least high school level Danish and were approved 
for refugee status or asylee status. Most immigrants went through the language 
immersion program for at least a decade, and many did not work. The ones who finally 
did get a job were placed in low-wage jobs as cleaners or caretakers for the elderly and 
young children. In the meantime, they were living and raising their children in low- 
income housing in neighborhoods with the worst education programs and highest crime 
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rates. This caused refugees and asylees to be about a decade behind other immigrant 
groups such as immigrants from the EU, the United States, Canada, and Australia who 
typically worked in high wage jobs upon moving to Denmark.166 The integration system 
and immigration policies disproportionately placed refugees and asylees at a 
disadvantage because of the lengthy time it took to be enfranchised. 
The refugees and asylees who came in the 1980s had skills that Denmark needed 
in the 1960s, but by the 1990s—work was no longer abundant.167 Furthermore, both the 
immigrants and the government thought that the refugees and asylum seekers would 
remain for a short period of time in Denmark and then eventually go home. 168 As the 
years went by, it was apparent that the refugees from the 1980s and 1990s would be 
permanently in Denmark. At the same time, a negative perception of immigrants in 
Denmark was solidified with the terrorist attacks in the United States followed by the 
controversial Mohammed cartoons published in Denmark in 2004 linking Muslims to 
terrorism and the idea that they were too culturally different to integrate. Given these 
social and political changes, the government blocked refugee migration during the 
2015/2016 Refugee Crisis. 
The Refugee Crisis in 2015/2016 caused Denmark to take a tough stance against 
refugees and asylum-seekers entering the country. Denmark since then has refused to 
accept the 500 refugees a year that the United Nationals High Commission for Refugees 
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(UNHCR) has allocated to them since 2015—the height of the so-called Refugee Crisis 
in Europe. Denmark only accepts asylum seekers who have made their way to Denmark 
on their own financial terms from abroad. Only 3 percent of all foreigners granted 
residency in Denmark were refugees in 2017, these were all refugees who had been in 
Denmark prior to 2015, and the dwindling numbers show a pattern of decrease in 2018 
and 2019. Denmark has received fewer asylum seekers than other Western European 
Union countries with the exception of the United Kingdom.169 According to Danish NGO 
Refugees Welcome in 2018, only 1,300 people were actually granted asylum in Denmark 
the rest are in refugee centers or were deported outside of Denmark. They also 
implemented even more integration strategies for non-Western immigrants and their 
descendants who were already in the country. 
The formal institutionalization of the current Danish integration strategy began in 
2015 with a request from the government to calculate how much immigration cost the 
Danish state. The Ministry of Finance in 2016 reported that non-Western immigrants and 
their descendants cost the Danish state 33 billion DKK ($5.02 billion) in 2014 while 
western immigrants created a net profit amount of 6 billion DKK (~$1 billion). The cost 
and benefits are linked to how much income one earns and the taxes collected from that 
income. Immigrants from western countries tend to earn high-incomes and therefore are 
taxed heavier creating a net profit for the state, while refugees and asylees tend to have 
higher cases of unemployment and receive government subsidies, which costs the state 
money. From these reports, the general consensus in Denmark was that non-western 
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immigrants were a burden to the welfare state and needed to participate in the labor 
market.170 
With the financial burden as the central argument for better integration practices 
for non-Western immigrants, the current strategy is to minimize the perceived financial 
burden. Danish society promotes the notion that able-bodied citizens and residents should 
work to contribute to the greater good of society so that they can have a robust universal 
welfare system.171 Most refugees and asylees received government welfare stipends for 
several years as they established themselves in Denmark. The tensions arrive in Denmark 
when immigrants are unemployed or underemployed long-term while also receiving 
government welfare benefits in the form of monthly allowances and also universal 
services like education, healthcare services, and parental leave. In a heavily taxed system 
in which people pay 35-60 percent income tax and 20 percent sales tax, tensions arise 
especially in a relatively small country like Denmark. The population is only 5.7 million 
people with a GDP per capita of $56,307.51 in 2017—one of the highest in the world, 
yet, the perceived financial burden and threat of immigration is higher for the domestic 
population who is accustom to people looking and acting like them. 
In 2017 the Ministry of Immigration and Integration said that their primary goal 
was to quickly get refugees into the labor market so that they could better contribute to 
society. The start allowance from the government for refugees and asylees was reduced in 
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2017 to compensation that was lower than what ethnic Danes received who were on 
government allowances. The idea behind this change was to force refugees and asylees 
off of government assistance. Danish citizens and residents with a non-Western 
background were also subjected to a reduced payment, which warranted a critique of the 
policies being discriminatory towards other ethnic groups who were not ethnic Danes.172 
The Danish government wanted to get abled-bodied immigrants and their descendants off 
of the monthly government stipend so that they could work and sustain themselves. 
Studies have shown the positive effects of decreasing government subsidies, which has 
led to better employment and financial independence.173 This goes back to the Danish 
notion of egalitarianism and sameness, the perception in the society was that non- 
Western immigrants were heavily dependent on government subsidies, and therefore the 
immigrants need to be taught how to be a Dane. 
Immigrant integration became the focal point of most researchers to understand 
why some immigrants in societies with universal social welfare programs have higher 
instances of poverty compared to the native ethnic population 174. Furthermore, systems 
with universal social welfare tend to have higher instances of immigrants leaving their 
home countries to fight in ISIS or al-Qaeda.175 Sweden and Denmark continue to use 
 
172 Atkinson and Sogaard, “The Long-Run History of Income Inequality in Denmark”; Barry and Sorensen, 
“In Denmark, Harsh New Laws for Immigrant ‘Ghettos.’” 
173 Jacob Nielsen Arendt, "Effekter Af Beskæftigelses- Og Uddannelsesrettede Indsatser for Ikke-Vestlige 
Ledige Indvandrere," 2014, 7; Rambøll, "Viden Til at Komme i Mål Med Integration." (Copenhagen, 
Denmark: Styrelsen for International Rekruttering og Integration, 2016)9. 
174 Kamaldeep Bhui, Nasir Warfa, and Edgar Jones, “Is Violent Radicalisation Associated with Poverty, 
Migration, Poor Self-Reported Health and Common Mental Disorders?,” PLoS ONE 9, no. 3 (March 5, 
2014); Galloway et al., “Immigrant Child Poverty in Scandinavia: A Panel Data Study”; Garner and 
Short, Measurement of Poverty, Deprivation, and Economic Mobility (Research on Economic Inequality). 
175 Edwin Bakker and Roel de Bont, “Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012–2015): 
Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 
91  
very different strategies (assimilation and multiculturalism) yet both countries have 
similar results with their immigrant populations not fully being integrated and also 
demonstrating higher poverty levels than the native ethnic populations. The next section 
starts by giving a brief historical context for Sweden. It then examines the reasons why 
Sweden chose their specific immigration and integration policies and became a state 
focused on a humanitarian agenda that interestingly led to structural discrimination issues 
in Sweden’s integration practices. 
Overall, Danish integration strategies are assimilationist due to the shrinking of 
the country’s size and the country’s regional and global influence. Historically, the Danes 
held on to their country, culture, and language by focusing inward to better the lives of 
individual Danes and protecting themselves from outside cultures and linguistic 
influences notably from Sweden and Germany.176 The Danes built an egalitarian society 
that continues today to redistribute wealth and resources to support all the members of the 
group and, in return, all able-bodied individuals are expected to work to contribute to the 
greater good of society.177 The Danish government uses their notions of an egalitarian 
society to promote sameness and combat anything that is perceived to be different from 
the average Dane as a manifestation of their survival techniques from the past.178 The 
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findings in this research suggest that there are three factors hindering the successful 
integration of immigrations. The first is that Danish national history of massive land loss 
influences its notion of identity. The second, is that sameness in Denmark means 
equality, and lastly, since equality is linked to sameness, immigrants who are different are 
not perceived to be equal to Danes, which has led to immigrants being isolated in low- 
income communities. 
SWEDEN: THE BENEVOLENT STATE 
 
The history of Sweden is rooted in a variety of factors, including their Viking 
past, the Kalmar Union of 1397, wars between surrounding countries, the robust social 
welfare system, and egalitarianism. The modern history of Sweden starts at the point 
when Sweden was united under the Danish Crown with the Kalmar Union of 1397-1523. 
The previous chapter outlined how Queen Margarethe of Denmark became the Queen of 
Scandinavia as her brother, father, husband (King Häkon) and eventually her young son 
died. Queen Margarethe defeated King Albrekt of Sweden in the Battle of Åsle in 1389 
which led to a unified Scandinavia under the Kalmar Union in 1397. In the Kalmar 
Agreement, each country retained its own individual laws, institutions, and customs. It 
was a confederation to maintain security mainly from the Germans; however, with the 
death of Queen Margarethe in 1412, the Union started to dismantle. Sweden began to 
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The Stockholm Bloodbath occurred after the Danish King Christian II beheaded 
most of the nobleman and clergy members in 1520 to prevent separatist movements that 
had sprung up once again in Sweden.179 The massacre opened the door for Gustav Vasa, 
the son of Erik Johansson who was a nobleman murdered by Christian II, to take 
complete control of Sweden and become King within just three years. King Gustav Vasa 
was a zealous leader who inspired the commoners and soldiers to fight for independence 
from Denmark.180 The King eventually hired a professional army with monetary help 
from Lübeck, a Northern city in modern-day Germany, that was weary of the expansion 
of Danish influence in Northern Germany. King Gustav Vasa ruled Sweden from 1523 
until his death in 1560. He is known as the founder of modern Sweden and the person 
who inspired Sweden to become the hegemon of the Northern region in Europe. For most 
of the next three centuries, Sweden became a sovereign state defined by wars with 
Denmark, the growth of their power in Europe, conflicts between the nobility and crown, 
and the centralization of government. 
Sweden became a dominant force not only in Scandinavia but throughout 
Northern Europe and in many parts of the world. Sweden’s role in the Thirty Years War 
1618-1648 impacted religious and political dynamics in Europe. The Thirty Years War 
was a conflict between Protestants and Catholics in the Holy Roman Empire. The 
protestants wanted to change their religion to Lutheranism and also gain more autonomy 
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Gustav II Adolf of Sweden led the Swedish army to invade and defeat the Holy Roman 
Empire which established Sweden as the leader of the Protestant world.181 The Treaty of 
Westphalia, which was led by Sweden, marked the point in history where the modern 
nation-state system developed, and state sovereignty was invented. Each state had a right 
to their own religion and autonomy from outside influences. 
By 1648 Sweden controlled most of the Baltic States, and within another 60 
years, Sweden had colonies spread throughout North America, Africa, India, and the 
Caribbean.182 Sweden's economy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was essential 
to its success as an empire. It relied on agriculture, natural resources, production, and 
trade. The King had an efficient military which was well organized and well-paid, that 
facilitated absolute power to be held in the hands of the King.183 Sweden’s early history is 
saturated with a strong military background and marked by the country’s attempts to 
dominate the Baltic Sea against the Danes and eventually the Russians. Swedish naval 
forces proved to be superior in the 16th and 17th centuries, providing them with control 
over the North Sea and Baltic Sea. The Swedish government, military, and monarchy, 
even with its internal problems, successfully dominated Northern Europe from 1560 until 
1721. Although Sweden had 300 years of fighting with Denmark, Denmark’s power had 





181 Peterson, Warrior Kings of Sweden. 
182 Suvi Keskinen et al., eds., Complying With Colonialism: Gender, Race, and Ethnicity in the Nordic 
Region, 1 edition (Farnham, England ; Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2009). 
183 Paul Douglas Lockhart, “The Swedish ‘Absolutist’ State, 1679–97,” in Sweden in the Seventeenth 
Century, ed. Paul Douglas Lockhart, European History in Perspective (London: Macmillan Education 
UK, 2004), 124. 
95  
Russia. Sweden eventually lost its status in the North with the rise of the Russian Empire 
over a series of years and by 1809 Sweden was no longer a world power. 
 
 
From Neutrality, Industrialization, and Labor Movements to Egalitarianism 
Sweden’s downfall from the hegemon in Northern Europe started with the Great 
Northern War from 1700–1721, continued with the diabolical Russo-Swedish War from 
1788–1790, and ended with the annex of Finland to Russia in 1809. Russia invaded 
Sweden in 1809 to try to force them to join an embargo on the United Kingdom. When 
Sweden refused, Russia took complete control of Finland, which had been under Swedish 
control since the 13th century. Russia also occupied all of Sweden’s Baltic territories and 
effectively ended Sweden’s dominance in continental Europe.184 The Swedish royal 
family in the 18th century, King Gustav III and King Gustav IV, were blamed for causing 
economic hardship and restricting the power of the nobility by forcing the country into 
too many wars over the years. Gustav IV was overthrown by the Swedish army, and his 
entire family was exiled to Germany in December 1809. This marked a point in Sweden’s 
history that the absolute monarchy ended, and the military and nobles gained power over 
the kingdom.185 
Losing Finland also resulted in democratic principles storming the country in 
1809 as the government power was split between three different institutions: The King, 
Riksdag (parliament), and the courts. Executive power was still in the hands of the King; 
however, the power to oversee collected taxes were in the hands of the Riksdag, power to 
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create laws was divided between the King and Riksdag, and power to judge was in the 
hands of the courts.186 This shaped Swedish national identity and established a stable 
centralized government as power has been divided between these institutions. It also 
shaped the political parties’ abilities to have influence in government and in 
policymaking. Sweden was left without a ruler in 1809 with the exile of the King and the 
royal family. The Swedish army had in mind Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, a military man 
who was Marshal in France to become king. The Swedish military and nobles saw him as 
the perfect candidate because his brother was married to Napoleon's wife's sister, so 
Sweden would have a more favorable stance with France, and he already had a son who 
could take over the kingdom if he died.187 
Jean Baptiste Bernadotte was crowned Prince of Sweden and head of state from 
1810-1818. He was renamed Karl Johan XIV in 1818 when he became king. King Johan 
needed to prove his allegiance and authority in Sweden, so he joined the Napoleonic war 
on the opposite side of France. The Swedish military and nobles gladly accepted 
Bernadotte as their King. His family is still the ruling dynasty in Sweden today. Swedish 
national identity began to form with the development of a stable centralized government 
under King Johan who promoted peace and neutrality after the Napoleonic wars. This 
neutral stance eventually led to Sweden developing a national identity related to welfare 
systems, equity, and support for multiculturalism. 
Sweden’s modern national identity was built upon a strong democratic neutral 
government that was supported by the newly appointed King Johan. The King is noted as 
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an influential person in Swedish history who steered the country towards neutrality. War 
was about to break out between Britain and Russia in 1834 over a dispute in the Middle 
East. The war, in the end, did not occur as the newly appointed King Johan made it clear 
in a confidential memorandum to the British and Russian governments that Sweden and 
Norway in the cause of any war would have “strict and independent neutrality.”188 This is 
the first documented instance in which Sweden showed a clear neutral stance. King Johan 
also gave a detailed account of his French heritage and his respect for independence that 
Napoleon threated to erode across Europe. He emphasized his allegiance to his new 
homeland, Sweden and stressed the importance of autonomy of all countries in Europe. 
He also detailed his interest in maintaining relationships with both Russia and Britain. In 
the confidential memorandum in 1834, he wrote the following. It is evident that King 
Johan wanted a neutral government not only to have peace but also to protect Sweden’s 
commercial industries. The King's stance was also fueled by industrialization, farmers 
and merchants’ interest in the budding external markets. 
The origin of the Swedish Welfare State began with the industrialization period in 
Europe (1760-1820). The industrialization was primarily fueled by European trade 
companies that used enslaved labor, indentured labor, and feudal systems to produce 
goods such as sugar on plantations to sell to Europe and goods such as iron in the Baltics 
under serfdom for trading; European markets made tremendous profits.189 As merchants 
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and farm-owners became wealthy from trading of goods, they demanded institutional 
change in the government to get more rights for themselves as rights were only available 
to nobility at the time.190 Sweden did not directly have a feudalism system in place, nor 
did the country have an extensive slave or trading companies in the Americas and Africa 
to the same magnitude of the British, Spanish, and French.191 However, by maintaining 
neutrality, Sweden benefited by allowed warring trading companies to use their trading 
ports in the Americas when other ports were closed because of conflicts between warring 
parties. 
Sweden became interested in the slave trade in the 17th century when it was clear 
that western developed nations were capitalizing on the demands for sugar and other 
exotic crops in the Americas by using free labor. 192 Sweden established its first colony in 
Delaware in the United States and a trading post in Ghana in 1638. In the 18th century, 
Sweden also established trading posts in China and in the Caribbean. In 1784 King 
Gustavus III received Saint Barthelemy from King Louis XVI from France in exchange 
for trading privileges in Gothenburg, a coastal city in Sweden. The primary source of 
income from the island was not so much from slave labor, although there were at least 
2,500 enslave people working on the island, most of the wealth came from other 
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countries using the Swedish port for the exchange of goods and people.193 Sweden 
profited from the slave trade because of its neutral stance that allowed trading companies 
to use their trading post during times of war. Sweden eventually ended slavery in all of its 
colonies on October 9, 1847. 
Social Welfare and Multicultural Polities Introduced by the Social Democrats 
 
The democratization process in Sweden gradually extended rights to all its 
citizens from about the 1830s with the development of wealthy farmers until arguably 
1975 when Sweden implemented in the social welfare system. In the beginning, when 
King Johan first took power, the government continued to represent the rights of just one- 
sixth of the population, which excluded most of the peasants. Sweden was divided by an 
estate system, i.e., clergy, nobles, bourgeoisie, and peasants.194 All Swedes were 
guaranteed fundamental legal protections and freedom of speech and could belong to any 
religion of their choosing, which was typically Catholic or Protestant in the nineteenth 
century. Criticism of the new system, however, mainly came from farmers, merchants, 
and the rising middle class, groups that still had limited representation in government. 
Sweden in 1830 had a major political uprising led by the farmers and the growing urban 
middle class who wanted rights in the state to be more inclusive of them. 
Swedish political system changed significantly in 1865 when parliament was 
changed from four different chambers of varying levels of importance to just two 
 
193 Ekman; 225. 
 
194 The estate's system legally defined people's duties, roles, obligations, and responsibilities under the 
feudal system. The monarchy was for the king and the queen. The clergy made up the first estate, the 
nobles made up the second estate, and the peasants and bourgeoisie made up the fourth estate. 
100  
chambers of equal importance. The First Chamber was chosen by the country assemblies 
and communal councils, 150 members were elected every three years. Candidates had to 
be at least 40 years old and earn a substantial income or have a substantial net worth. The 
Second Chamber comprised of 230 members and was representative of the landowning 
farmers and merchants’ class. Candidates had to be at least 30 years old and could not 
make more money than elected officials in the elite sector. The First Chamber 
represented the nobility, upper bureaucrats, military officers, and the urban rich. The 
Second Chamber was dominated by landowning farmers. Only about one-sixth of the 
population could vote in 1865, laborers and women still did not have suffrage. The labor 
movement in Sweden really shaped the entire country to be a nation-state that promotes 
equality. 
The labor movement in Sweden was divided into two parts: one focused on 
political representation, the other on building a union 195. The Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation (LO) was founded in 1898, which organized all trade unions under one 
association. 196 The labor movement was associated with the Swedish Social Democratic 
Party (SAP), which is still the dominant governing party of Sweden today. Both LO and 
the SAP have dominated political life in Sweden since the late 19th century.197 Even 
today, with 70% of its population in a union, Sweden has the highest number of members 
in a union in the world. The labor union demanded better working conditions, the right to 
vote, regardless of gender and income. As a result of LO, by 1909 the majority of men 
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got the right to vote, and in 1919, women could vote in municipal elections and by 1921 
universal suffrage was extended to all legally abiding people in Sweden. 
From 1809 through 1919, fundamental political rights were extended to all 
members of society, which marked a notable change in Sweden from absolute monarchy 
to full democracy. The history of the labor movement and the laborers succeeded in 
taking over the government and built the modern Swedish society that reflects an 
egalitarian society with strong social welfare programs. The labor party has had a 
significant impact on government policies, work, and life in Sweden for almost 200 
years.198 The labor party is one of the leading reasons that Sweden has maintained strong 
welfare policies, policies that support egalitarianism, and multicultural integration 
policies. Sweden represents a country that has the most significant membership in a labor 
union in the world. Although Sweden established rights for the poor and women, they 
still had problems like many other countries in Europe during both world wars. Sweden 
established itself as a neutral country during the World Wars, but it was still heavily 
entrenched in politics in Europe as Sweden had to manage tenses relationships with 
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
 
Social Democrats Gain Control of the Swedish Parliament 
 
This notion of national identity in Sweden developed with the Social Democrats 
gaining dominance in parliament. The period between 1914 and 1945 was afflicted with 
frightening problems, massive deaths, and technological advancements, such as the tank 
 
 
198 Edgren and Olsson, “Swedish Working-Class History.” 
102  
and nuclear weapons. The 1920s and 1930s presented an economic crisis that affected the 
world and generations to come. Fascism was on the rise, and social and political tenses 
were very high as countries tried to define their democracies. Sweden during this time 
took a foreign policy initiative that favored restraint and neutrality. This was the case at 
least when it came to direct war with dominant world powers such as the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia. The Swedish government and King agreed in 
official documents that Sweden no longer had the capacity or desire to fight a war against 
other countries whose militaries were superior to Sweden’s military.199 Sweden’s foreign 
policy and national identity became embedded in the notion of neutrality and 
humanitarian aid. The Social Democrats implemented policies that locked-in practices 
that became the backbone to Swedish foreign-policy and domestic policies. 
During World War I while the Entente (Britain, France, Russia) and the Allied 
Forces (Germany and Austria-Hungary) planned for quick victories, Scandinavian 
countries hoped to avoid war altogether. Sweden, Denmark, and Norway had announced 
their neutrality in the war in 1912 and reinforced their intentions again in 1914. Sweden 
had a long history with Germany balancing against Denmark during many of the wars 
between the 15th–19th centuries, and strict neutrality was not necessarily possible for 
Sweden.200 Sweden's new foreign policy had supported Germany for over 40 years. King 
Gustav V's wife was a direct cousin of the Kaiser Wilhelm II in Germany. Furthermore, 
economically, Germany was a vital source of raw materials and manufactured products 
for Sweden and Germany was an essential buyer of Sweden's iron and manufactured 
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products. 201 Sweden earned substantial profits from trading in World War I, which 
helped the lower, middle, and upper classes gain more wealth.202 Capitalism flourished, 
and more rights were extended to the masses. 
Although Sweden had a democracy, Sweden was still a country with deep class 
divides with the new industrial working class, and the upper-class elites. The workers 
related to socialism and communism while the elites strived for capitalism. Democracy 
had been achieved now that there was better representation in the government, but the 
class system was more challenging to change. The lower classes wanted social, 
economic, and political equality. As a result, seven political parties developed. The 
Swedish Communist Party wanted radical social and economic reforms that would 
change the entire system of governance. The Social Democrats wanted reform; however, 
they wanted to use the current governing system to facilitate better equality. The Liberals 
divided into two parties over issues of Prohibition: The Farmer's Party focused on 
economic issues related to agriculture while the Liberals mainly focused on Prohibition. 
In 1933, however, the Communist Party shifted its alignment to the Social Democrats. 
The Conservatives continued to hold onto their views of the class, world order, and 
legitimacy. Some Conservative party members shifted to the far right and established 
affiliations with the Nazi regime. 
The Great Depression (1929-1939) hit Sweden in 1930. It caused prices to 
skyrocket, and high unemployment, about 187,000 union workers, were without jobs. 
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When employers tried to increase their profits by firing more people, riots erupted in the 
streets. On May 14, 1931, protesters met with armed soldiers in Lund, Sweden. As a 
result of this clash, four marchers and a bystander were killed, and five others were 
injured. The labor movement was outraged, and 80,000 people gathered in the streets of 
Stockholm the next day. The county governor and the police chief were absolved of any 
wrongdoing, but the leader of the Communist Party, Axel Nordström, was sentenced to 
two and a half years in prison. As a result of the rioting and the subsequent deaths, 
maintaining peace and strengthening democracy became a primary goal for many 
Swedes. These events in the 1930s set the stage for Sweden to become a social welfare 
country because the Communist Party was blamed for the death and injuries.203 The 
Social Democrats took over from the Communist Party and held the majority seats in 
parliament from 1932 onwards to the present day, and they shaped policies that facilitated 
a strong universal welfare system. They also facilitated the notion of humanitarian aid 
coupled with refugee and asylee migration as part of the national identity. 
In hopes to avoid being drawn into World War II Sweden declared neutrality 
again in September of 1939. Sweden was the only Nordic country that was not attacked 
or invaded by Germany. Sweden was supposed to be neutral throughout the war; 
however, the government allowed German equipped divisions to cross from northern 
Norway to Finland. Germany had access to Swedish railroads which transported men and 
weapons to and from Norway. Sweden allowed Nazi vessels and aircraft to use Swedish 
airspace and territorial waters. They continued to export products such as iron ore and 
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ball bearings to Germany, both of which were crucial for the development of the German 
Tanks.204 The clear tradeoff for Sweden was that Germany agreed not to invade them. 
Sweden's behavior was not necessarily neutral, but some say necessary for the country to 
prevent invasion from Germany. Sweden’s economy flourishes during WWII, allowing 
for the country to focus on humanitarian aid later once the war was over. 
The Development of Social Welfare in Sweden, the “Swedish Model” 
 
Sweden is famous for its extensive social welfare system that was said to have 
eliminated poverty by providing government benefits to everyone through high tax 
schemes. The Swedish welfare state is based on the central idea that everyone has a 
fundamental right to healthcare, family services, pensions, free education (including 
university education) irrespective of income. The so-called “Swedish Model” evolved in 
the 20th century with the majority of change occurring post-1945. Because Sweden did 
not suffer from the war on its soil during the world wars, the government could focus on 
establishing a robust egalitarian welfare system more quickly than Denmark, Norway, 
and Finland.205 Furthermore, neutrality in Sweden caused the country to prosper from 
their trade agreements with Germany throughout WWII206 and later with Russia during 
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The Swedish Model developed from the 1930s through the 1970s, which blurred 
the lines between different socioeconomic classes.208 The Social Democrats (SD) in the 
1930s began making policy changes in government after the Great Depression, which 
eventually led to universal welfare in 1975 that was created to protect all Swedes against 
social insecurity.209 Universal welfare systems became the bedrock of the nation along 
with an 85-90 percent employment rate. Female labor participation increased as labor 
demands increased, which led to public childcare facilities supported by employers and 
unions.210 The SDs introduced a myriad of labor laws in the 1970s that increased 
equality. The Swedish Model worked because the system contained both private business 
ownership and government control.211 Manufacturing remained in the control of private 
owners but was accompanied by a high taxation policy on income and consumption, 
which redistributed income to low-income earners. 
Scholars have also noted that the Swedish Model succeeded over the long haul for 
several additional reasons. First, the model was implemented slowly over a period of 
time. The government took control of all health insurance schemes prior to the end of 
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municipalities into the central government in the 1950s. 212 After these two significant 
integrations, the government followed with education, parental leave, etc. until the 
Swedish Model was fully developed by 1975. Secondly, Sweden did not need to recover 
from war, and therefore, they sold natural resources such as iron ore to countries in 
Europe that were rebuilding.213 Thirdly, since Sweden had declared neutrality and refused 
to take a side in the Cold War, its defense budget was small, and it could trade with both 
the Capitalist West and the Communist East.214 Fourth, which is crucial for this research, 
Sweden did not have to manage a large immigrant population from 1945 through the 
1970s and therefore the country did not have significant problems such as nativism or 
racism that can occur with demographic changes 215, however, this changed once Sweden 
opened up to massive immigration. 
 
Immigration to Sweden 1945-2018 
 
 
Between 1945 and 2018, Sweden's population increased from 6.7 million to 10.4 million 
inhabitants. The most significant population growth came from non-Western refugees 
and asylees, their family members, and descendants from the past 40 years.216 According 
to Statistics Sweden, by the early1990s Sweden took in about 40,000 non-Western 




212 Eric Brodin, “Collapse of the Swedish Myth,” Economic Affairs 12, no. 2 (1992): 14–22. 
213 B. Boëthius, “Swedish Iron and Steel, 1600–1955,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 6, no. 2 
(July 1, 1958): 144–75. 
214 Hopper, “Sweden.” 
215 Robert D. Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century Lecture,” 
Scandinavian Political Studies 30, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 137–74. 
216 Nordstrom, The History of Sweden, 143. 
108  
largest non-Western refugee/asylee population of 166,000 in one year compared to its 
population size in any Western country. Immigration has impacted the country's ethnic 
makeup, language, popular culture, economy, and politics. People who immigrated to 
Sweden after 1945 fell into three categories: labor migrants and their dependents, 
refugees, and asylees, and their descendants. 
From 1945-1967 Sweden was in need of laborers to work in their booming ore 
and forest industries. The Nordic countries entered into a joint labor market agreement in 
1954 that allowed Nordic people to work in other Nordic countries. Immigration from 
Denmark, Norway, and especially Finland was massive at this time as the Swedish 
market had not suffered from the war on its territory and could provide work 
opportunities to other Nordic countries.217 Immigration also opened up to countries in 
Southern Europe such as the Former Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, which was 
the first time that populations from outside of the Nordic region or Northern Europe 
gained a significant presence in Sweden. Labor and refugee immigration increased in 
Sweden throughout the 1960s and 1970s, but the foreign population in Sweden reached 
just 2 percent of the total population by 1975. 218 As Swedish economic expansion started 
to retract by the late 1960s, the state and manufacturing companies saw less need for 
immigrant labor. As a result, the government implemented a policy in 1967 to regulate 
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return home.219This brought labor migration to an end, but it also fueled refugee and 
family reunification migration. 
The period from 1975 to 1990 is often linked to a transitional phase in Sweden 
immigration from labor immigration to refugee and family migration. Major wars and 
political upheavals around the world displaced significant groups of people. Sweden 
became a dominant receiver of refugees, asylees and family reunification immigrants 
marking the second wave of newcomers to Sweden. The people who came in the 1970s 
and 1980s were primarily from Iran, Iraq, Chile, Eritrea, Palestine, and Southeast Asia. 
By the 1990s, they came primarily from the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and many 
countries in the Middle East. Once the immigrant groups established permanent 
residency, they brought their family members to Sweden through family reunification 
laws.220 Sweden became known as a haven that embraced multiculturalism and people 
fleeing persecution. Sweden continued to accept refugees and asylees into the twenty-first 
century, which drastically impacted not only the ethnic landscape of the country but also 
challenged the generous nature of social welfare. 
The third group of immigrants in Sweden are not necessarily immigrants, because 
they themselves did not include immigrant to Sweden, but their parents did. Sweden 
reported in 2018 that 24.1 percent of inhabitants in Sweden had a foreign background, 
meaning that they or both their parents were not born in Sweden. When considering the 
number of people who have just one parent born in Sweden, the number increases to 
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about a third of the Swedish population having an immigrant background.221 The top non- 
Western immigrant groups came from, in order as listed, the Former-Yugoslavia, Syria, 
Iraq, Poland, Iran, Somalia, Turkey, and Afghanistan. People born abroad with non- 
Western backgrounds make-up about one million people in Sweden (10 percent of the 
population), this number does not include diverse Swedes who were born in Sweden. 
Most European countries after World War II do not publish official statistics of people’s 
ethnic and/or religious backgrounds. Therefore, the ethnic and/or religious diversity of 
Sweden could be 20-25 percent of the total population with people who are visibly and 
culturally different from ethnic Swedes. Most of the immigrants in Sweden live in the 
same neighborhoods creating ethnic enclaves of immigrants. 
The largest cities in Sweden, such as Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö, have 
become multiethnic places where various ethnic groups developed neighborhoods that 
express their own native cultures. Most of the communities developed around the mid- 
1970s when larger groups of non-Western migrants first began arriving in Sweden.222  
The suburbs were traditionally places that absorbed immigrants for decades and, in many 
ways, hid them from sight. Most of the immigrant neighborhoods, such as Rinkeby and 
Tensta near Stockholm, have high unemployment, low performance in schools, and gang 
violence. This has created a negative perception of non-Western immigrants in Sweden. 
Furthermore, because Sweden is a welfare state that functions best with a large working 
population, tensions began to arise in relation to the non-Western immigrants in the 
country who have a higher percentage of unemployment and therefore higher instances of 
 
221 Statistics Sweden, “Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2017,” February 21, 2018. 
222 Malmberg et al., “Residential Segregation of European and Non-European Migrants in Sweden.” 
111  
reliance on government stipends. This immigrant policy created an intense backlash, 
primarily from the conservatives Swedes. 
As many scholars have noted, immigration can unsettle historical sense of 
community, which establishes a sense of "us" as members of a community and "them" 
who do not belong to that shared community nor have rights.223 According to researchers, 
the growing number of ethnically distinct newcomers can erode the sense of social 
solidarity on which welfare states are constructed.224 Alt-right and moderate Swedes 
began to resent the refugees and economic migrants who arrived from Eastern Europe, 
Africa, and the Middle East.225 This was primarily due to the economic strains the 
country experienced from new policy initiatives that increased labor costs beginning in 
the 1970s when the SDs developed the Swedish welfare system and extended rights to all 
members in society.226 
Beginning in the late 1960s, as more immigrants arrived in Sweden, the 
government also extended welfare benefits to them as a result of the nation's 
commitment, under the Social Democrats, to support the moral principle of equality and 
generosity.227 Welfare was extended to guest workers in 1968 with a policy that ensures 
all residents had the same rights as natural-born citizens. The Swedes, or at least the 
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Social Democrats, thought that the best way to facilitate good citizenship was to provide 
all people with the same fundamental social rights which included healthcare, education, 
government stipends, etc.228 The monumental work of Helene Ginsburg in 1983 
highlights the expectation the government had that new arrivals would feel accepted in 
society and would want to live up to certain expectations such as having fulltime 
employment to contribute to Swedish society. Sweden was one of the first countries in 
the world to implement multicultural policies that supported ethnic and religious 
diversity. Even today, individuals who move to Sweden and intend to stay for at least a 
year have access to free university education, universal health care, and job training 
services. 
Sweden's immigration and integration policies gave new arrivals rights 
independent from meeting specific integration requirements such as language tests and 
lengthy residency requirements in order to become a legal resident or a citizen.229 The 
Swedish constitution, Chapter 1, Article 3 in 1974, established principles that allowed 
immigrants to express their own culture. The belief was that this led to immigrants' 
feeling better about themselves, and therefore, they could better integration with the 
Swedish culture.230 There have been numerous shifts in Swedish integration and 
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immigration policies over the years, but the differentiation still remains from its other 
European counterparts that immigration rights are not linked to integration achievements. 
Sweden introduced a few mandatory requirements since the 2000s, such as a minimum 
requirement of 5 years for citizenship. However, residence permits, and citizenship 
remain unlinked from economic and acculturation performance in Sweden. 
Refugees and asylees particularly do not contribute to the welfare state, and if 
they do, they make 20-30 percent fewer earnings than ethnic Swedes and people from 
Western European countries over their lifetime. Economic scholars have explored the 
impact of immigration on the expenditures of social welfare programs. They focused on 
the impact of immigration on the welfare state in terms of spending, and they pondered 
the draw that strong social welfare programs have on immigrants from low-income 
countries. Borjas (1999) argued that the U.S. had a reduction in the number of migrants 
who would leave once they were unemployed because of the social welfare benefits they 
received after losing their jobs.231 A study in Europe (2002) indicated that immigrants 
who moved to generous social welfare programs such as in Sweden and Denmark were 
disproportionately dependent on government stipends compared to the native 
population.232 This is mainly due to low-income earners who use publicly provided 
education systems, medical services, and who will eventually withdraw pensions but 
have not paid significantly into the welfare state.233 The immigrants who earn low- 
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incomes are usually a result of barriers to high wage jobs, particularly refugees and 
asylees, in welfare states.234 The barriers often facilitate a decade of dependence on 
government stipends in addition to robust social welfare securities, which translates to 
long-term poverty for immigrant children. 
Prior to obtaining permit residency in Sweden, the Swedish government has 
established rights for people seeking asylum. According to the Migrationsverket, the 
Swedish Migration Agency, all asylum applicants have a right to emergency healthcare, 
dental care, maternity care, and contraception. People under 18 seeking asylum are 
entitled to the same healthcare and dental care as children who are residents in Sweden. 
The Migration agency provides accommodation while applicants wait for their decision; 
it is free if the individual or family cannot afford it. The government will also provide 
financial support for daily expenses, accommodation, and a special allowance. For 
accommodation where food is provided asylum-seekers receive between 24 SEK ($2.52) 
a day for a single adult where food is provided or 71 SEK ($7.41) day where food is not 
provided by the accommodation. Asylum-seekers can work during their application 
process if they have proper documents proving their identity from their home country. 
Otherwise, they cannot work until they have a work permit. Children have a right to 
attend school under the same conditions as other children. However, adults have to wait 
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until they have a residency to attend school. There is no requirement to learn Swedish to 
get access to citizenship or residency. Only people with a residency permit and a social 
security number have access to language courses. It takes at least four years of legal 
residency for asylum-seekers and refugees to obtain permanent legal residency in Sweden 
or citizenship. Sweden remains one of the easiest countries to get permanent residency 
and citizenship in the European Union, although they have increased scrutiny towards 
applicants since 2017. 
Obtaining legal residency or citizenship is relatively more straightforward in 
Sweden compared to other EU countries such as Denmark, which requires 8-9 years of 
permanent residency for all individuals who are not high-income earners, including 
refugees and asylees. Nevertheless, in Sweden, on average, it could take ten years before 
new arrivals have the job training and language skills to enter into the labor market. 
Although Sweden gives access to residency and citizenship much faster than Denmark, 
entering the labor market and becoming enfranchised into Sweden takes the same amount 
of time as in Denmark, which is between 8-10 years. For example, this could be due to 
new arrivals' inability to validate their education from their home countries whose 
intuitions have been dismantled during the war as in the case of Syria, often educational 
training has to be repeated in Sweden. The lengthy adjustment period could have been a 
result of policy initiatives that require specific benchmarks in the language before 
refugees and asylees have access to jobs. Or, it could be a result of people from war-torn 
countries who might not have had access to stable elementary educational systems who 
need basic educational training before they can join the job market. The government in 
2017 has tried to fast track this process into the labor market for highly skilled asylees 
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and refugees (e.g., doctors, scientists, professors, etc.) by implementing short study 
programs so that they can join the workforce in a couple of years. However, there still 
leaves a large percentage of immigrants and refugees who are not highly skilled, and it 
will take them a long time to adjust to their new life in Sweden. 
Obtaining legal residency or citizenship is relatively more straightforward in 
Sweden compared to other EU countries such as Denmark, which requires 8-9 years of 
permanent residency for all individuals who are not high-income earners, including 
refugees and asylees. Nevertheless, on average, it could take ten years before new arrivals 
have the job training and language skills to enter into the labor market. Although Sweden 
gives access to residency and citizenship much faster than Denmark, entering the labor 
market and becoming enfranchised into Sweden takes the same amount of time as in 
Denmark, about 8-10 years. Lengthy adjustment periods in Sweden could be a result of 
policies that require specific benchmarks in the language before refugees and asylees 
have access to jobs. The government in 2017 tried to fast track this process into the labor 
market for highly skilled asylees and refugees (e.g., doctors, scientists, professors, etc.) 
by implementing short study programs so that they can join the workforce in a couple of 
years. However, this leaves a large percentage of immigrants and refugees who are not 
highly skilled, and it will take them a long time to adjust to their new life in Sweden. 
Throughout the waiting period in Sweden, refugees and asylees not only receive 
social welfare benefits (e.g. education, healthcare, parental stipend for children, etc.), 
which are fundamental rights in Sweden, they also get housing, a food stipend, and living 
allowance to support themselves as they adjust to life in their new country. However, the 
money they receive keeps them at the poverty level. They are, in fact, less wealthy than 
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the native population, and it can be a decade before they can join the workforce and get 
higher-paying jobs. This could set them and their descendants back decades. Immigrants 
and their descendants experience higher poverty rates because of structural practices that 
limited access to jobs, housing, and educational services in both Denmark and Sweden. 
This will be discussed more in Chapter 4. 
CONCLUSION: THE SAME RESULT BUT DIFFERENT STRATEGIES 
 
Economists and political scientists have argued that the Scandinavian welfare 
state’s strength rests on foundations of high levels of trust and solidarity, low levels of 
unemployment, and high taxation.235 Trust and solidarity have traditionally been 
emphasized and have encouraged citizens to accept a robust state that imposes heavy 
taxes to provide social security, employment, and universal healthcare.236 However, 
social trust has started to erode in both Denmark and Sweden with the arrival of non- 
Western immigration.237 As the countries have grappled with fully incorporating these 
newcomers, they chose different paths towards integration. This chapter provided an 
overview of Danish and Swedish history in relation to their assimilation and multicultural 
policies. Denmark chose an aggressive assimilation policy that forced newcomers to 
assimilate by leaving their own culture and religious backgrounds at the border. While 
Sweden chose a policy that supported their humanitarian mission, which promoted 
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Neither of these policies worked as research has revealed that non-Western immigrants 
have higher poverty levels than any group. 
The effects of structural issues related to where immigrants are placed in housing, 
access to employment in both countries, and the general framing as immigrants as “other” 
or socially “less than” has placed non-Western immigrants at a disadvantage. As a result, 
they have higher instances of poverty and dependence on government subsidies. The 
national identities embedded into what it means to be Danish and Swedish are the leading 
cause for immigrants with non-Western backgrounds to not fulling being incorporated 
into the societies. Unresolved issues relating to structural barriers have hindered full 
integration in Denmark and Sweden—the length to becoming enfranchised in both 
countries was the same even though the integration policies were different. Furthermore, 
tensions developed in Denmark and Sweden in similar ways in relation to specifically 
refugees and asylees being a tax burden to society as they tend to have higher 
unemployment and low-wage jobs. 
In conclusion, high functioning welfare states need citizens and residents who 
have the ability to work and contribute to the demands of the high taxed systems. When 
there are more people perceived to take government subsidies rather than contribute to 
the welfare state, the immigrant would feel less welcomed into the host society. In 
Denmark, the notion of sameness has played a tremendous role in building the Danish 
national identity in response to the country losing territory and influence. In the name of 
preserving their culture, language, and ethnicity, Denmark has developed a clear stance 
against immigration, which borders on the line nationalism. Sweden continues to be open 
to multiculturalism, but the Swedish Democrats have gained significant ground in 
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parliament by becoming the third-largest party in parliament. Sweden is slowly becoming 
more restrictive towards immigration as perceptions about refugees and asylees have 
evolved towards a negative stance. It will be interesting to see how immigration and 
integration policies will impact the nations in the future. The next chapter will look at 
survey data collected from Denmark and Sweden that analysis perceptions about 
integration from the perspective of immigrants and the native ethnic populations. 
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CHAPTER IV. PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS 
 
Massive migration has become an international concern to western societies as 
migration can impact a country’s economy, security, and domestic politics.238 The 
perception that a society has towards migrants impacts how that particular group is 
received in the host country and can facilitate tensions with the native population. This 
study revealed through the survey questionnaires that the problems related to immigrants 
integrating in Denmark and Sweden are perceived differently by the native population 
and immigrants. The immigrant population sees the policy initiatives minimally as 
isolating and, in extreme cases, as xenophobic. As large influxes of diverse migrant 
groups come, citizens feel threatened because of nationalism and in-group out-group 
dynamics.239 The survey questionnaire was the research tool used in this analysis of 
immigrant integration. 
Prior to conducting the primary analysis, the survey data were screened for 
completeness, missing value patterns, outliers, and violations of specific statistical 
assumptions. Of the 1029 respondents who participated in the survey, 50% began the 
survey but did not complete a single question; this is normal for survey data as most tend 
to get a response rate of just 30 percent. A small proportion of respondents (4.5%) 
completed between 2%–77% of the survey. Forty-five (45.6%) percent of respondents 
completed 100% of the survey. All analyses conducted in this study used data from the 
 
238 Greenhill discusses threats to a state’s security from migrant sending states while Samuel Scheffler in 
the article Immigration and the Significance of Culture (2009) exams migration as a threat to national 
identity. Both of these perspectives are valid and, in fact, are connected. Modern nation-states often feel 
threatened when large numbers of migrants move to the country which impact cultural practices and the 
availability of domestic resources. 
239 Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe; Gellner and Breuilly, Nations 
and Nationalism, Second Edition (New Perspectives on the Past). 
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second and third groups of respondents, who completed the majority of the survey. Thus, 
the sample included a total of 515 respondents. Analysis of missing value patterns 
indicated that the percentage of missing data ranged from 6.4% for religion and 28.7% 
for income. Little and Rubin’s 2002 Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test 
indicated that missing data appear to follow certain patterns as indicated by a significant 
chi-square (2 = 209.29, df = 33, p < .001).240 Studies show that many people do not feel 
comfortable responding to questions about their religion or income, which accounts for 
this missing data and this suggests that the missing data pattern may not be random.241 
Given the sample size and to limit bias, four outliers were removed from the 
study. Examination of the outliers revealed that four respondents had scores below three 
standard deviations from the mean for perceived integration. Some of the common 
methods to accommodate data with outliers include data transformation and data 
truncation. Transformed data are difficult to interpret, particularly when the raw scores 
have meaningful scales.242 Exclusion of outliers may lead to an underestimation of 
standard errors thereby reducing analytic efficiency.243 Given the sample size and to 
avoid any bias resulting from the inclusion of outliers, I excluded the four outliers from 
 
 
240 Roderick J. A. Little and Donald B. Rubin, Statistical Analysis with Missing Data (John Wiley & Sons, 
2014). 
241 In a future survey, I would consider thinking of ways to help people respond to question prompts better. 
However, a specific strategy to combat this issue is to use the data that is available. See Costello and 
Osborne 2005 for more details about using a dataset with missing data. They argued that this was a 
legitimate strategy because the research is using the information available and not making assumptions. 
242 Jason W. Osborne, “The Effects of Minimum Values on Data Transformations,” April 2002. Data 
transformation is used when moving data from one source to another. For instance, the data were 
collected using Qualtrics Survey services and the responses were transferred to SPSS and R for analysis. 
Moving data from one system to another can sometimes impact the results of the data. 
243 Jason W. Osborne and Amy Overbay, “The Power of Outliers (and Why Researchers Should Always 
Check for Them),” Practical Assessment Research and Evaluation, no. 9 (2004). 
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the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test. Although ANOVA is robust in its assumption of 
normality, skewness and kurtosis were tested for values of perceived integration. Results 
of the analysis showed that in absolute value terms, both the skewness value of 
.29(SE=.12) and kurtosis value of .31(SE=.23) were within acceptable limits. The 
histogram in Figure 3 also confirms that the perceived measure of integration does not 








RELIABILITY OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
The measure of perceived integration comprised of five items that tend to reflect 
five dimensions of integration. The dimensions ranged from satisfaction with life in 
general, to satisfaction with level of education, to satisfaction with neighborhood safety. 
To check that the measure assesses the underlying ideas of perceived integration, a 
reliability analysis was carried out and was tested using Cronbach’s alpha test. This test 
measures the reliability of the scale used in the quantitative scientific tests. The results 
indicated that the tools used to measure perceptions of integration are reliable. Alpha 
values higher than .90 indicated that the internal validity of the survey results are 
excellent and alpha values higher than .70 indicated that internal consistency is 
acceptable. The current samples perceived an integration scale at ( = .77). This is a 
similar result to the reliability test performed using similar instruments, such as the ICS 
in 2013, and the NAS study in 2013, which looked at adult migrants in Taiwan and 
Denmark respectively.244 This test shows that the survey tool and scale are a reliable 
method of analysis. 
Descriptive Statistics of the Survey Respondents 
 
Table 3 presents the demographic characteristics of the survey sample of Danish 
and Swedish participants. The table shows that over half (52.5%) of the participants 




244 See the following studies. Shu-Fen Kuo et al., “The Development and Psychometric Testing of East 
Asian Acculturation Scale among Asian Immigrant Women in Taiwan,” Ethnicity & Health 18, no. 1 
(February 1, 2013): 18–33; Paola Masillo, “A Comparability Study of Two Italian Language Proficiency 
Tests for Adult Migrants” (12th Annual EALTA Conference Policy and Practice in Language Testing and 
Assessment, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2013). 
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that the vast majority (94%) of respondents are citizens or permanent legal residents in 
their respective countries, this number includes people with immigrant backgrounds born 
in the host country. A large majority (78.2%) of respondents were ethnic Danish or 
Swedish citizens. Less than 25 percent (21.8%) were immigrants, descendants of 
immigrants, or had at least one parent who immigrated to Denmark or Sweden. The 
majority of people who completed the survey were between the ages of 18–54 years old. 
The number of respondents over 54 years old was just 16.4%. See Table 1 below. 
 
 
TABLE 3. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
 
Variable Category Frequency Percentage 
Gender Female 226 52.7 
 
Male 254 46.9 
 
Other 2 .4 
Legal Status Citizen 446 94 
 
PLR 15 3.2 
 
RP 13 2.7 
Age Range 18–34 202 41.7 
 
35–54 202 41.7 
 
55 and above 80 16.5 
Background Native 338 78.2 
 
Immigrant 100 21.8 
 
Key: PLR= Permanent Legal Resident; RP= Residence Permit 
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Main Analysis of the Survey Data 
 
To address the first question a two-way ANOVA was used. A two-way analysis 
variance (ANOVA) test is used to look at the main effects of the independent variables to 
see if there is an interaction or a relationship between variables. This question was 
concerned with not only how perceived integration might vary by country but also 
considered whether the effect of perceived integration might differ across native born 
citizens and immigrants. Perceived integration was subjected to a two-way ANOVA, 
concerning Denmark versus Sweden, and native-born populations versus immigrants. 
More specifically, a two-way ANOVA with two main effects and an interaction effect 
was conducted to compare mean levels of perceived integration. The descriptive statistics 
for perceived integration by country and immigration are presented in Table 4. The mean 
perceived integration across countries and immigration status appear to show that there 
are no differences between the two countries and perspectives of integration. 
The ANOVA results indicated that the main effect for the respondent country was 
not statistically significant, F(1, 232) = 2.29, p = .13, suggesting that there are no 
statistically significant differences between Denmark and Sweden in how immigrants are 
perceived to be integrated in each country. This is validated by the fact that poverty levels 
are high in both countries specifically for children with immigrant backgrounds 
according to the 2015 OECD report on poverty. Similarly, the results indicated that the 
main effect for respondent’s immigration or natural citizenship status was not statistically 
significant, F(1, 232) = .06, p = .80, suggesting that there are no statistically significant 
differences between native born citizens and immigrants in how they perceived 
immigrants’ level of integration to their respective society. Not surprisingly, the 
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interaction effect (native born citizen and immigrant) was not significant either, F(1, 232) 
 
= 1.02, p = .3. Immigrants and the native-born population views of perceived integration 
was very similar and the difference in opinions was not statistically significant between 
each group in Denmark and Sweden. 
 
TABLE 4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INTEGRATION BY COUNTRY AND GENERATION 
 
 
Country Population Mean SD #Respondents 
Denmark Immigrant 3.96 .52 21 
 
Native 3.85 .60 195 
Sweden Immigrant 3.75 .65 34 
 
Native 3.81 .53 186 
Total Immigrant 3.84 .57 381 
 
Native 3.83 .57 436 
 
 
In addition to between country differences, this study examined the contribution 
of religion and income to integration of immigrants into the host country. The increasing 
number of Muslims in Europe has painted them as a threat to western Europeans 
especially with the rise of jihadist terrorism and the perception that Muslim women 
particularly pose a threat because they tend to not work but withdraw welfare benefits for 
their children.245 Income has continuously been a factor related to perceptions of 
integration, whereas a person with high incomes tend to be perceived to be more 
 
245 Milan Obaidi et al., “Living under Threat: Mutual Threat Perception Drives Anti-Muslim and Anti- 
Western Hostility in the Age of Terrorism,” European Journal of Social Psychology 48, no. 5 (August 1, 
2018): 567–84. 
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integrated. Towards this end, two one-way ANOVAs (i.e., one for religion category and 
another for income category) were conducted. A one-way between subjects’ ANOVA to 
compare the differences in perceived integration among four categories of religion 
revealed that the effect for the religion category was statistically significant, F(3, 432) = 
3.58, p = .01. Multiple comparison results indicated Christians reporting signifyingly 
higher perceived integration than respondents in the “Other” religious category and 
Muslim religious category (see Tables 5 and 6). 
 
TABLE 5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PERCEIVED INTEGRATION BY RELIGIOUS CATEGORY 
 
 
Religious Category Mean SD n 
Christian 3.92 .56 184 
Muslim 3.82 .74 19 
Other 3.63 .65 48 
No-Religion 3.80 .53 185 
 




TABLE 6. ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PERCEIVED INTEGRATION BY RELIGION 
 
Source SS df MS F p 
Between Groups 3.45 3 1.15 3.58 .01 
Within Groups 138.71 432 .32 
  
Total 6555.28 435 
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Similarly, a one-way between subjects’ ANOVA test that compared the 
differences in perceived integration among five income categories revealed that the effect 
of income was statistically significant, F(3, 366) = 7.57, p < .01 (see Table 7). The one- 
way ANOVA is used when comparing categorical independent variables and one 
continuous variable. Multiple comparison results indicated those with low (3.58) income 
reported signifyingly lower perceived integration than those who had indicated high 
(3.97) or very high (4.12) income categories. Interestingly, the low-income (3.58) and 
medium (3.79) income group did not differ from the group that refused (7.74) to provide 
income information. This shows that income level and religion may have an impact on 
perceived immigrant integration. 
 
TABLE 7. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PERCEIVED INTEGRATION BY INCOME CATEGORY 
 
Income Category Mean SD n 
Low 3.58 .58 45 
Medium 3.79 .59 113 
High 3.97 .50 80 
Very High 4.12 .38 38 




TABLE 8. ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PERCEIVED INTEGRATION BY INCOME 
 
Source SS Df MS F p 
Between Groups 8.71 4 2.18 7.57 .000 
Within Groups 104.15 362 .29 
  
Total 112.86 366    
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In addition to determining the role of income and religion, the project examined if 
there are country level differences in several indices of integration, in other words, 
whether respondents voted in the previous election, believed that full integration is 
possible, and thought that immigrants are treated well. To examine patterns across the 
two countries, a chi-square test of independence was utilized. Table 9 presents cross 
tabulations and chi-square tests for the integration indices by country. As can be seen 
from the table, there are no significant differences between respondents who resided in 
the two countries with regard to whether they voted in the previous election or whether 
they believed that full integration was possible. Nevertheless, there was a significant 
difference between residents in both countries regarding whether they thought 
immigrants are treated well. The table shows that immigrants in Denmark are perceived 
to be treated better than immigrants in Sweden. In Denmark 68.1% of respondents said 
that immigrants are treated well whereby 56.1% of respondents in Sweden said that 
immigrants are treated well. Treated “well” was defined as having the same level of 
access to jobs, education, and housing at the same level as the native population. 
Nonetheless, the table also shows that a similar percentage, 89.3% in Denmark and 
87.8% of respondents in Sweden, thought that immigrants were actually integrated into 
the host society. 
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TABLE 9. CROSS TABULATIONS AND 𝒙𝟐 TEST RESULTS FOR INTEGRATION INDICES BY COUNTRY 
 
Variables Denmark Sweden Chi-Square Tests 
of Independence 
Voted 𝑥$ (1) = 2.03, 
 
p = .09 
 
 
(1) = .84, 
 
p = .22 
 
 
(1) = 7.41, 
 
p = .02 
 
 






The research study also aims to address whether people with non-Western cultural 
backgrounds are less likely to integrate in Europe. It was expected that Muslims, 
Africans, and people from the Middle East (non-Westerners) have a more difficult time 
integrating into Europe. To test this a chi-square test of independence was used. A chi- 
square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between each country 
and the perceived difficulties in integrating into society for some ethnic or religious 
groups. The relation country and the perceived difficulty for Muslims to integrate into 
Western European society was not statistically significant, X2 (2, N = 429) = .20, p =.90 
in each country. Similarly, the perceived difficulty for Africans, Eastern Europeans, 
Western Europeans, North Americans, Asians and South Americans to integrate into the 
No n (%) 50(24.9%) 39(19%)  
 



























Yes n (%) 141(68.1%) 119(56.1%)  
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host country were not statistically significant different from each country (see Table 10). 
This means that the perceived difficulty for immigrants from non-Western backgrounds 
to integrate was viewed as the same by respondents in Denmark and Sweden. About half 
of the respondents found it very difficult or difficult for Muslims and Africans to 
successfully integrate in both countries and one fourth said that it was either not easy/not 
difficult and less than a fourth said that it was very easy/easy for them to integrate. This 
shows that the ethnic/religious background is often perceived as a huge barrier to 
integration according to the survey respondents. 
The data in Table 10 show that perceptions play a major role in how immigrants 
and the native population interact with each other. Other Nordic peoples were seen as 
easily able to integrate (62.4%) in other Scandinavian societies followed by North 
Americans (53.8% Denmark and 54.6% Sweden) and Western Europeans ( 47.9% 
Denmark and 52.1% Sweden). Interestingly, North Americans were seen as better able to 
integrate into both Denmark and Sweden than people from other EU countries. Eastern 
Europeans (38.5% Denmark and 31.5% Sweden), South Americans (32.5% Denmark and 
31.9 % Sweden) and Asians (30.2% Denmark and 27.3% Sweden) were seen as similarly 
able to integrate into Denmark and Sweden. The backgrounds that were perceived to be 
the least likely to easily integrated were Muslims (22.5% Denmark and 21.8% Sweden) 
and lastly Africans ( 20.2% Denmark and 19.9% Sweden). 
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Muslims 𝑥$ (2) = .20, 
 







Africans 𝑥$ (2) = 1.45, 
 

















𝑥$ (2) = 2.65, 
 
p = .27 
 



















𝑥$ (2) = 2.36, 
 
p = .31 
NEND n (%) 80(37.6%) 92(42.6%) 
 
VD/D n (%) 51(23.9%) 56(25.9%) 
 
 
VE= Very Easy, E = Easy, NE = Not Easy, ND = Not Difficult, VD= Very Difficult, D = Difficult 
VE/E n (%) 48(22.5%) 47(21.8%) 
NEND n (%) 58(27.2%) 63(29.2%) 
VD/D n (%) 107(50.2%) 102(49.1%) 
 
VE/E n (%) 43(20.2%) 43(19.9%) 
NEND n (%) 60(28.2%) 72(33.3%) 
VD/D n (%) 110(51.6%) 101(46.8%) 
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Denmark Sweden Chi-Square Tests 
of Independence 
North America   𝑥$ (2) = 5.260 
VE/E n (%) 
 







p = .07 




𝑥$ (2) = 1 
VE/E n (%) 64(30.2%) 59(27.3%) p = .97 
NEND n (%) 95(44.8%) 100(46.3%)  




𝑥$ (2) = .24, 
 





Nordics 𝑥$ (2) = 8.29, 
 
VE/E n (%) 133(62.4%) 139(63.4%) 
 
NEND n (%) 36(16.9%) 18(8.3%) 
 
VD/D n (%) 48(20.7%) 54(27.3%) 
p = .01 
 
 




BARRIERS TO IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN DENMARK AND SWEDEN 
 
The governments in Denmark and Sweden passed laws to help immigrants learn 
the language, help immigrants obtain gainful employment to support themselves, help 
them navigate the naturalization process, and learn the host countries’ norms and values. 
The spectrum of how these systems work varies, but the general understanding is that all 
VE/E n (%) 69(32.5%) 69(31.9%) 
NEND n (%) 99(46.7%) 98(45.4%) 
VD/D n (%) 44(20.8%) 49(22.7%) 
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of these values are important to integration. A study from the National Academy of 
Science, Engineering, and Medicine in 2015 found that the level of education, language 
ability, and income all help improve immigrants and their descendant’s integration 
process. Nonetheless, there are often barriers that could hinder integration despite the 
goals of policy. 
Integration refers to the degree to which new arrivals obtain a job, learn the host 
language, secure an education, and participate in civic life. Another factor to integration 
is based on where immigrants live. For instance, people who live in poor immigrant 
majority communities are perceived not to be integrated while people who live in a 
community with the majority of ethnic Danes or Swedes are argued to be more 
integrated. Therefore, categories of integration are important aspects of how countries 
measure integration but are by no means exhaustive or a perfect measure of it. Measuring 
immigrant integration is complex because some of the categories are representative of 
problems in societies overall and do not reflect issues specific to immigrants. Such as the 
issues of most immigrant communities having high instances of poverty while also 
encompasses people largely with immigrant backgrounds; this could be an integration 
issue or simply a problem reflected in society. Nonetheless, starting somewhere by using 
rigorous research from scholars and policy institutions in the United States and Europe 
helps to establish a base point for examining integration. 
 
 






p = 0.569 p = 0.937 
Chi Square 0.324 Chi Square 0.00632 
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Ethnic Dane  Danish Ethnic Swedes  Swedish 
Immigrants  Immigrants 
Yes No 
0.0% 
15.6% 15.1% 8.1% 11.3% 
50.0% 
Is It Possible for Non-Western 
Immigrants to Integrate? 
     88.7% 91.9% 84.9% 84.4%  100.0% 




The question arrives then that if most people in both countries believe that integration is 
possible why are there larger portions of the population with non-Western immigrant 
backgrounds 28% more likely to be impoverished than the native ethnic population when 
everyone is supposed the have the same access to resources in the welfare state? Given 
this fact, there must be a study to examine the barriers to integration. 
The most prominent barriers to integration were perceived to be learning the 
language, finding a job, racism and discrimination, and cultural barriers for immigrants 
and the native population, see Chart 2. The table shows the percentage of each group’s 
ranking of specific issues related to barriers to integration in Denmark and Sweden. The 
percentages indicated how many people show that specific issue as important.246 
Immigrants in Denmark ranked the most important barriers such as language, finding a 
job, and racism and discrimination (respectively) as the top three issues for integration. 
 
246 The categories for barriers to integration were created based on interviews with immigrants in both 
Denmark and Sweden. When I heard a barrier mentioned in the interview multiple times, I included it in 
the survey questionnaire. To me, this indicated that it was an issue important to the integration process 
that needed to be explored in greater detail. 
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0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
25.3% 13.9% 28.5% 46.2% 26.6% 56.3% Ethnic Swedes 
Language 
Children Succeeding 
Finding a job 
Finding housing 
Accessing Government Services 
Racism and discrimination 
Cultural Barriers 
14.6% 4.9% 14.6% 51.2% 12.2% 39.0% Swedish Immigrants 
37.1% 7.1% 17.1% 18.2% 45.3% 65.9% Ethnic Danes 
40.5% 13.5%   16.2% 29.7% 21.6% 59.5% Danish Immigrants 










Ethnic Danes said language, cultural barriers, and children succeeding (respectively) as 
the most prominent barriers to integration. Immigrants in Sweden said that finding a job, 
language, and cultural barriers were hindrances. Ethnic Swedes said language, finding a 
job, and cultural barriers were the top three issues for integration. About 30 percent of 
immigrants in Denmark said racism and discrimination were a problem while just 18.2% 
of ethnic Danes said it was a problem. In Sweden, 28% of ethnic Swedes said that racism 
was an issue for integration compared to the opposite just 14.6% of immigrants in 
Sweden who said it was a problem. Racism and discrimination played an important role 
in barriers to integration largely for immigrants in Denmark and for the ethnic Swedes. 
This aligns with the interviews that were conducted with the participants. The following 
sections will discuss the prominent barriers to integration and use supporting evidence 
from interviews with people from the host countries. 
 
 
CHART 2. PROMINENT ISSUES IMMIGRANTS FACE 
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Barrier One: Perceptions of Immigrants’ Language Ability 
 
The survey questionnaire asked people living in Denmark and Sweden what they 
thought were the most prominent issues immigrants encountered when adjusting to life in 
the countries. The data showed that 65.9% of ethnic Danes and 59.5% of Danish 
immigrants thought that learning the language was the most important issue while 56.3% 
of ethnic Swedes and just 39% of Swedish immigrants said that learning the language 
was a prominent issue. The majority of people marked language as the number one issue 
in each group. Many other scholars support this notion that learning the language of the 
country in which one lives is crucial for successful integration particularly in the areas of 
job placement, making friends with the local population, and accomplishing an everyday 
task in a new country from purchasing bread at a store to getting legal documents.247 
Language is presented as a barrier because of the misperceptions surrounding who can 
speak and who cannot speak the host country languages. Most immigrants are presumed 
not to speak Danish or Swedish because the native populations are not accustomed to 
foreigners speaking their language. 
Immigrants today generally can function in Scandinavia without learning Danish 
or Swedish if they know English and/or German; however, integration is difficult when 
the immigrant does not know the host country’s language.248 Swedish and Danish post- 
 
 
247 Borevi, Jensen, and Mouritsen, “The Civic Turn of Immigrant Integration Policies in the Scandinavian 
Welfare States”; Goodman, “Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake? Identifying, Categorising 
and Comparing Civic Integration Policies”; Ager and Strang, “Understanding Integration”; Rafael 
Alarcón et al., Making Los Angeles Home: The Integration of Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 
1st ed. (University of California Press, 2016); Banulescu-Bogdan, “Shaping Citizenship Policies to 
Strengthen Immigrant Integration.” 
 
248 Oers, Ersbøoll, and Kostakopoulou, A Re-Definition of Belonging? 
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undergraduate programs at the master’s and Ph.D. levels are entirely in English. The 
Bachelor’s degree programs have English-taught courses, but they are limited. The fact 
that the majority of courses at the master’s and Ph.D. level suggests that English is a 
well-known language in Denmark and Sweden. Most people can function without 
knowing the local language; however, knowing the native language in host countries 
always leads to better integration and understanding of the local population and 
culture.249 Governments have recognized this importance and therefore have emphasized 
language obtainment for new arrivals. The governments in Denmark and Sweden have 





Danish Language Immersion Process 
 
 
Denmark in 1998 had a loose language requirement integration; however, the 
country broadened the law in 2002 to require all new arrivals to learn Danish up to B2 
(high intermediate) if they intended to obtain citizenship or permanent residency. 
Generally, speaking the immigrants who arrived after 2002 took formal language courses 
and had proficiency in Danish. One perspective in Denmark is that immigrants who 
arrived prior to this continue to lack Danish language skills because the government did 




249 Oers, Ersbøoll, and Kostakopoulou; Linda M. Crawford-Lange and Dale L. Lange, “Doing the 
Unthinkable in the Second-Language Classroom: A Process for the Integration of Language and Culture,” 
1984. 
139  
and 1990s, particularly immigrant Muslim women who have been out of the workforce 
for decades, are often portrayed in the media as not being able to communicate in 
Danish.250 According to the Ministry of Immigration and Integration, 47 percent of non- 
Western working-aged immigrant women are employed compared to 74 percent of 
Danish women who are employed. Since language is a crucial aspect of integration and 
working helps develop language skills and cultural immersion, it is largely believed that 
non-Western immigrant women do not speak Danish because they have been house- 
wives for their families. Denmark did not have a stringent language requirement in order 
to obtain citizenship until 2002, so there was no real incentive to learn Danish. 
Today, language courses in Denmark are offered through the local municipalities 
and through private language schools for everyone.251 It can take 2-8 years to obtain the 
B2 level required for Danish citizenship or permanent residency. Course prices range 
from 1,000 DK ($150) to 2,000 DK ($300) per level depending on the length of the 
courses and the language level, individuals can take courses as many times as it takes to 
pass the course, and the government covered the costs. Assimilation costs can often be 
high for social welfare states, especially when covering the costs for migrants.252 For this 
 
250 Peter Nannestad, “A Game Real Actors Won’t Play? Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Denmark as a 
Collective Action Dilemma,” The International Migration Review 38, no. 1 (2004): 287–308; Mikkel 
Rytter, “‘The Family of Denmark’ and ‘the Aliens’: Kinship Images in Danish Integration Politics,” 
Ethnos 75, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 301–22. 
251 As a Fulbright scholar in Denmark from August 2017 through January 2018, I had free access to Danish 
language courses. I met with a language in-take assessment administrator who interviewed me based on 
my prior language skills and educational level to assess my capabilities to learn Danish. Since I had high 
intermediate proficiency in Bulgarian, a language I learned as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Bulgaria, and 
because I am pursuing my Ph.D. I was placed in a higher language group. While the language assessment 
officer was interviewing me, I wondered how the Danish government could afford the costs for every 
migrant from the EU and outside of the EU to attend numerous years of language classes. The 
government eventually changed the policy because of the costs. 
252 Masatoshi Jinno, “Assimilation, Immigration, and the Welfare State,” FinanzArchiv/Public Finance 
Analysis 67, no. 1 (2011): 46–63. 
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reason, starting in 2019 the Ministry of Immigration and Integration in Denmark 
announced that it will no longer offer language courses for free and that they require all 
EU citizens and migrants to pay for their language courses required for citizenship or 
permanent legal residency. The only exception is for refugees and asylees; the 
government will continue to pay for their language and educational training. It would be 
interesting to see how this impacts Western immigrants, who tend to be high-income 
earners, and their decision to become permanent residents or citizens in Denmark. 
The survey showed that learning and speaking Danish is one of the most 
important aspects of integration, but the survey also showed that most immigrants are at 
least fluent in Danish, see Chart 3 below. Of the total number of people with immigrant 
backgrounds who completed the survey, 55 percent said they were native speakers, 32 
percent said that they were fluent, and just 13.2 percent said they had basic Danish 
language skills. This shows that the language requirement in Denmark is being enforced 
and people speak Danish. Furthermore, second and third-generation immigrants grew up 
speaking Danish in schools. The perception that immigrants do not speak Danish is a 
gross exaggeration when nearly 88 percent of immigrants are fluent in Danish, which has 
been confirmed by other studies.253 
 
 






253 Hjarn v Zernichow Borberg, Nydansk er nydanskere og danskere virkelig så forskellige?, 1st ed. 
(Multivers, 2016); Jørgensen, “Decentralising Immigrant Integration: Denmark’s Mainstreaming 
Initiatives in Employment, Education, and Social Affairs”; Ministry of Finance, “Act Amending the Act 
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Studies have shown that immigrants who were not born or raised in Denmark 
speak Danish, but it is with an accent. Danes automatically assume that they are not 
fluent in the language when they hear an accent because Danes are not used to hearing 
their language spoken by foreigners.254 Comparatively, native English speakers are more 
accustomed to different accents in English not only because so many different native- 
English accents exist (e.g., the United Kingdom, United States, Ireland, Australia, etc.), 
but also because so many non-Native speakers speak and write in English. It is much 
easier for native-English speakers to accept different English accents then it is for Danes 
to accept different Danish accents. According to the self-assessment, most immigrants in 
Denmark speak Danish, albeit maybe with an accent. In Denmark, although some of the 
older generations of immigrants might not know Danish fluently because there was no 
language requirement, the younger generations who went through school in Denmark 
speak Danish fluently and know Danish culture—Danish is their native tongue. 
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Sweden does not have formal language requirements to obtain citizenship, 
although they do require refugees and asylees to take language courses as part of their 
education and job training. The results from the survey indicated that the majority of 
immigrants in Sweden who took the survey are not native speakers. A total of 84.4% 
listed themselves as fluent in Swedish, while only 12.5% of immigrants said they were 
native speakers, and just 3.1% said that they had only basic Swedish language skills. 
These numbers are very different from Denmark, where the majority of immigrants were 
native speakers. Furthermore, more people indicated that they were not fluent in Danish 
(13.2%) compared to the number who said they were not fluent in Sweden (3.1%). Given 
that Sweden does not have a language requirement for citizenship or permanent legal 
residency, it is surprising that fewer immigrants are fluent in Danish compared to 
immigrants in Sweden. Language acquisition in Sweden has always been a tool of 
integration for the country, but no a tool for citizenship or residency. 
 
 
CHART 4. IMMIGRANTS SELF-ASSESSED LANGUAGE ABILITY (SWEDEN) 
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To get permanent residency or citizenship in Sweden, the person must be at least 
18 years old, have legally lived in Sweden for at least five years, conducted themselves 
according to the law, pay all government fines, and have a permanent residence at the 
time of applying. If a person is applying for citizenship and has lived with their registered 
partner for at least two years, they can apply for Swedish citizenship after three years of 
legal residency. Sweden does not have an official language requirement or cultural 
knowledge tests for immigrants to obtain citizenship or residency. Although Sweden does 
not have a language requirement for immigrants, it does have a national language school, 
called Svenskundervisning för invandrare (SFI), Swedish for immigrants in English, that 
plays an integral role in integration. 
SFI has existed in Sweden since the 1960s to help immigrants learn Swedish and 
has part of the state’s integration process since then. Knowledge of the Swedish language 
is seen by the Swedish government as important to becoming acquainted with Swedish 
culture and an important first step to the process of employment.255 The laws changed in 
Sweden in 1973 when the government realized that labor migrants who were recruited in 
the late 1950s through the mid-1960s to meet industry labor shortages were staying 
permanently in Sweden.256 The laws in 1973 gave labor migrants the right to be 
compensated while they took time away from work to learn Swedish. In 1986 the 
teaching structure changed again after an evaluation from the government revealed that 
the language courses needed to be aligned with additional educational training for new 
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arrivals. As a result, the teaching structure split into two specific areas of instruction: 
language training and basic education for foreigners. SFI focused on adult language 
training for foreigners while adult basic education program Komunal Vuxenutbildning 
(Komvux), the municipal adult education in English, allowed foreigners to obtain a 
grammar school and high school level education in Sweden.257 This was important for 
refugees and asylees who came from war-torn countries who might not have had access 
to education in their home countries, whose educational systems in their home countries 
were not comparable to Sweden, or for individuals who did not have access to their 
transcripts from their home countries and needed additional training in Sweden. 
Language acquirement is important to the integration process. The goal of 
integration is to allow immigrants the ability to take part in political, social, economic, 
and cultural life in their host country to live at the same level as the native population. 
The ability to speak the host country language is an important part of the integration 
process. However, many factors need to be considered on behalf of the migrant as 
linguistic abilities often differ depending on where immigrants migrated from and their 
socioeconomic status in their home country. Immigrants who come from a multilingual 
region (such as Africans, and South East Asians) or because the process of migrating 
exposed immigrants to new languages may make them more aware of linguistic 
differences, which leads to faster retention of a new language.258 
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The ability of a new arrival to navigate a new society is impacted by their 
background. The rise of refugees and asylees from war-torn Iraq and Somalia since 2005, 
who came from poor backgrounds and destroyed educational infrastructures, could have 
facilitated integration issues related to language learning and access to employment in 
Sweden. Language development relates to people’s abilities to learn given their 
psychological situation, their exposure to other languages, their educational history, and 
so on. Given all these different scenarios, barriers related to language learning, and 
perceptions about who can and cannot speak the language, has become a crucial identifier 
of integration. Employment, especially in the context of the welfare state, is an important 
part of helping new arrivals learn the host country language. The next section will discuss 
the barriers to integration as related to employment. 
Barrier Two: Immigrants Access to Employment 
 
As mentioned previously, employment has become a central issue to integration 
in Denmark and in Sweden based on an analysis from the OECD in 2007 and again in 
2015 showing that Scandinavia countries are among the worst performers in terms of 
non-Western immigrants participating in the workforce. As a result, immigrants have 
lower incomes, higher poverty rates, and immigrants are overrepresented among 
government allowance recipients.259 Immigrants’ success in the labor market depends on 
many factors related to the immigrant themselves, the country of origin, the circumstance 
of migration, class and the destination country. Taking into consideration the labor 
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not had exposure to a Germanic language. Furthermore, high minimum wage and labor 
market demands for high levels of formal education qualifications place new arrivals who 
do not meet these standards at a significant disadvantage.260 Labor market migration has 
become the key indicator as to rather immigrants are integrated or not in a host society. 
To this end, Scandinavian countries have implemented new integration programs in 
2007/8 and again in 2014/15 to better facilitate labor market integration. 
Integration in Scandinavia has largely become a labor market integration issue. 
The Ministry of Labor in Sweden is in charge of integration policies and works with a 
host of other ministries and agencies (i.e., ministry of justice, Swedish Migration Board, 
the Police, the Migration courts, etc.) that facilitate immigrant integration. The Ministry 
of Immigration and Integration in Denmark in the same vein has made employment a 
central issue for integration. The survey data collected in this study show that a large 
percentage of immigrants and the native populations in Denmark and in Sweden named 
“finding a job” as a prominent issue of integration, see Chart 5 below. More than one- 
third of all immigrants and the native population in Denmark ranked employed as the top 
issue for immigrants. Immigrants in Sweden ranked it as the number one issue pertaining 
to immigrants while immigrants in Denmark ranked it as the second most important issue 
for immigrants. All of the groups (immigrants and the ethnic populations) listed 
employment as the first or second important factor. In both countries the goal is to speed- 
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Sweden: Labor Market Integration 
 
The Swedish government’s major focus by the start of the 2000s was to 
streamline the integration process for immigrants from the moment they settled in the 
country to get them into the workforce. In early 2011, the Ministry of Integration and 
Gender Equality was ended by the center-right government coalition.261 The 
responsibility of integration was handed over to the Ministry of Labor with a Minister of 
Equality responsible for working against discrimination and segregation. The focus on 
employment is not unusual because, as mentioned previously, Sweden has one of the 
highest unemployment rates of all OECD of foreign-born residents compared to the 
native population, 28% of non-Western immigrants in Sweden are unemployed.262 The 
unemployment level increased, according to the Migro research report in 2013, due to the 
large influx of refugees and asylees from Iraq (39 percent) and Somalia (25 percent) since 
2008 whose educational systems have been disrupted from war. One issue is that highly 
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qualified migrants, refugees, and asylees credentials cannot be verified or recognized by 
the Swedish government because the home institutions are not reliable for verification. 
Non-Western immigrants from those countries also lack language skills to work in the 
Swedish labor market, not to mention that a destroyed educational infrastructure can 
hinder education attainment later. For instance, if a medical doctor, economist, or 
university professor from Somalia does not speak Swedish, or at least English, it is very 
difficult for them to find a comparable job in Sweden even though they are highly 
educated. Those skillsets are needed in Sweden but are not transferrable if one cannot 
speak Swedish. This situation places high-skilled labor in under-employed positions or 
renders them unemployable. 
The Ministry of Labor allotted funds to address disparities in the workforce by 
creating government operated programs in conjunction with language immersion 
programs. Instegsjobb (initial job) was created by the government in 2007 to help 
immigrants get into the labor market while they are also learning Swedish. The entry 
level positions provide government wage subsidies of 80% for up to 24 months for 
companies that hire immigrants. The benefit for the employer is the obvious fact that they 
do not have to pay full wages for the new arrivals. The work entry program for 
immigrants takes place during SFI language education, once the SFI courses are 
completed, the entry level job ends and the ability to participate in the program also ends. 
In 2008 and later 2014, Sweden made additional reforms that allowed employers more 
leeway for non-Western immigrants who arrived in Sweden with English language skills. 
The Swedish strategy for integration included a faster track for language immersion, and 
access to work, school, and adult training programs. 
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The Swedish government is trying to dismantle barriers to integration by targeting 
people when they first arrive to the country. In 2014, the government implemented one- 
year study programs, tests in certain subjects instead of lengthy reeducation programs, 
and a fast-past Swedish language immersion program for highly educated individuals 
who arrive in Sweden to get jobs in similar fields where they worked in their home 
countries. The goals were to adapt an education plan that took into consideration the 
educational experiences that individuals brought with them. Having options meant that 
the new arrivals had a higher chance of completing language instruction and getting into 
the workforce. Another new initiative included in these reforms was the adult-education 
(folkhögskolor) programs that included fast past educational programs for adult learners. 
Not all people with immigrant backgrounds are new arrivals, so the government 
has also taken initiatives to incorporate impoverished people living in the suburbs of 
major cities around Sweden into society. These initiatives are largely led by the 
municipalities, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and immigrant associations. For 
instance, the Assyrian Federation carries out integration-related work. The Chilean 
community (Chilenska riksförbundet) organizes advocacy work for the labor market to 
promote equality, voting rights, and they do work around anti-racism. The Turkish 
community has Turkiska Riksförbudet, which promotes awareness about integration 
issues for Turkish immigrants, anti-discrimination measures, and they also host cultural 
events that promote acceptance and cross-cultural learning. There are numerous Cultural 
Centers in Sweden in immigrant majority neighborhoods, such as Mångkulturellt centrum 
(Multicultural Center) that promotes research-based practices related to integration. 
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The most recent focus of the Ministry of Labor has geared towards helping 
immigrant women get into the workforce. Government reports consistently show that 
immigrant women are the lowest paid and have the highest unemployment rate in 
Sweden—they make up 63.1 percent of the 28 percent of those registered as unemployed 
in Sweden. The goal is to get more immigrant women into the labor market, according to 
the Minister of Labor Ylva Johansson.263 The Ministry of Labor recently allotted 300 
million SEK ($31.5 million) to the employment of immigrant women. The first step is for 
immigrant women to learn Swedish. Since many immigrant women do not work when 
their children are young, the goal is to have language courses for those who are on 
parental leave to participate in efforts to learn Swedish. Daycare facilitates and 
kindergartens are also being staffed with language instructors for parents on leave. The 
Danish government has also taken measures to help immigrant women find work. 
 
Denmark: Labor Market Integration 
 
In July 2018, the Danish government implemented new integration laws that 
impact immigrants and their descendants who are permanent legal residents or citizens. 
This integration policy is different because it is not solely addressing new arrivals to the 
country, but it impacts people who are already legal residents and citizens of Denmark. 
The new laws aim to solve income gaps and criminal issues that are disproportionately 
represented by people with immigrant backgrounds. Denmark has a very low poverty rate 
of 5%, which means 308,000 people live below the poverty line. However, half of this 
 
 
263 Sofia Brändström and Minstry of Employment, “300 Million for More Efforts for Foreign-Born 
Women” (2019). 
151  
number comprised of immigrants and their descendants. Furthermore, as in Sweden, a 
large percentage of unemployed people in Denmark are women. According to Statistics 
Denmark, 53 percent of working-age women immigrant women do not work—a large 
percent of impoverished people are also immigrant women. The government introduced a 
myriad of new laws in July 2018 to regulate the life of people living in low-income areas. 
The idea behind the laws is to forcibly compel immigrants to integrate into mainstream 
society in Denmark vis-a-vi work. The general perception is that refugees and asylees 
move to Denmark for the social welfare available to them. 
In 2018, the government cut the integration allowance in half with the idea to 
motive refugees and asylees to get a job. According to Statistics Denmark 2019, asylees 
and refugees receive between 6,010 DK ($909.49) and 12,019 DK ($1818.24) a month 
depending on their status as single, with a spouse, or with children. They also get a 
stipend of 1,500 DK ($227.26) monthly for attending language classes. After paying their 
taxes and rent, families with two adults and three children on government allowances on 
average have about 7,420 DK ($1122) a month of disposable income for food and other 
family expenses compared to citizens on government allows who have about 15,000 DK 
($2,225) a month for disposable income. The average disposable income for families not 
on government allowances is 16,024 DK ($2413). This creates a system of perpetual 
inequality as limiting resources for one group over a series of years will make it difficult 
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There is an ongoing debate in Denmark about Muslim women who are primary 
stay-at-home caregivers for their children or women who are now grandmothers who 
came in the 1980s but never worked outside of their home or learned Danish. The actual 
number of women in this group is often exaggerated and heavily politicized in Danish 
media. The biggest issue is that generally, most people work, including women, and taxes 
from those salaries are redistributed to the general populations to take care of healthcare, 
childcare, education, etc. One of the benefits of the high taxes is the quarterly stipend that 
parents receive from the government to ensure that every child has their basic food and 
clothing needs met. This is for all children, whether citizens or not, who live in Denmark. 
If individuals do not work, they are not contributing to social welfare from their taxed 
income. The debate about Muslim women is often pivoted against farmers and their 
wives who also tend not to work outside of the house, but collect child subsidies; 
however, they do not receive the same scrutiny as immigrant women. 
Misperceptions in Denmark about immigrant integration have caused the Danish 
government to created integration policies that would unremittingly foster an assimilation 
strategy fit for newly arrived immigrants. The new laws have been largely approved by 
parliament but present a tremendous problem to immigrants who are subjected to them. 
The most infamous law requires parents living in low-income neighborhoods to send 
their children to daycare from the age of one for at least 25 hours a week for mandatory 
instruction on Danish values including the tradition of Christmas and Easter, and Danish 
language.265 Parents who do not comply could face a stoppage of government subsidies 
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for their children. Other citizens in Denmark who do not live in these low-income 
neighborhoods have the option of enrolling children in preschool [or not] up to the age of 
six, and they can continue to receive their quarterly stipend from the government. The 
difference is how and who the law applies to with its aim specifically towards ethnic and 
religious minorities living in impoverished neighborhoods. 
The demarcation of immigrant neighborhoods in Denmark has placed immigrants 
in a peculiar position. The government wants to integrate them but at the same time, 
labels them as different and not truly Danish. This has created a divide along the lines of 
class, race, and religion. The government integration initiatives were created in 2018, so 
seeing the actual impact of the policies on poverty levels in Denmark will unfold as more 
time passes. Nonetheless, the new policies, along with previous policies, have stimulated 
feelings in Denmark that viable work opportunities are limited for non-Western 
immigrants because of their race/ethnic and/or religious backgrounds. The next section 
will discuss racial barriers in both Denmark and Sweden. 
Barrier Three: Perception of Racism and Discrimination 
 
In the context of most Nordic countries, racism is a term associated with the slave 
trade in the United States, apartheid in South Africa, and the eugenics of Nazi 
Germany.266 This tradition of restricting the meaning of racism has silenced and detached 
Nordic countries from their participation in the slave trade and in the Eugenics movement 
well after World War II.267 Racism has been framed as something in the past and far 
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away from Nordic history or, at best, extremely right-wing.268 The idea of Nordic racial 
exceptionalism has been pivotal in the region’s understanding of their relationship with 
people with immigrant backgrounds. The fact that people in Nordic countries do not 
recognize the impact of their racial intolerance has been labeled by Ylva Habel as 
“sanctioned ignorance,” which has nurtured a culture of color blindness mixed with 
claims of not seeing visible differences such as skin color although people are 
discriminated against because of these differences.269 The culture of racial silence has 
worked to hide the ways that racism impacts the lives of non-White people in Europe.270 
In 2006 David Theo Goldberg explored the notion of race and racism in Europe in 
his work Racial Europeanization. He found that the European Union (EU) created the 
notion of “Europe” as a region comprised of a specific “race of people,” which has 
become deeply embedded into European societies today. Prior to Europeanization, 
nations and individual groups existed, such as Germans, French, Swedes, etc. but a 
collective “European identity” is relatively new and developed alongside the notion of 
exclusive membership in the EU pivoted against people groups and or countries who 
were members not such as North Africans, Muslims, Turks, etc. The manifestation of 
racism in Europe is most exemplified with the treatment of non-Western immigrants, 
whose cultures and religions are perceived to be backward and primitive compared to 
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western developed countries (e.g., United States, Australia, Canada) that have a cultural 
connection to Europe. 271 
One of the main beliefs about racism in Europe is that the extermination of Jews 
in Nazi Germany represents the only real manifestation of racism physically on the 
continent. This simultaneously bans other experiences of racism and excludes 
experiences related to colonialism, orientalism, and exoticism that people with immigrant 
backgrounds often face in Europe.272 Europe’s 500 years of colonial history, in which 
most European countries participated in the sell and trade of human beings from Africa, 
the Middle East, and Asia, disappeared from most of their histories with the exception of 
France, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain. Racism today is perceived to be an 
exception in European societies and associated with alt-right neo-Nazi extremism. 
Racism has therefore been buried and instead tolerance has succeeded essentially 
manifesting the tolerate actor’s position of power because their actions can never be 
interpreted as racist since it is never anti-semantic or as extreme as neo-Nazis.273 Racism, 
in Europe today, represents a mixture of institutionalized practices that are embedded into 
the fabric of society, which represents everyday racism—experiences that tell and 
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The survey data showed that the native and ethnic participants in the study viewed 
racism and discrimination differently. In modern Europe racism is expressed in anti- 
immigration laws, overly excessive immigrant integration policies, the panic of terrorism 
and securitization, immigrants’ lack of educational and employment opportunities 
(structural racism often interpreted as social problems) and a swathe of other policies 
pivoted towards immigrants of non-Western European backgrounds. Immigrants in 
Denmark and Sweden have experienced all of these instances of everyday racism that 
many people do not recognize as racist. From the study, ethnic Danes (18.2%) saw 
racism and discrimination as a factor in the adjustment experience of non-Western 
immigrants, while 29.7% of immigrants in Denmark viewed racism as a problem for 
integration. Interestingly more ethnic Swedes (28.5%) marked racism and discrimination 
as a barrier to integration while just 14.6% of immigrants in Sweden marked racism and 
discrimination as a hindrance to integration. In fact, immigrants in Denmark (29.7%) and 
ethnic Swedish participants (28.5%) viewed integration barriers similarly pertaining to 
racism and discrimination. See Chart 6. The reasons behind this similar view can be 
linked to the debates surrounding the Muhammad cartoons published in Danish media in 
2004 that has released a predictable attitude in Denmark about the non-discussion of 
racism and discrimination where “racism is always already presented as a nonsensical 
thing” that is wrong on all levels and yet not applicable to Denmark.275  Ethnic Swedes, 
on the other hand, identified racism and discrimination as an issue that could be traced 
back to Sweden’s ideologies about neutrality. 
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In Denmark there has been a shift of focus on the dangers of political correctness 
which has been framed as a new form of racism—political correctness and censorship 
equals a loss of freedom. 276 The debate centers on not being like Sweden, which Danes 
view as being overly politically correct as manifested in Sweden’s antiracist policies and 
censorship on remarks that might be damaging to minority groups. For example, a most 
recent case was when the Swedish clothing-retail company H&M had an advertisement 
with a Black boy wearing a hoodie that said: “Coolest Monkey in the Jungle” that 
received a lot of criticism around the world. Historically, people of African descent have 
been called monkeys. This advertisement sparked protests around the world. Several 
stores in South Africa were vandalized and people around the world boycotted H&M. 
The company responded by issuing an apology and explaining that they would try to 
learn from their mistakes to move forward in the future. Denmark viewed this censorship 
as political correctness and against freedom of speech. The political correctness labels 
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Swedish mainstream culture had been reduced to destructive political correctness in 
Danish debates.277 Freedom of speech has made Danes unaware of the impact this has on 
people with immigrant backgrounds. 
 
The Effects of Danish Racial Exceptionalism 
 
 
Another survey question in this study asked about the strengthens and weaknesses 
that diversity brings to Denmark. The perception was also very different for ethnic Danes 
and immigrants in Denmark. Just 55.7 percent of ethnic Danes said that diversity 
strengthened Denmark while 74.2 percent of immigrants said that diversity strengthened 
Denmark, see Chart 7. Studies show that non-Western immigrants tend to have more 
children than ethnic Danes and in the past ten years the immigrant population in Denmark 
has grown by 15 percent.278 Religious and racial diversity in Denmark are inevitable as 
more diverse people migrate to the country and have more children than ethnic Danes. 
Culture in Denmark is changing and the simple fact is that tensions between the native 
population and foreigners is inevitable.279 Native Danes will try to protect their cultural 
practices and newcomers will always have aspects of their own culture that they pass 
down to their children.280 The response that some ethnic Danes are having to diversity 
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highlights both British Prime Minister David Cameron and German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel’s stance in 2015 that multiculturalism had failed in response to the rising terrorist 
attacks and violence in Europe perpetrated by immigrants. 
Immigrants will bring their own cultures with them, but they are also impacted by 
the domestic culture in which they find themselves. Adaption happens both ways with 
immigrants and the host society being influenced by each other.281 For instance, street 
food in Denmark has been heavily impacted by Turkish cuisine. Almost every street 
corner in Copenhagen has doner kebabs (durum, shawarma) which are warm slices of 
falafel, lamb, beef, or chicken cut from a vertical roasted meat slab that is then mixed 
with fries, mayo, and vegetables and placed inside of pita bread. This is one of many 
ways that Turkish traditions and food have influenced Denmark. Immigrants in Denmark 
have also been impacted by Danish culture, particularly by eating smorrebrod—a 
traditional Danish open-faced sandwich on dark ryebread that has cold cuts, cheese, and 
spreads on top. This food is native to Denmark (broadly speaking Scandinavia) but it is 
also a tradition that immigrants in Denmark have also adopted. Diversity in many ways is 
flourishing in Denmark despite the often-negative perspective of it. Nonetheless, 
diversity framed as multiculturalism in Europe has become a proxy for social and 
political issues related to immigration, identity, political disenchantment, terrorism, and 
working-class decline. As a result, people feel fragmented in which immigrants feel 
alienated and citizens are resentful towards diversity. 
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The Effects of Swedish Racial Exceptionalism 
 
 
Issues surrounding racism and discrimination in Sweden are complex. As 
indicated in Chart 6, immigrants in Sweden do not perceive racism and discrimination as 
a hindrance to their integration process while a larger percentage of ethnic Swedes do see 
it as a hindrance to integration. The disparity in opinions might be linked to laws and 
policies in Sweden that have been in place since the 1970s that help combat racism and 
discrimination. Because Sweden has the most explicit anti-discrimination laws in Europe 
for immigrants that promote equality and access, the immigrants might feel like they have 
more of a voice to express discontent compared to immigrants in Denmark. The changes 
in Swedish laws in the 1970s was influenced by ideas about multiculturalism in the 
international context with influences from Canadian and UK policies and politics. 
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Sweden was influenced by ideas about the cultural rights of citizenship,282 
multiculturalism,283 and liberal pluralism284 for decades after 1970s Sweden implemented 
reforms that erased assimilationism that was the strategy in most European countries at 
the time. The Swedish multicultural model was the most well-developed attempts that 
merged together liberal ideas of citizenship with diversity.285 The central focus in 
Swedish integration laws was to promote equality, freedom of choice, and partnership 
through formal laws that gave immigrants easier access to citizenship and minority 
groups (such as the Finns and native Sami people) rights to their unique identities as 
ethnic Swedes.286 
This worked for a while in Sweden, but the model had its shortcomings as 
outlined in Paradoxes of Multiculturalism by Schierup and Ålund in 2011. They argued 
that institutional practices in the Swedish multicultural model led to a hierarchy system 
that gave immigrant organizations generous but heavily politicized and highly- 
conditioned systems of public support.287 The system was found to promote systemic 
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the Middle East into “social problems” that needed to be fixed based on their ethnic 
background, culture or religion. The issue of immigrants, particularly refugees and 
asylees from non-Western countries, became an even larger problem when difficulties in 
the Swedish welfare model were impacted by the ebbs and flows of the international 
market in the 1990s and again in 2008 with the economic downturns. This left refugees 
and asylees at a disadvantage in the exclusive Swedish labor market and in society as 
they became a target for problems associated with the overexpansion of the welfare state. 
This manifested itself through the uprising of neo-Nazi grassroots movements that led to 
attacking of refugee camps and a populist party, New Democracy, developing and 
winning seats in the Swedish parliament in 1991. However, this rising did not last long 
because Sweden did another analysis of their multicultural program throughout the 1990s 
and into the early 2000s that lead to new initiatives implemented by 2007 to promote 
diversity management, based on the U.S. model of diversity management in public policy 
and business, rather than rights determined along the lines of ethnic and religion. The 
new policies also focused on the total population to develop institutions in the housing, 
education, health, and labor market for all people who had a disadvantage because of 
their background or ability level. Basically, Swedish integration policies merged with the 
concepts of economic growth to help immigrants find jobs and be more incorporated in 
society by placing the responsibility on all members of society, including the immigrants. 
The point here was to highlight that integration laws in Sweden since 1975 have given 
immigrants’ rights to challenge issues related to discrimination that they might encounter 
in Sweden. It is for this reason that many of them in the survey might have marked that 
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discrimination and racism is not a major hindrance to integration in Sweden, although 
they did say that immigrants are not generally treated equal in Sweden. 
The survey questionnaire asked respondents if they thought immigrants were 
treated equal to the native population. The question explained that treated equal meant 
that immigrants were socially accepted as a national of the country and had equal access 
to jobs, education, healthcare, etc. The survey revealed that although immigrants in 
Sweden did not think racism and discrimination was a hindering factor to integration, 
they did say that immigrants were not treated equally to ethnic Swedes. 56.3 percent of 
the participants with an immigrant background said that they were treated the same, while 
43.8 percent said that they were not treated equally. Around the same percentage of 
ethnic Swedes (Yes = 55.1% and No = 44.9%) expressed a similar opinion about the 















Integration is fairly complicated as it is difficult to measure whether someone is 
integrated or not in terms of their psychological attitudes towards their new host societies. 
Just because someone who is economically and socially well connected to a new host 
country does not necessarily mean that they are integrated mentally with the host culture, 
while someone who is not economically well off or not well-connected might strongly be 
connected to the host culture.288 Nonetheless, there are measures used to determine 




The goal in this chapter of the dissertation was to outline, discuss, and explore the 
differences in opinions about integration from the perspective of immigrants and the 
native population. In the case of language acquisition immigrants and the native 
population in both countries had similar outlooks and placed language at the top of the 
list of issues immigrants face when it comes to integration. Following this category was 
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racism and discrimination. Immigrants in Denmark said that racism was a prominent 
issue while ethnic Danes did not see it as such an important issue in comparison. In 
Sweden, the native ethnic population thought that racism and discrimination were a 
hindrance to integration while the people with immigrant backgrounds did not rank it as 
high. The reasons why there was a disparity in the understanding of racism and 
discrimination in Sweden were linked to the laws and policies implemented in the 1970s, 
1990s, and later in 2011 that solidified immigrant rights. Although immigrants in Sweden 
thought that racism and discrimination were minimal, they did not think immigrants were 
treated equally to the ethnic population, as indicated in Chart 8. This points to issues of 
who belongs and who does not belong in Sweden based on skin tones, culture, and 
religion. The disenfranchisement of the Muslim community in Europe has become a 
prominent issue of integration as more Muslims feel isolated in society. 
A major issue in Europe is the role of Muslims in societies. Many media 
commentary and scholars argued that Muslims in Europe are not integrated because their 
culture and religion are not compatible with Western culture.289 However, Muslims 
historically in Western countries like the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom 
have been very well integrated both socially and economically into the fabrics of 
society.290 Muslims have held, and continue to hold, a variety of socioeconomic positions 
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in society and they earn wages similar to or better than that of non-Muslims.291 These 
negative attitudes in the West rose out of the rising terrorist incidences perpetrated by 
people who claimed a Muslim identity. The psychological impact of terrorism has had a 
negative impact on the perception of Muslims in Western societies. 292 Muslims today are 
largely perceived to be a threat to western societies because of the potential for them to 
be indoctrinated by jihadist ideology that is anti-West and supports violence. The rise of 
new jihadist ideology was shaped by the war against terrorism.293 The Danish case links 
directly with Sweden as who has claims to be a “true Swede” or “true Dane” is linked to 
race/ethnicity, culture, and religion. 
This divergence in Denmark and Sweden happened gradually starting from the 
late 1990s. Denmark has progressively gotten more restrictive on immigration and 
integration while Sweden has operated under a liberal immigration and integration 
system. Although Sweden has begun to change its policies, it is still much easier to get 
permanent residency and citizenship in Sweden than many other EU countries. Both 
countries are pivoting towards integration policies that focus on labor market integration 
to relieve the welfare state of social welfare restraints caused by a higher percentage of 
non-Western immigrants who have not accessed the workforce for a variety of reasons. 
The issues of the different stances in policies in Denmark and Sweden have been linked 
to different ideas about nationhood and social cohesion. Sweden operates under the 
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notion of civic nationhood that gives the right to citizenship to anyone who meets policy 
standards irrespective of their ethnic or religious background. Denmark, on the other 
hand, operates under ethno-civic nationhood which is based on ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious ties to the land.294 The distinction in their approaches reflects in their policies. 
The results are the same in both countries because of issues related to language, 
education, and racism, access to the job market have hindered immigrants from being 
fully incorporated members of both societies. These issues, coupled with the vitality of 
the global market, which heavily impacts the welfare state and the domestic job markets, 
has put immigrants at odds with the native population. Integration is a two-way process, 
so the blame is not simply on the host society, but also on the recent increase in refugees 
and asylees from war torn countries who came with fewer skillsets, fewer education 
qualifications, and less language experience compared to previous immigrant groups. The 
Danish and Swedish governments have to figure out a way to incorporate educated 
immigrants from non-Western societies with shortened education programs and language 
immersion programs. The other issue is education people who have never received an 
education previously. Educating refugees and asylees is an expense but necessary task to 
fight against poverty for future generations. The next chapter will discuss the field 
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Integration, as discussed throughout this dissertation, is the ability of immigrants 
to establish themselves economically and socially in a host country to the same degree as 
the native population. The Oxford dictionary says that integration is the unrestricted 
ability to bring together people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds into an equal 
association. It is the opposite of segregation. States interpret integration in different ways. 
The Danish government sees integration as a set of policies that helps immigrants adapt 
to Danish culture and values so that they can be the same as Danes or at the minimum 
accept the Danish way of life. Accepting Danish culture means that displays of religion, 
culture, or traditional dress are secondary to showing allegiance to the collective identity 
of the state. The Swedish government interprets integration as a set of rights that provide 
equal opportunities for immigrants to establish themselves in Sweden. It is based on 
providing immigrants support with language training, education obtainment, and job 
placement to help them be successful in the country. It is a rights-based system in 
Sweden while in Denmark it is a system that facilitates sameness. In both cases 
immigrants have to adapt to the state and the immigrant’s culture is secondary to the 
goals of the state. To get at the heart of perceptions of integration practice and policies, I 
did 12 months of in-depth field work in Denmark and Sweden. I interviewed numerous 
people from the general population and did fieldwork. 
The interviews and ethnographic study occurred during field research in 
Scandinavia. The interviews were approximately 60 minutes long and I also had 
enriching untimed conversations with people in both countries that lasted from 3 minutes 
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to two hours that also informed this study. The majority of the interviews were conducted 
face-to-face in people’s homes or in their workplace with the exception of one phone 
interview and one skype interview. The informal impromptu interviews were not 
recorded and took place in various social settings. All of the official interviews were 
audio recorded, except one where the participant did not want to be recorded due to 
feeling uncomfortable with their voice being recorded. I took extensive notes for all 
interviews and later transcribed audio recordings to include them in this project. 
All of the interviews and enriching conversations were conducted in English. 
 
Scandinavians have the best non-native speaking English skills in the world, according to 
the English Proficiency Index. In fact, Sweden has ranked number one in the world for 
many years followed by Denmark and Norway, which are ranked number four and five in 
the world for non-native English speakers. My experience in Scandinavia indicated that 
at least 60-80 percent of the population were fluent in English and the majority of the 
remaining people could speak basic words and phrases. Everyone I interviewed and had 
enriching conversations with were fluent in English, including the immigrants. The 
participants were fluent irrespective of their education level. The participants ranged from 
individuals with a basic education that is required in Denmark and Sweden up to the age 
of 15/16 years old to people who earned a Ph.D. in Engineering from prominent 
universities in the countries. The participants in the official interviews had the option of 
using a translator, but they all chose to do the interview in English. 
The official interview questions started with semi-structured questions and ended 
with a set of open-ended questions. The open-ended questions gave the participants the 
ability to respond freely to specific themes related to integration and immigration 
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policies. Questions for the participants specifically focused on their experiences with 
integration as a concept in their everyday lives. The participants were asked the same 
questions, but the people who worked with immigrants were asked additional questions 
about the role of their organization in the integration process. All of the participants had 
to reside in either Denmark or Sweden. The interview questions are in Appendix B. I 
asked all participants for verbal consent to use their responses in this study. If they did 
not agree, I did not include them. 
Using the snowball method, upon arrival to Denmark and later Sweden, I asked 
my host institutions if they knew of people who would be interested in participating in 
the study. I asked friends from Denmark and Sweden if they had family members or 
people they knew who would be interested in participating in the study. I posted 
announcements in various groups on Facebook aimed at immigrants. I asked people in 
my local grocery store, gas station, dentist office, restaurant and the immigration office if 
they would participate. Essentially, I solicited the help of everyone and anyone that I 
encountered in my daily life. In the end I interviewed 34 people in Denmark and in 
Sweden. I interviewed numerous refugees, asylees and migrants who were high-income 
earners and low-income earners. I interviewed far right party voters and far left party 
voters. I interviewed people whose family members were radicalized and joined the 
Islamic State and went to fight in Syria. I interviewed Muslims, Christians, Jews, and 
atheists about their perspective on integration. I had numerous enriching conversations 
with people throughout the study that were not official interviews but informed many 
aspects my research. 
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The style of this chapter is different from the preceding chapters as it uses a 
different research tool. This chapter mirrors my personal experiences and interviews I 
had with participants. Participant observation was used to find patterns and make 
inferences about the societies. This project reveals interactions I had with real people in 
each country, experiences I had during a preliminary research trip for a month during the 
summer of 2016, and experiences I had in the region when I visited for the first time in 
2011. I gathered a treasure trove of real-life stories that illustrated themes related to 
immigrant integration in Denmark and Sweden. My research was informed by the 
participates and observations I made and my own personal experiences in these countries. 
This chapter reflects the experiences that I had and the experiences I saw displayed in 
front of me. 
The themes I found in the study mirrored some of the findings that were noted in 
the historical analysis chapter and the survey questionnaires data related to barriers to 
integration: language, employment, institutional barriers, and perceptions about 
race/ethnicity of immigrants. The ethnographic study additionally revealed that non- 
Western immigrants who succeeded in Denmark and Sweden, essentially the ones who 
were socially and economically integrated, had additional personality traits and/or 
support from members in the host countries. I will briefly highlight the barriers to 
integration that was also mentioned in the previous chapter, but then I will discuss 
successful integration practices from immigrants who came from the global south. The 
next section discusses my cultural immersion process as a researcher to set the stage for 
how I conducted this study. 
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RESEARCHER’S CULTURAL IMMERSION PROCESS 
 
I deeply embedded myself into the host countries to get a nuanced understanding 
of integration. I went through the immigration process that all non-European Union (EU) 
citizens have to go through, so by all means I was an immigrant. I took several 
uncomfortable trips to the immigration offices to fill-out legal paperwork. I opened a 
bank account in both countries and registered myself twice as a temporary resident when 
I moved from Denmark to Sweden. I enrolled in the required Danish language courses for 
foreigners, Sweden does not technically have language requirements for new arrivals, so I 
did not enroll language courses there. However, I attempted to enroll in language courses 
in Svenskundervisning för invandrare (SFI), Swedish for Immigrants in English, which is 
a free Swedish language education program for immigrants in Sweden. Unfortunately, I 
could not enroll in the courses because my visa was only for six months and I was not a 
refugee or asylum-seeker. SFI courses are free for people live in Sweden for at least a 
year and for people who come for humanitarian reasons. 
I fully submersed myself into the Swedish and Danish culture as an immigrant. 
My physical body allowed me access to immigrant communities that I would not have 
had access to otherwise. People treated me as though I was a non-Western immigrant 
upon initially meeting me. Anytime, I entered state institutions or encountered people in 
my everyday life, my physical body spoke volumes to the fact that I was not from 
Denmark or Sweden let alone Europe. This made the process for me to imbed myself in 
immigrant communities easier because other people who looked like me identified me as 
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an insider with them.295 Muslim women let me into their homes for interviews. 
Immigrant men saw me as part of their community and respected me as an independent 
successful woman. My style of dress and mannerisms are very “Western,” so people 
often assumed that I was a second-generation immigrant before speaking to me. Once 
people spoked to me and realized that I came from the US, the native-born populations 
treated me “special” because I was often the first Black American many of them had met. 
The immigration officers seemed friendlier when they realized that I was less likely a 
threat or likely to stay in the country permanently because I was from the U.S. and 
visiting for research purposes. 
I spent significant time in immigrant majority neighborhoods. I regularly went to 
the dentist, the public library, grocery stores, coffee shops, clothing stores, and 
haircare/beauty supply stores in immigrant majority neighborhoods for my own basic 
needs. I participated in numerous social events geared towards immigrants.296 In both 
Denmark and Sweden, I joined a religious social group that was comprised of immigrants 
from Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, we met weekly to discuss not only faith, but 
social and political issues as it related to being diverse people in Europe. In addition, I 
started a meetup.com297 group in Stockholm, called Beyond Color for Women in 
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Stockholm to get to know more women of color in Sweden. The group currently has 183 
members since I launched it in January 2017. The group gathered for social events such 
as watching movies (we saw Black Panther together and had a discussion after the 
movie), happy hours, eating at various trendy ethnic restaurants around Stockholm etc. 
We also attended educational workshops, performances, and discussions about diversity 
in Sweden at community centers around Stockholm. I interviewed a few women from this 
group and had very enriching conversations with others about their integration process. I 
got interested in Scandinavia from a trip I had taken to visit a friend I met in Chicago. 
My First Experience in Scandinavia 
 
My first experience in Scandinavia was in the summer of 2011 when I took a trip 
to Malmo, Sweden to visit a colleague who had become a close friend. I met him when I 
was a study abroad advisor at a university in Chicago. He worked in the Dean’s office on 
the top floor of our building and I worked on the first floor. We bounded in the hallway 
my first week on the job. He stopped me in the hallway to ask me if I worked at the 
University. When I replied, “Ye”s and told him that it was my first week on the job, he 
then informed me that we were two of the three people of color in the entire building who 
worked for the University who were not professors. We would joke about it all the time 
over lunch and became close friends as a result of it. A few years after we met he decided 
to move back to Malmo after 15 years in the United States. I made plans to visit him in 
Sweden since I was taking a group of students on a study abroad trip to Ireland and 
Sweden was a direct flight away from Dublin. 
Per my friend’s suggestion I flew into Copenhagen, Denmark and I took a 15- 
 
minute train ride into Malmo. The train went over the Oresund strait, a narrow body of 
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water that separates Denmark from Sweden. The Oresund has a significant historical 
context for the region as many battles were fought over who would control the strait and 
thus the Baltic trade route. This situation, however, was prior to my knowledge of the 
historical significance of the Oresund strait. I was nonetheless impressed by everything I 
saw. The beautiful water, the clear blue sky, combined with the clean modern train 
gliding over the bridge was very peaceful and calming for me. This was the easiest border 
crossing from one country to the next that I had ever experienced in my life. I was very 
happy to be in Scandinavia. 
My friend met me at the train station in Malmo around 12 o’clock in the 
afternoon. He suggested that we walk to a nearby café in the city center so that I could 
get a little food and coffee before we walked 15 minutes to his mother’s apartment. He 
had been back in Sweden for less than a month, so he was staying with his mom until he 
could find a job and get resettled in Sweden. He had applied to several jobs around 
Sweden and had interviews the coming weeks. The city center was beautiful and 
indicative of architecture I associate with medieval Europe. The cobblestone streets, the 
old colorful buildings, the outdoor cafes, and the restaurants—it was simply breathtaking. 
We sat outside at a café to enjoy the warm sun. I ordered cappuccino and pastry and my 
friend ordered a coke. The minute we placed our order, people started to recognize my 
friend and stop at our table to say hello. 
Five of his childhood friends walked by the café and we had conversations with 
all of them. As each childhood friend left, I got information about them. One guy had 
moved to Sweden as a Palestinian refugee from Jerusalem when he was 7 years old and 
he was the same age as my friend when he came to Sweden. Another childhood friend 
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had moved to Sweden from Iraq and was of Kurdish descent. That friend did not shake 
my hand, my friend explained, because he was a practicing Muslim now and could not 
touch women. Lastly, he mentioned that the blonde girl I had just met was not Swedish 
and that she came from Bosnia at a young age and was also as a refugee. 
As his last friend left the table, my friend asked me if I noticed anything different 
about Malmo. I was unclear about what he meant, and I asked him to explain. He asked 
me if I had noticed that there were very few ethnic Swedes in Malmo. He was very proud 
of his hometown and the diversity that was displayed around us. I also was very happy to 
be in Malmo, because I too had grown up in an immigrant neighborhood in Chicago that 
was diverse beyond black and white racial diversity. People living in my neighborhood 
were from all over the world and practiced every religion that one could imagine. I loved 
my childhood neighborhood and I thought that Malmo would be the same. I was very 
happy to be there. 
We left the café after we finished our food and headed to his mom’s apartment. 
 
As we got closer to the apartment and further away from the city center, the 
neighborhood began to change. It no longer looked like medieval quaint town in Europe. 
I felt like I was back in Bulgaria where I did Peace Corps and the buildings were built in 
the 1970s but were barely maintained. I felt like I was in the suburbs of France where I 
had travelled a year prior to visit my French Algerian friend who lived in the poorest 
suburb near Paris. The neighborhood reminded me of the ghettos of Chicago where my 
cousin was born and raised until my uncle got enough money to move them into a house 
in a safer neighborhood. I could not believe that I was in Sweden. 
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I was shocked because the level of poverty that I saw around me was astonishing 
especially for a social welfare country that has free education, healthcare, and 
government stipends for people in need. Sweden had ranked the highest for the happiest 
people in the world on many occasions. Yet, here I was in an impoverished area similar 
to impoverished neighborhoods I had visited across the globe. To be clear this was not 
abject poverty where people do not have running water or bathrooms. These people were 
not the most miserable or unfortunate living in utter humiliation because of their financial 
status. This was poverty that one would see in the global north that reflects poverty where 
people have the bare necessities for living and nothing more. I was shocked. This was not 
like my childhood neighborhood in Chicago that was a safe cultural hub. 
To be fair, my friend warned me back in Chicago that he was from the “ghettoes” 
of Sweden. Even at the café that day, he tried to warn me again that he lived in one of the 
poorest areas in the country with him mentioning that there were very few ethnic Swedes 
in Malmo. I simply did not hear him. I could not receive what he was saying because, in 
my mind, Sweden, and Scandinavia, was the socialist ideal that I aspired for the US. It 
could not be nearly as dangerous as poor areas of Chicago or New Mexico that have very 
high crime rates. I did not believe him because Sweden is one of the wealthiest countries 
in the world. I had another reality check when we reached his apartment complex. 
The first thing I noticed were four young people of African and Middle Eastern 
descent across the courtyard. They had bottles of what looked like alcohol and I could 
recognize the smell of marijuana. They were talking loudly, laughing and joking. When 
they saw us walking across the courtyard, they greeted us and continued with their 
afternoon activities. This was a Friday and after school, so although it was a little 
178  
unnerving, I simply put it out of my mind. As we entered my friend’s apartment building 
I could smell the urine in the hallway. I did not react. My friend assured me that his 
mom’s apartment was nice and not to pay attention to the hallway. We entered the 
apartment and indeed it was comfortable and clean. His mom greeted me in English and 
offered me traditional East African food and coffee. Drinking coffee in Eritrean culture is 
a ritual where friends and family talk and get to know each other. I was honored to 
participate in this ceremony in Sweden. I had a great time visiting my friend that week, 
but I saw a side of Scandinavia that I did not know existed. 
I tell this story because it expresses the complexities and the diversity of life in 
Scandinavia. One the one hand there is universal social welfare that provides for all 
citizens and residents living in the state, however, on the other hand there is high levels of 
poverty for many immigrants who come from the global south who are often isolated 
from mainstream society. Furthermore, there is vibrant diversity in Scandinavia that is 
often overlooked as part of the national culture. This is not limited simply to Scandinavia, 
but in Europe in general. There are communities of people across Europe who practice 
traditional tea ceremonies, speak their own languages, and live in poverty and yet they 
are integrated. Integration is very complex, because it can go beyond socioeconomic 
status. It is how the immigrant is received in the host society and how the individual sees 
themselves in relation to the native population. 
My friend eventually went on to get a high-ranking administrative position at a 
leading university in Stockholm. His now wife, who also has an immigrant background, 
has a management position in an investment bank in Stockholm. They are very successful 
and there are many more stories of successful people from his neighborhood in Malmo. 
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The most famous soccer player in Sweden, Zlatan Ibrahimović, whose parents were 
Bosnians, grew up with my friend. They both are examples of successful people from 
Malmo, but the majority of people from his neighborhood were not successful. In fact, 
some of them were recruited to fight with the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) and had died 
abroad or were in prison in Sweden. Others had succumbed to selling drugs or 
participating in gangs. This planted a seed in my mind to explore communities of color in 
Europe more closely. I became fascinated by people of color in Western Europe and their 
ability to succeed in liberal democratic societies. This curiosity extended beyond the 
traditionally researched countries such as the United Kingdom and France. I wanted to 
explore what life was like for people of color living in Scandinavia. 
 
 
Preliminary Research in Scandinavia 
The next time I visited Scandinavia was in the summer of 2016 for preliminary 
research. I arrived with a new level of interest in socialism. President Trump was the 
presidential candidate for the Republican party, and I had my cards set on Bernie 
Sanders, but once he was out of the race, I saw green and I had my hopes were set on Jill 
Stein. I was excited about visiting countries that represented my own political views that 
valued universal social welfare programs and preserving the earth. I was also fascinated 
by the issues of immigration and integration that appeared to have divided Europe. In 
2016 Germany and Sweden had agreed to take in a large share of the people arriving to 
Europe from Syria and Iraq, while the majority of other countries in the EU such as 
Denmark and Hungary refused to allow in refugees or asylum-seekers in their borders 
beyond letting them pass through to countries that would accept them. The United 
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Kingdom was so distraught over the potentiality of immigrants arriving in their country 
that they called a national vote and the majority of people who voted decided to exit the 
EU. Despite the turmoil and political debates that were happening around me, this was a 
great time to be in Europe and collect preliminary data. I learned a lot in that initial visit. 
I arrived in Copenhagen in late June with my twin sister. I decided to visit 
touristy attractions before starting my preliminary research. My good friend from 
Germany took a train up from Hanover. He had spent a year in Stockholm studying 
economics, but he had never visited Denmark even though he lived less than a seven- 
hour train ride away. We booked an Airbnb apartment in one of the most expensive areas 
in Copenhagen to have easy access to the restaurants, bars, and nightlife. Copenhagen did 
not disappoint us. The restaurants were fantastic for all types of cuisine. We visited a 
Thai restaurant, Italian restaurant, and we had traditional Danish smorrebrod (open-faced 
sandwiches) and pastries. We all agreed that we could not get enough of the delicious 
food. My German friend had to go back to work on Tuesday, so he left Denmark that 
Monday. My sister and I shifted to another Airbnb a few blocks away from the 
Mjolnerparken neighborhood, one of the poorest areas in Copenhagen. 
We rented an Airbnb apartment from an East African woman who was in Canada 
for a year completing a master’s program. Her aunt met us at the apartment to give us a 
tour and provide us with keys. The apartment was beautifully decorated with Ikea 
furniture and had all the amenities we were used to in the US. The aunt spoke very little 
English, but she asked us if we spoke Danish or Amharic. When we responded that we 
only spoke English she proceeded to give us the tour in her limited English. We had 
access to the washer and dryer in the apartment along with all of the pots and dishes in 
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the kitchen. After the introduction, my sister and I decided to get dinner. We noticed a 
doner kebab storefront on the bus ride to the apartment, so we went there for dinner. 
The moment we entered the restaurant I could smell the delicious chicken and 
spices cooking on the virtual rotisserie. The cook came from the back of the storefront 
carrying frozen meat that he placed in a refrigerating element near the grill. He then 
greeted us in Danish to ask us for our order. My sister immediately responded that we did 
not speak Danish and he switched to English. I ordered a chicken durum extra spicy, and 
my sister ordered a meal with rice, kebab meat, and sautéed vegetables. As we waited, 
the cook asked us were we were from. I said that we were from Chicago and that we 
came to Copenhagen from the US. 
The cook looked at us with special interested and asked us if we knew of 
Mohammad Ali? We mentioned that yes, we knew of him and that he was a great boxer 
in the US. I also mentioned that I had met Mohammad Ali a couple times at a diner in 
Chicago where he and his wife Lonnie frequently went when they were in Chicago. 
Mohammad Ali had recently passed away on June 4, 2016, so I mentioned this to the 
cook. He then said that he knew this already and that Mohammad Ali did a lot for African 
Americans like us and for Muslims like him in the US. He disclosed that he was the 
owner of the shop and came to Copenhagen in the 1980s from Pakistan. He mentioned 
that Muslims were not treated well in Denmark and that people like him and Black 
people like us needed to stick together. He finished cooking our meal and placed my 
durum on a thin sheet of aluminum foil and he put my sister’s meal in a takeaway box. 
We paid and before we could walkout he asked us if he could show us something. We 
 
said sure and washed his hands before he went to the back of the restaurant. 
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He came back with his cellphone and asked us if had ever read the Quran, I 
mentioned that I had taken a world religion course and that some of the course material 
came from the Quran. He then proceeded to pull up the Quran on his cellphone and read 
us scriptures about the Prophet Mohammad and how Allah loved us. He said that he was 
an Imam at his Mosque and that there were people who could help us learn more about 
the Muslim faith. He read about five additional scriptures and I was mesmerized. His 
proselytizing strategy was very similar to things I had experienced from Christians in the 
United States. He was warm, welcoming and got me intrigued by linking struggles that 
Muslims experienced to that of African Americans. He was very charismatic and 
passionate about his faith. He gave us a flyer about his mosque and invited us to come if 
we were interested. I mentioned that we were headed to Sweden after a week and that we 
could not make it to his mosque, but that I would visit it in the future. I left the storefront 
fascinated that an Imam recognized a Black Muslim American’s contributions to the fight 
for equality. I planned to interview the owner and to visit his Mosque when I returned. 
When I went back to the restaurant a year later, I could not find the owner or the Mosque. 
That summer of my preliminary research debates about immigration and 
integration was on the minds of most people in Europe. This was after the European 
Refugee Crisis a period marked by high values of people moving into the EU, the Charlie 
Heblo killings in Paris in January 2015, and the terrorist attack in Copenhagen on 
February 14, 2015 when a discussion organized by controversial Swedish cartoonist Lars 
Vilks ended with three people killed, including the perpetrator, and five police officers 
were injured. The perpetrator of the terrorist attack in Copenhagen was a jihadist who 
grew up not too far from the kebab storefront. After my experience in Denmark I took a 
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train to Malmo for a second time. I travelled to Gothenburg and Stockholm to check out 
immigrant communities in those cities. My sister flew back to the US and I then travelled 
to Oslo, Norway to attend a summer school on migration at the University of Norway. 
That summer I explored the region and discovered that I had enough potential data to do 
a study in Scandinavia for a year comparing integration in Denmark and Sweden. 
BARRIERS TO IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN DENMARK AND SWEDEN 
 
There are five barriers to integration that I observed from the in-depth field study. 
The first three mirrored the findings that I saw reflected in the historical analysis chapter 
and the survey data chapter such as barriers presented by language ability, access to 
employment, institutional barriers, and perceptions about race/ethnicity of immigrants. 
The ethnographic study additionally revealed the importance of cultural allies who helped 
facilitate the new arrival’s immersion process into the host society. Barriers is something 
the makes it difficult or blocks something from happening or being achieved. Barriers in 
integration can happen at multiple levels and are often cultural and established as 
practices that connect to organizational and bureaucratic arrangements that maintain the 
social expectations of behavior. Many integration barriers are established arrangements 
and practices that are not internally controlled by one person, but instead derive from 
entrenched practices. The hurdle that immigrants have to overcome is understanding the 
barriers and jumping past them. Everyone whom I interviewed who had a high-paying 
job, spoke the host language fluently, and felt like they belonged had two things in 
common, they were self-motived people and/or they had a cultural ally. A cultural ally is 
someone willing to support another person in order to remove external barriers that 
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prevent that person from using their skills and abilities to succeed in a community. They 
are showing the new arrival the way so that they understand the rules of the society. 
Social rules in Scandinavia play in important part of successful integration. As 
mentioned in the first chapter, Jante law is a code of conduct in most Nordic countries 
that emphasis the importance of not doing things out of the ordinary or being overtly 
personally ambitious. This law promotes the notion of having just enough and not 
thinking that you are special or better than anyone else around you. The cultural compass 
sets average as a goal and discourages individual success. This is not to say that people in 
Nordic countries are not successful, however, they must be humble about their success 
and express modesty in their achievements. For instance, the founder of Ikea, Ingvar 
Kamprad took the bus everywhere in Sweden. In an interview he attributed his success to 
being humble and never giving his employees the impression that he was more important 
than them. Kamprad died on January 27, 2018 when I first arrived in Sweden for 
research, he was worth 59 billion dollars. Jante law ties also into the success of social 
welfare in Nordic countries because people are used to living modest lifestyles, they are 
more willing to share in high taxes to benefit the good of the society as a whole.298 
Anyone who transgresses against Jante law are held with suspicion and hostility as it goes 
against the society’s social stability and sense of harmony. The immigrants who could 
understand these concepts related to social cohesion did very well in the society, 
immigrants who did not adhere to these rules were outsiders. A barrier to integration was 
not understanding required behaviors and expectations of the host societies. 
 
 
298 Booth, Almost Nearly Perfect People The Truth about the Nordic Miracle. 
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Integration is the core theme presented throughout this project. I opened all of the 
interviews with the question, “What is integration to you?”. The answers varied from 
each respondent, but one that stuck out to me the most came from a Vietnamese woman 
who moved to a small town in Denmark in the late 1980s with her parents, grandparents, 
Aunt, and her siblings. They were part of the 800,000-boat people who fled Vietnam 
between 1975-1995 by boat and ship after the Vietnam War. She was lucky to have all 
over her family members survive the boat ride when they landed in southeast Asia. Her 
family members lived in a refugee camp until they were settled in West Germany before 
they got refugee status and then were finally settled in a small town in the southern part 
of Denmark. Today, Denmark has about 14,669 Vietnamese people living in its territory 
and most of them came for humanitarian reasons. The person I interview, whom I will 
call Linh, was in her second year of medical school when I met her. She was married to 
an ethnic Dane. She was getting ready to go on maternity leave from medical school in 
expectation of her first child. I met Linh at mutual friend’s housewarming party. This 
friend suggested that I speak to Linh about integration because of her background as a 
refugee and because she had strong opinions about integration. Linh and I arranged to 
meet at a coffee shop in central Copenhagen the following week. 
I met Linh at a trendy coffee shop near her medical school. She got there before 
me and was waiting near the front of the coffee bar when I arrived. The coffee shop had a 
warm feel to it with a combination of copper, brass, and wood accents. The coffee bar 
was wooden and set on a platform and behind the counter the baristas were preparing 
coffee and food. I ordered a delicious ham sandwich with vegetables, coffee, and a 
cookie. Linh ordered the combination of something similar: sandwich, coffee, sugary 
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snack. We sat down and started the interview right away. She was on her lunch break and 
had to go back to the hospital after an hour. I could tell the Linh was a little nervous 
because she kept peeking at me as I pulled out my recording device. I explain to her 
that everything would be confidential. She smiled mentioned that her sister 
interviewed people for her Ph.D. research and that her sister paid she and her   
husband to transcribe them. She then laughed at me and said, “You are going to have 
a lot of work to do transcribing all of your interviews.” I smiled and mentioned that 
transcribing was my least favorite part of research and that I would use a similar 
method that her sister used. We smiled and that seemed to break the ice. 
The first question I asked Linh was about integration. I wanted to know what 
integration meant to her. She said that integration was about a relationship and 
people supporting you to help you adjust to a new country. Integration was about “a 
community of people who welcomes and shows you how to adapt to the new 
country.” She attributed her success in getting into medical school, her parents and 
grandparents’ successes in Denmark to their neighbors. She said their success was 
beyond initiatives of the government, she related it to her neighbors who took the 
approach of not trying to change them or their view on the world, instead her 
neighbors slowly introduced them to the new world where they lived. 
We had this amazing family [in my town]. This guy who worked in the army 
in Denmark. When he got older he started a driver’s education school. He  
took my whole crazy family, I have five aunts and two uncles, my 
grandparents, my parents, [to learn how to drive]. He was like, to be able to 
work in Denmark and to function in Denmark, you need to drive a car. He 
took the whole family under his wings, and we of course paid for the driver’s 
course, but he was constantly patient. [My family] didn’t know the language 
well, so he had to do it in English. Considering that this was 27 years ago, it 
was definitely harder [for him]. But, he was just adamant. For example, my 
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grandfather failed the test like three times or something like that, and my   
mom to, but he was constantly adamant until they succeeded. And, now he’s   
is a family friend. Every year he insists that he's family and he brings a big bag  
of Danish Christmas candies. Until we were 15 he gave my mom 100 kroner for 
each of us to buy gifts because he considered us to be his relatives. He has been to 
every family wedding. He was at my wedding. The fact that he said OK, let me 
walk this way with you so that you have a driver's license is so practical, right? 
 
 
Another neighbor helped them as well. When Linh’s family first arrived in 
Denmark they were placed in the richest area in their town because it was the only house 
available that could fit a large family. Their neighbor was very rich, and he really liked 
her father. The neighbor did not have a son but considered Linh’s father like a son. He 
helped her father understand finances and how to manage the Danish system. Her father 
also helped the older neighbor around his house fixing things that needed repair. Their 
relationship was a close bond—like a father son relationship. When the rich neighbor 
passed away, the pastor who officiated the funeral read a note from the deceased man that 
said he considered her father like a son. Both these families helped Linh’s family 
because, she believes, the neighbors were open to people with diverse backgrounds and 
her family was also open to different cultures. She said the following 
If you are an immigrant and there is no body there to show you the way or 
to welcome you, you will be standing on the outside looking in. The 
rhetoric [they use today] is harsh, harsh, harsh. [They say] you’re just a 
problem, you’re taking all the money, and so many things are wrong 
because you are here. Constantly being faced with the fact that you are 
different. You look different and then of course you need to find your 
group who feel the same way. Instead [Danes] should say I’ll just show 
you and help you. 
 
Linh is a prime example of someone who is successfully integrated in Denmark. 
She speaks Danish flawlessly. She will earn a high income as a medical doctor. She 
respects Danish cultures and traditions. She is Christian and she feels very Danish. 
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However, she realized a few years ago that the immigrants that they were talking about in 
the media, was her. She said, “I just realized something a couple years ago and I was so 
sad. I just looked at my husband and said to him, I think I have always considered 
immigrants not me. I have always considered everybody else, but I am just as much as an 
immigrant as the Muslim girl who comes here because of work. They are actually talking 
about me.” She went on to say that the she understands why Muslims in Denmark are so 
angry and why it is easy for them to hate. Because, no matter how hard they fight to 
belong, to prove that they are not bad, Danes always hold it against them. She said, “I 
remember when I was younger my dad told me, you know you always have to fight a 
little harder because we live here. I was like I don’t get that. I thought it was so unfair, 
because like I didn’t decide to move here, even though it’s easier for me because I am 
Asian, I didn’t decide to move here you decided for me.” 
A interesting aspect to what Linh mentions, is that it is easier for her to live in 
Denmark because she is Asian compared to other ethnic groups. I heard this repeated 
throughout Denmark. In fact, the Queen Margrethe II of Denmark in 2016, in a memoir 
co-written with journalist Larsen, mentioned that certain groups like Southeast Asians 
refugees were more easily integrated in Denmark than other groups because of their calm 
demeanor and orderly way of organizing themselves.299 Likewise, an ethnic Danish male 
I interviewed said that he did not think his daughter would have difficulty being accepted 
in Danish society because she is half Asian. 
Her mother comes from a generation of adopted Koreans. I think the 
Danes are used to that and that helps a lot. Plus, she [my daughter] is pale 
 
299 Thomas Larsen and Margrethe II, De dybeste rødder: dronningen fortæller om Danmark og danskerne, 
1st ed. (Gyldendal, 2016). 
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like me with blue eyes so ethnically she will be alright. I am not worried 
about that. She looks very white so not everyone notices that she has 
something else like Asian. I think to some extent Danes think that it is 
something cool about mixed cultures mixed race. I’d like to think that and 
particularly with Asian mix. I have thought about her being bullied in 
school because she just started, but I don’t think so. There are a handful of 
other kids like her that are mixed with Danish and Asian. 
 
Later, I found that Denmark per capita has the highest number of adoptees from South 
Korea in the world, 9,297 came between 1965 and 2008 according to the South Korean 
Ministry of Health and Affairs in 2009.300 This father was not concerned about his 
daughter fitting in to Denmark because she had light skin and eyes, which is a clear 
indication that skin color and features are considered when thinking of acceptance in 
Denmark on equal terms as Danes. 
The main takeaway that Linh brings to this discussion of integration is the 
concept of allowing immigrants to maintain their culture, but also understanding that a 
cultural ally is important for success.. In Linh’s case, her neighbors helped them learn 
about Denmark—he was their cultural ally. She shared with me another story about 
adjusting to her small town in Denmark. Her parents, when they first moved to Denmark, 
always kept their curtains closed. The neighbors around them were getting suspicious of 
her family and assumed that they were hiding something or planning something evil for 
the town. It was not until their friendly retired army neighbor told them that they had to 
leave their curtains open at all times that they realized this was a tradition or cultural 
norm in Denmark. In fact, must Danes leave their curtains open because it is very dark in 
 
 
300 Parents who could not have children in Denmark from 1965-2008 adopted children from South Korea. 
Today, there are a lot of fertility services in Denmark that helps with these issues, so parents are using 
alternative methods in place of adoption. 
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Denmark during the winter, the homes are usually designed to let in a lot of natural light. 
Without insider information about this practice in Denmark, it would be very difficult for 
new arrivals to integrate. Integration is a two-way street where the new arrival has to 
adjust to the new environment and the host society has to adjust as well and help 
immigrants. Cultural allies play a crucial role in helping immigrants. 
Connecting Integration Barriers to Race and Ethnicity 
 
Muslims in Europe have gotten a horrible representation stemming from increased 
terrorist attacks on European soil. According to Religion Monitor in 2018, Muslims were 
often frustrated by discrimination in the labor market and they want to practice their 
religion without it hindering their careers. Muslims are more likely to live parallel lives 
rather than join a community as a result of feeling isolated. Cultural allies are just as 
important for Muslim’s but more often than not they are not living or working in 
integrated communities. This deals with not only structural issues when the governments 
in Denmark and in Sweden instituted a long-term practice of placing refugees in the same 
neighborhoods, but it goes even beyond that because not all immigrants were placed in 
immigrant majority communities as indicated my Linh from Vietnam. I conducted an 
interview with a third-generation ethnic Kurdish woman, whom I will call Awira, whose 
grandparents immigrated from Turkey in the 1970s. She grew up in a small town in 
Denmark where the majority of her family lives today. 
Her grandfathers on both sides immigrated to Denmark from Turkey as migrant 
workers and brought their wives and family members later. Her parents were born in 
Denmark and she was also born in Denmark. She was raised in a small town in the 
manner of any ethnic Danish child: celebrating Christmas and eating pork. Her childhood 
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was virtually absent of any real religious values or ethnic values linking her to her 
Turkish, Kurdish, or Muslim background. I met her in the Fall 2008 when she was 18 
years old. Her dark hair and almond skin-color made me think she was Bulgarian when I 
first met her, but when she explained she was from Denmark, I realized that she was an 
ethnic minority in her home country just like me. I was a Peace Corps Volunteer in 
Bulgaria while she was doing a leap year through the Erasmus Program, the EU 
education abroad and volunteer program for young people. We became very close while I 
was wrapping up my time in Bulgaria. I might have been the first African American she 
met, and she certainly was the first Turkish Dane I had ever met in my life. She spent 
another six months in Bulgaria and then she travelled to Indonesia for an additional six 
months before returning to Denmark. 
I kept in contact with her over the years through Facebook, and when I decided to 
do research about immigrant integration in Scandinavia, I messaged her. I knew from her 
Facebook posts that she was wearing a hijab now and that she had converted to Islam. I 
also saw that she was married to a Muslim man who had two children with his previous 
wife. The person I met ten years prior was no-longer the wide-eyed secular teenager but 
was a full-fledged adult Muslim woman. I messaged Awira in 2016 when I arrived in 
Denmark for preliminary research. We made plans to meet but she cancelled because her 
husband’s son had died the day we were supposed to meet from a heart murmur while he 
was at school. I expressed my condolences and told her to take care of her family and that 
to keep in contact with me to let me know how they were all doing. A year later, I was 
eventually able to meet with Awira for the first time in ten years. I messaged her when I 
was back in Denmark to ask how her family was doing and to see if she wanted to meet. 
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She responded immediately and suggested a vegan restaurant in a trendy area of 
Copenhagen called Norrebro. She wanted to go there because the food would be healthy, 
and she did not have to worry about pork being used in the ingredients. We met and 
talked for at least two hours. It was wonderful to catch up with her and to learn that her 
family was coping with the death of her husband’s son. She mentioned that we needed to 
meet again, and we made arrangements to meet at her house for the in-depth interview 
the next week. 
As I made plans to visit Awira in her home, I started to get a little afraid. I looked 
on google maps to see where she lived, and it was about a 20-minute train ride outside of 
Copenhagen in one of the poorest suburbs of the city. I did not want a rendition of events 
that I had experienced in Malmo and I knew that recently gun violence had become very 
prominent in Copenhagen. In fact, a fellow Fulbrighter from New York City had called 
me Saturday to say that he was on the bus on the way back to his neighborhood north of 
Mjolnerparken, the most dangerous in Copenhagen, when he saw a group of guys chasing 
another guy and shooting at him. My friend was surprised because we were in Denmark. 
The summer we were in Denmark there were 15 instances of gun violence in 
Copenhagen. Although there were no deaths associated with the shootings, the 
government investigated 25 different addresses associated with gangs and drug violence. 
I knew that Awira was not involved with gangs, but I was concerned about getting home 
too late from visiting her. She suggested that we meet in the morning, because her 
husband’s other child lived with them now and she needed to get him from school so 
earlier would be better for both of us. 
193  
It took me about an hour to get to her home. She met me at the train station on her 
bike. She was wearing a hijab that covered her hair and a baggy dark blue ankle length 
dress over lose fitting black cotton pants. She had on no makeup, but she still looked very 
beautiful in her conservative baggy clothes. It was about 10 am and she suggested that we 
go for a walk around her neighborhood for a few hours and then we could head to her 
house for lunch. In a similar vein as my friend in Malmo, she asked me to notice that the 
majority of people around us were not ethnic Danes. She gave me the history of the 
neighborhood and said that it used to be a town for Danish people who worked in 
factories. They were usually low-income earners and that the neighborhood had slowly 
been replaced with immigrants over the years. She was not from this town, but her 
husband grew up here and felt very comfortable in the neighborhood. We visited the local 
library that she described as a wonderful place for children. We visited a local park near 
the a river water, and we talked about our lives after Bulgaria. 
I learned from my friend that her conversion process to Islam was difficult for her 
family. Although her parents and grandparents are Turkish Kurds, they had no religious 
ties to Islam beyond cultural practices. In fact, her parents are atheists and her siblings 
either converted to Christianity or are not religious. Her brother is married to a Ghanaian 
woman who was born and raised in Denmark, they attend Christian services regularly, 
and her sister is married to an ethnic Dane and they are not religious. My friend’s parents 
tried to persuade her not to become Muslim because they felt that she would be 
stigmatized in Denmark as the society had become generally unwelcoming for Muslims. 
When she told them that she was Muslim and that this would not change, they tried to 
convince her that she should not wear a hijab even if she decided to be Muslim. None of 
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it work. She joined a Mosque, started practicing Islam, and wearing conservative 
clothing. At this point it was about noon, so we headed to her apartment for lunch. 
Her apartment complex was indicative of many apartment buildings I had visited 
in Europe. It was nice, clean, and comfortable, but basic in many ways. The 
neighborhood reminded me of clean “project” buildings in the US when they were built 
in the 1960s and 1970s to house factory workers in major cities. Her building was a large 
brick building that had at least 100 units in one complex. The majority of people in her 
building were immigrants and their descendants. We took the elevator upstairs and that 
was also clean and functioning. Her apartment building was really nice even if it did not 
have all the bells and whistles of higher-income neighborhoods. We talked more about 
her conversion to Islam as she prepared lunch. She had the following to say about 
converting is Islam and radicalization. 
I think when I converted, I was also in a risk group of being radicalized. 
What prevented me from not being radicalized, maybe it's just me and I'm 
just analyzing now, but what protected me is that I went to different places 
and went to different mosques and I met different people. And when I 
developed in my own religion, I found out that the other mosque that I 
went to first had some opinions that are different from this mosque. I 
listened to both of the opinions. I actually thought oh that this new place is 
actually better with their opinions. I think because I went to a different 
Mosque and met different people, I was protected from becoming radical. 
 
 
When I asked her why she converted to Islam, she mentioned that she felt like she 
belonged and that she was welcomed into the religion. She also said that her experience 
in Indonesia in 2008 after she left Bulgaria created a curiosity in her to explore Islam 
because of the Muslim women she met there were really nice, and she respected them. 
Once she converted to Islam and started wearing a scarf, people treated her differently in 
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Denmark. Now, several times a month people would tell her that she was free now and 
that she did not need to wear a hijab. We talked about the impact of these words on her as 
a third-generation Dane. She said that it made her feel isolated from the society and the 
only country she has ever known. She expressed that if people actually treated her as a 
Dane, she might start to feel like one and feel accepted in society. She hoped that her 
children in the future would be accepted as Danish. From her interview and many others, 
I learned that there are racial tensions that run deep in Denmark. People with immigrant 
backgrounds largely do not feel like they are accepted in society, particularly Muslims. 
Her husband came home from work early. By this time, it was 2:30 in the 
afternoon. His mother brought his son home from school a little after he arrived. He is 
Chilean descent, but he was born in Denmark to parents who were refugees fleeing 
Pinochet’s regime in the 1980s. He spoke Spanish to his mother, Danish to my friend, 
and English with me. It was a beautiful example of diversity that exists in Denmark. His 
mother wanted to take the son shopping for shoes, so the little boy left with his 
grandmother. At this time, I asked my friend and her husband about the loss of their other 
son last year. They said that it was very difficult for the family. His ex-wife gave him all 
parental rights to the other son and left Denmark. She supposedly moved to Turkey, but, 
my friend and her husband suspected that she had married an ISIS fighter in her grief and 
was somewhere in Syria. They did not like to talk about it in front of their son because he 
had already lost his brother just a year prior. They told their son that his mother was in 
Turkey. The mother would sometimes call to talk to her son, but they told her not to give 
the son details about where she was or what she was doing. 
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My friend’s husband converted to Islam as a teenager because most of his 
neighbors where Muslims and he felt connected to the faith. He was studying to become a 
dentist, a profession that many educated Muslim men pursue in Scandinavia. They 
invited me to stay for dinner because at this point it was 5pm in the evening. I wanted to 
learn more about my friend’s husband, so I asked him about his integration process being 
a Latino Muslim in Denmark. I was fascinated by his response. He mentioned that 
initially when people met him they assumed he was Turkish or from the Middle East 
because of his tan skin and beard, but when they learned of his Chilean background, they 
were always more welcoming towards him. He said that he got better treatment as an 
ethnic Chilean because the values in Chile were seen as more similar to Denmark than 
Turkish or Middle Eastern backgrounds. However, he noted that since he did not drink 
alcohol as a Muslim, he felt isolated at work. No one invited to social events because they 
did not want to offend him. He said that he would be willing to go and drink water or 
juice, but they never invited him. 
My friend Awira and her husband’s experiences in Denmark as a third- and 
second-generation Danes, was fascinating. I could tell that she had a similar awakening to 
realizing that she was considered in immigrant in the same way that Linh had when she 
realized that she too was considered an immigrant. Awira had the following to say about 
immigration. 
Why are people so afraid of getting immigrants to Denmark? Of course, 
we should take care of our economy and everything but the way they see 
immigrants now, I think it’s actually a bit of racist way of seeing 
immigrants. I mean they don’t see them as human beings. Because if you 
see them as human beings you would like for them what you like for 
yourself. For third-generations or second-generations like me it's easier [to 
be integrated]. We know the language and we are grown up here, so we 
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can get a good education and we can get integrated in that way. But still 
the whole way that the Danes maybe see me is that I'm still different and I 
feel different. I think maybe other people would not see me as integrated 
because of my background mainly because I wear a scarf because I'm 
different from the majority. 
 
She interestingly places herself as different from immigrants but at the same time 
sees herself as connected to them. She speaks fluent Danish, so life is easier for her. She 
is a third-generation immigrant who grew up in Denmark, so she understands Danish 
culture without difficulty. However, her religion marks her as different and she and her 
husband live in a parallel society not only marked by where they live but also in how they 
are excluded from communities at work. Understanding diversity and accepting others as 
members of a community is difficult. Racism and discrimination according to people I 
interviewed was something that they experience regularly as sometimes people can be 
insensitive to their cultures and religion. 
Several immigrants interviewed for the research project spoke about the negative 
perception Danes had of their culture. An African woman I interviewed said that she 
divorced her husband of twenty years because of the tensions she felt with her husband’s 
family and her own African culture. She came from a middle-class well-educated 
Zambian family. She attended boarding schools with foreigners in Zambia and received a 
university education from the United Kingdom; her ex-husband did not attend university 
and was from a small town. Her ex-mother-in-law would say to her, “In Denmark speak 
Danish.” She was expected to put her African heritage aside to be part of Denmark. She 
said that once in a while she wanted speak English, her language of education, or speak 
her own native African language. She said, “If you feel unwanted by the majority in that 
country where you are living, then you don’t really make an effort to try and mix because 
198  
they are not making the effort to understand you. Then if you’re being attacked all the 
time and hearing that through the media you are not welcomed, I think it's makes it 
difficult to survive in Denmark.” 
I interview Dr. René León Rosales, who is the research director at the 
Mångkulturellt centrum (Multicultural Center) in Stockholm. He has an immigrant 
background from South America but has lived in Sweden since childhood. I asked him 
about integration in Sweden, which can also apply to issues in Denmark. During the 
interview he had the following powerful words to say about racism in the Sweden from 
his personal experiences and also as he saw reflected in his research. 
The notion of being a migrant is really connecting to skin color. So even if 
you're born here with parents who were born abroad or maybe they were 
born here, but whose skin color is different [and] you don't have the 
normative Swedish physic, they ask you where you are from. I can see that 
you're not from here, so where are you from? And a lot of activists are 
talking about the notion of everyday racism. I think in the US you have 
notions of microaggression. There is a reaction to that question because 
basically what you're saying is, I see that you’re not white, so you know 
your body does not belong to this place. So, for me in the everyday life we 
have in our perception the world is managed also by patterns where we 
connect bodies with places. We react where bodies are out of order. You 
know? You see some bodies that you really don't think that kind of body 
belongs here. For a lot of people here [in Sweden] the bodies that are 
naturally connected to this landscape are white bodies and this is really 
implicit. Implicit, in a way that it's not often problematized. 
Dr. Rosales’s view on successful integration was different from my own because 
he did not believe immigrants ever completely were integrated irrespective of their 
education level or income. He had the following to say “I'm not a researcher in this area 
and I’ve not done an advance political or social analysis, but often many educated people 
[and high-income earners] feel really frustrated by how they are treated. Although they 
are well-educated and although they're really smart, they find themselves in 
199  
[uncomfortable] situations that they kind of don't want to accept.” This uncomfortable 
situations often refer to being treated differently like Awira’s husband who was never 
invited to go out afterwork with his colleagues. In some cases, having an accent when 
you speak the host language makes people automatically assume that you do not 
understand them or speak their language. In many ways Dr. Rosales is correct about 
integration never fully being achievable because the person who is different will always 
be marked by their dissimilarities. Integration however, in a monetary sense, is 
achievable as more people with immigrant backgrounds can access better jobs and not 
have to live in poverty. I turn in the next section to employment and continue with the 
theme of cultural ally and self-determination as a method for immigrants be integrated. 
Immigrant’s Access to Employment 
I started this chapter about my friend who I met in Chicago a decade ago and I 
will end with his story of integration. My friend immigrated from East Africa to Sweden 
in 1987. He was about 7 years old when his parents fled Eritrea for political reasons. His 
family initially lived in a small-town in Scania (a region in Southern Sweden), but 
eventually they moved to Malmo to be in a more diverse community. He spent the 
formulative years of his childhood in the poorest suburbs of Malmo with people from 
Africa, Bosnia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia etc. His childhood neighborhood is infamous for its 
high crime, high unemployment rates, and diversity. The neighborhood is the largest 
immigrant community in Sweden—80 to 90 percent of the people living there are 
immigrants and their descendants. Most of the people in the neighborhood are 
impoverished. Yet, my friend is very successful in Sweden despite being from that 
neighborhood. He and his wife, who is also Eritrean, studied in the United States for their 
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bachelors and master’s degrees and returned to Sweden to take various management 
positions in their professions. When I asked him about integration and barriers in 
Sweden, he had the following to say. 
Of course, in a way there's a lot of barriers in society for people who are 
not of that society, but those barriers can and are broken at all times by 
people who push the barriers. And if you push enough in the right way, at 
least in Sweden, they can't legally stop you from getting a degree, it’s your 
human right. And if you get a degree, you can apply for jobs. And, people 
[immigrants] will say, “Well, yes I have a degree, but no one will hire 
me.” And then they give reasons as to [why by saying] well my name is 
different.” I know a guy, back when I was younger, who finished high 
school and got a [Bachelor’s] degree. His name was Muhammad, first 
name. He applied for jobs and couldn’t get jobs to the point where he 
changed his first name. In some sense I think it worked for him. 
[However], I felt really sad for him. I really did. And I understand him, but 
in that same time I know other Muhammads who have jobs; I truly do. So, 
I don't know if it's systemic because if other Muhammads have gotten 
jobs, but he didn't, does that mean the system is not for all Muhammads? 
But yes, there are barriers, I won’t lie. Some have had it easier than others, 
but the consensus is that [everyone] has to push and eventually you will 
break the barrier. 
 
The majority of immigrants I interviewed in Sweden talked about their rights to 
education, their rights to equal treatment, and their rights to access to employment in 
association with their human rights. Immigrants recognized that racism and 
discrimination exist in Sweden, but they also have a sense of self-advocacy because they 
could call upon the law and their basic human rights to challenge systems of oppression. 
My friend had the following to say about racism and discrimination in related to jobs. 
I think systemic treatment [discrimination] is hard to break. That's why I 
say you as an individual have to be strong and don't let the system, I know 
is cliché, but don't the system break you. Instead let it be a motivational 
factor. Again, even though there are systemic breaks in society you still 
have the legal rights, if you know them, to obtain the things you want to 
attain within the law. You have to become knowledgeable. I’ve worked 
my way up from the ‘gutter’ in Sweden, bad neighborhoods, into where I 
am today. And if I had let the system tell me that this is not possible, or 
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individuals tell me that this is not possible, I wouldn't be here today. I can 
promise you that. I chose to stand up for myself. It's not like it [biased 
systemic and individual treatment] was evident and visual for me either, 
but you feel it of course but then I don't let it bother me. I didn’t let it 
break me. 
 
In this sense, he is alluding to Sweden’s history of strong multicultural policies that have 
promoted the ideas of right for all people living and working in Sweden irrespective of 
their immigrant or minority background. My friend also mentioned that he understood 
Swedish people. He understood the Jante law and being humble in his interactions with 
people. He had a respect for Swedish people and their society, and he has a respect for his 
own cultural background. He was able to succeed in Sweden, because he was determined 
to do so. He listened to the wise advice from work mentors that he had in the United 
States and he also had close friends in Sweden who mentored him to having a leading 
position at a prominent university in Stockholm despite systemic barriers. 
In conclusion, the goal of this chapter was to discuss results from my participant 
observations. Immigrant integration was introduced from the perspective of immigrants 
in Denmark and Sweden. The field study revealed the importance of understanding 
expectations in Danish and Swedish societies, the important role of cultural allies, and the 
importance of self-determination. Feeling welcomed in a community is contingent upon 
the political climate at the time. Islamic values are pivoted against western values, 
because of the rise of terrorism in Western Europe perpetrated by Jihadists since 2001. 
The media positions that argued that Muslims are not integrated because their culture and 
religion are not compatible with Western cultural values. However, Muslims historically 
in Western countries like the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have been 
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very well integrated both socially and economically into the fabrics of society. It has been 
only recently that Islam and immigration have become a prominent debate in Europe. 
Immigrants in Denmark and Sweden recognized that racism existed in their host 
countries. However, Swedish immigrants talked a lot about their rights and did not 
necessarily associate racism or discrimination to their ability to succeed in the country. 
Many of the people I spoke to in Sweden saw genotype as an important factor to feeling 
like they were native to the country, but they all recognized that they had rights in 
Sweden. They understood that under the law, all Swedes, citizens and residents alike, 
were supposed to be treated equally. Therefore, when the Migration Policy Index (MPI) 
ranked Swedish integration and migration policy as number one in the world, in many 
ways, that is valid. Immigrants feel empowered by the multicultural policies and that they 
have a right to work, to education, to healthcare, etc. Sweden succeeds in the way. In 
practice, there is a tremendous hurdle that immigrants have to overcome, which requires 
them to understand Swedish cultures and traditions and fit in the mode of what it means 
to be Sweden, which is embedded in Jante law. 
Denmark appears to be very different from Sweden in terms of how immigrants 
interpreted racism and discrimination. The Danish immigrants I interview thought that 
there was a general distain for immigrants, particularly Muslims, in Denmark. They liken 
this distain to issues of racism and discrimination and the lack of respect for diverse 
cultures. The larger issue, as addressed in Chapter II, is Denmark’s attempt to maintain 
its very existence since it is such as small country and massive migration could impact 
Danish culture and tradition. It also goes to Denmark’s political stances in relation to 
terrorism, the country promoting the controversial cartoons in claims of freedom and 
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speech, and so forth. Nonetheless, every person I interviewed in Denmark felt integrated 
when they had Danish friends who explained cultural nuances and expectations to them. 
They also felt integrated when their own cultures were respected by Danes. 
The Danish government interprets integration from the lens of sameness. 
 
Membership to the society is granted based upon how an immigrant can adapt to the 
Danish language and accept Danish cultural values. The government perceives 
integration as a set of policies that helps immigrants adapt to Danish culture and values 
so that they can accept the Danish way of life. The Swedish government sees integration 
as a set of rights that provide equal opportunities to immigrants. It is a rights-based 
system in Sweden while in Denmark it is a system that facilitates sameness. In both cases 
immigrants, nonetheless, have to adapt to the state and the immigrant’s culture is 
secondary to the goals of the state. The following chapter provides the concluding 
remarks to this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 
I started this dissertation talking about the puzzle that Denmark and Sweden 
present to the world. Denmark, since 2001, has chosen to implement assimilationist 
policies, while Sweden has maintained multicultural policies; yet they are getting similar 
results to their integration progress. The OCED has reported high instances of long-term 
poverty for immigrants in both countries compared to other developed nations and to the 
native populations in Denmark and Sweden. This dissertation sought to study these 
countries’ policies, societies, and history more closely to understand why this was 
occurring. By selecting just two cases (Denmark and Sweden) and analyzing them in 
great detail, I could better identify conditions and procedures that were linked to 
successful or failed outcomes related to immigrant integration. 
As Peter Katzenstein (1985) and Ernst Gellner (1983) outlined in their research, 
small homogenous societies gained strength and economic wealth because there were no 
minorities to challenged dominant social structures and policies early in the 
industrialization period or in the early history of the countries. Countries like Denmark 
and Sweden created innovative industrialized institutions because minorities were not 
there to object to the goals of the homogenous group. Although their theory suggests that 
everyone in a homogenous society will think and act similar and that women will have 
similar ideas to men, which is problematic., there is still something to their argument. 
Denmark and Sweden have become diverse societies, and this project indicated that 
institutions, policies, and social behavior were socially constructed over time in these 
countries and were conducive towards people who could fit into the “in-group.” Others 
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who could not “fit-in” tended to be the poorest in the societies and experience the politics 
of belonging as an out-group. I presented in this study that the institutional structure of 
integration policies, both formal and informal, are not helping build social capital and the 
socioeconomic status of non-Western immigrants. 
An important aspect of this study involves the “politics of belonging” and 
“belonging.” The notion of belonging is very different for people associated with diverse 
ethnic and racial backgrounds and with different ages, gender, sexuality, etc.—the 
experience of belonging is multilayered and can cover a multitude of experiences in 
different scenarios.301 Chapter 3 of this dissertation demonstrated that not only do 
integration approaches seem related to national identity, but that as Benedict Anderson 
(1983) argued, nationalism is not based on rationality but links to modernization, 
international threats from the outside world, industrialization, and capitalism. 
“Belonging” is different from the “politics of belonging,” as the politics of belonging 
operates under the assumption of imagined communities that supports nationalism and 
barriers to outsiders.302 Nationalism promotes an idealized relationship to the state for its 
members and creates politics of belonging by isolating non-members through restrictive 
policies, negative rhetoric, and isolation. Nationalism is similar to familial and religious 
attachment where there is no rational reason and self-interest necessarily involved, 
beyond protecting the interest of the group. Belonging, on the other hand, relates to social 
locations, identification, and emotional attachments, and ethical and political values.303 A 
 
 
301 Yuval-Davis, “Belonging and the Politics of Belonging”; Masuoka and Junn, The Politics of Belonging. 
302 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
303 Masuoka and Junn, The Politics of Belonging. 
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non-Western immigrant can feel emotionally attached to their communities, their 
neighborhoods, and even the country in which they dwell, but the "politics of belonging" 
can hinder their political engagement, entitlement, and status in the host community. 
The findings from my research illuminated connections between nation-building 
and the politics of belonging to historical myths and to current integration policies in 
Denmark and Sweden. I argued that Denmark and Sweden are getting similar policy 
outcomes even though they used very different integration policies because informal and 
formal policies are barriers to non-Western immigrants. This study argued that there is a 
gap between the goals of integration policies and the outcome in immigrant communities. 
I found that socially constructed practices and institutions trumped integration policies, 
which created the similarities in outcomes in the two countries. The study highlights that 
by changing integration requirements, and by loosening standards explicitly established 
for non-Western immigrants, better integration could happen for new arrivals in Europe. 
 
LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
 
With every research project, there are limitations. Amongst the various limitations 
of this study, the data are not representative of the entire immigrant or native population 
in Denmark, Sweden, Europe, or the world. The survey and the fieldwork provided 
insight into the topic of immigrant integration but did not explain the specific behavior of 
all immigrants in the world let alone all immigrants in each country. The categories of 
integration such as civic engagement, economic status, education attainment, linguistic 
and spatial integration, are not all perfect indicators of integration because the native 
populations could also suffer in these areas and they do suffer in these areas. 
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Furthermore, this study focuses on socioeconomic integration and a little on spatial 
integration, which could create blind spots in the analysis. Other studies could do a more 
in-depth analysis of other integration markers. By no means does this study answer all 
questions about immigrant integration or immigration policies. It provided a simple 
insight into a huge issue. 
An additional limitation is the demographic of people included in the project. The 
study focuses on people who have already established themselves in the host country, 
meaning that they have lived in Denmark or Sweden for at least seven years. It also looks 
at the opinion of the native population. Researching recent arrivals might be useful to 
fully understand the process of integration from the beginning stages to the end. 
Furthermore, the study does not focus on the agency of immigrants themselves. Although 
it discusses immigrants and takes statements from them, it misses their agency in their 
own struggle for social capital and belonging. Future projects should consider including 
this as a factor of the immigrant integration process. 
The last limitation I want to discuss concerns terminology related to assimilation, 
multiculturalism, and integration. Chapter 2 goes through the various points at which the 
debates move away from assimilation to multiculturalism and how the center of this very 
debate concerns issues of integration, social inclusion, and belonging. Framing 
integration, assimilation, multiculturalism, belonging, etc. is difficult because they are 
understood differently in various cultural contexts. The way one defines each term may 
impact the results of a study. I define integration from an economic perspective in terms 
of socioeconomic integration because that is how it is discussed today, which could 
generate specific results in the study. If a different study interprets integration differently, 
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they will come up with different results. Although this study does have some limitations, 
the findings here are rich and contribute greatly to immigration and integration literature. 
 
 
THE FUTURE IMPACT OF THE STUDY 
 
Globalization has changed the world we live in to be more interconnected and 
diverse than ever before. I discussed in the introduction chapter that 258 million people 
had settled internationally. More people are moving now than ever before, although it is 
only 4 percent of the world's population who settled internationally. However, the 
majority of immigrants moved to seven countries; the US, Germany, Russia, the UK, 
China, France, and Canada. Although Denmark and Sweden are not the top destinations 
for most people migrating abroad, they are a top destination in the West for people 
leaving their home countries for humanitarian reasons. As more people move abroad and 
more wars create displaced people, it will be imperative to create a two-way integration 
process that will help immigrants thrive in their new societies and the host societies to 
adapt to new arrivals. 
Social welfare countries like Denmark and Sweden needs immigrants. The 
populations are aging, and young people do not have as many children as did in the past. 
Immigrants provide a great source of labor mainly when they contribute more 
economically to the governments than what they receive. A significant issue in 
Scandinavian countries is the perception that immigrants receive more government 
subsidies than native populations. Problems occur because people who arrived for 
humanitarian reasons tend to rely on government aid for at about a decade before they 
can provide for themselves. Since, this is the largest immigrant population in the 
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countries, outside of Western EU immigrants, it becomes more expensive for the 
government to house humanitarian immigrants and, as a result, the host populations have 
become more resentful towards them. Ten years of dependence on government stipends 
puts the immigrant into long term poverty, so it is not a good practice for them to remain 
on government subsidies long-term, although it might be necessary while they adjust to 
their new countries. 
Immigrant integration should be a two-way process in which the receiving society 
and immigrants adapt to each other. Immigrants have been pressed to adapt to new host 
societies through language, education, work, and cultural immersion programs, which are 
all important, but integration policies fail to recognize the role of the state to help the 
native population adapt to new arrivals. This study did a close analysis of integration 
requirements and showed the potential barriers for immigrants. Particularly, if the goal is 
to get immigrants into viable jobs, then the introduction programs need to be shorter. 
Furthermore, governments need to ensure that all people in a society feel respected and 
accepted; immigrants should feel like they fully belong in the host society. A central 
theme in this study also addressed the massive importance of national identity and 
socially constructed myths that eroded multicultural integration programs such as the 
program in Sweden. If the idea that national identities are socially constructed is taken as 
truth, then the state can reconstruct national identity to be inclusive of diverse people.304 
 
 
304 William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Siniša Malešević, Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and 
Nationalism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, “Nationalism and the 
Marketplace of Ideas,” International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 5–40; Fu-Lai Tony Yu and Diana Sze 
Man Kwan, “Social Construction of National Identity: Taiwanese versus Chinese Consciousness,” Social 
Identities 14, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 33–52. 
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To help incorporate immigrants into society and to create "belonging," the state 
must address cultural and historical myths that support homogeneity. In response, 
governments need to create new socially constructed ideas that support diversity in the 
globalized world. This study indicated that political institutions and socially constructed 
ideas trumped integration policies. A significant way to address socially constructed ideas 
about who belongs and nationalism in a society is through education and textbooks.305 
This means that textbooks that support diversity and inclusion need to be implemented 
from the elementary school level through the university level to promote positive 
messages about diverse people living in a society who are not ethnically European and/or 
Christian. It worked when Europe was restructuring itself to become the EU after the 
Second World War, and it can work again to establish non-Western immigrants as equals 
to Europeans. There needs to be room for immigrants to be entirely accepted in a host 
society no matter their genotype or religion. If the goal is to promote human rights for all 
people, then acceptance of difference is crucial, especially if immigrants are to feel at 
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a.      
b.      
c.      
d.      
e.      
APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONS 
FILTER QUESTIONS: 
1. To know if you are eligible for this survey, can you tell me in which year you 
were born? If you don’t know, write in 9999. 
 
WRITE IN YEAR: 
Y Y Y Y 
 
2. In which country where you born? If you don’t know write in “Don’t Know.” 
WRITE IN Country: 
 
 
3. In which year did you first come to live in [country]? “Live" means to settle 
down as immigrant. It does not mean simply to visit as a tourist or for school. 
Write in 9999 if you don’t know. 
 
WRITE IN YEAR: 
Y Y Y Y 
 
4. What nationality/ies did you have when you were born? Nationality can be the 
country where you were born or your ethnic background that you got from your 
parents. Write in as many as necessary. Write stateless/or No Nationality if it 
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5. And what nationality/ies do you have today? Include your nationality at birth. 
Nationality can be the country where you were born or your ethnic background 
that you got from your parents. Write in as many as necessary. Write stateless/or 
No Nationality if it applies. You can also write in “Don’t Know,” if you don’t 
know. 
 











6. What type of residence permit do you have now in [country]? Mark an “X” 





i. Beneficiary of subsidiary 
protection / Other 
humanitarian status 
 
c. Family reunification 
 
d. Permit for relatives of an 
EU/EEA national 
j. er legal residence 
status (e.g. health) 
 
k. Renewing an expir 
 
e. Permanent resident 
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10. Last year, that is 2016, what was your total family income from all sources, 
before taxes? Mark an “X” by the option that applies to you. If you don’t know 
write in “Don’t Know.” 
 
 
a. 10,000 – 17,999 
 
b. 18,000 – 22,049 
 
c. 23,050 – 32,499 
 
d. 32,500 – 52,499 
 
e. 52,500 – 72, 499 
 
f. 72,500 – 99,999 
 
g. 100,000 – 149,999 
 
h. 150,000 + 
 
i. Don’t know 
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LIFE SATISFACTION QUESTIONS: 
 
11. Could you please write down on a scale of 0 to 10 how satisfied you are with 
each of the following items? Where 0 means you are very dissatisfied and 10 
means you are very satisfied? 
 
Write a number between 0 - 10 for each item. 0 = dissatisfied and 10 = very 
satisfied 
 
a. Your life these days 
 
b. Your present level of education  
 
c. Your present job [if you are not currently working, write 55] 
 
d. Your accommodation    
 
e. Your family life 
 
f. Your health 
 
g. Your social life 
 
h. Refusal [Write 88 if you don’t want to answer] 
 




ACCESS TO NATIONALITY: 
 
 
12. Have you ever applied to become a citizen of [COUNTRY]? Mark an “X” by 
one of the selections. 
 
a. No [Skip to Question 17] 
 
b. Yes 
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c. My parents or guardian applied for me 
 




f. Don’t know 
 
 
13. In what year did you apply for [Country] Citizenship? If you have applied 
multiple times, put the year when you first applied. If you don’t know write in 
9999. 
 
WRITE IN YEAR: 




14. Which procedure did you use to get [country] nationality? Mark an “X” by 
the option that applies to you. Write in the name of other procedures not listed. If 
you don’t know write in “Don’t Know.” 
 
a. [Name of ordinary naturalization procedure] 
 
b. [Name of procedure for spouse/partner of national] 
 
c. [Name of any facilitated procedure] 
 
d. I was born with this nationality 
 




g. Don't Know 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15. Please mark “X” if any of the following potential problems that sometimes 
happen when people apply for [country] nationality happened to you. Mark 
an “X” by one of the selections. If you applied under more than one procedure, 
just write problems in first procedure. 
 
a. I had difficulties obtaining the documents that were required (e.g. 
identity documents, residence permits, proof of housing).   
 
b. I had problems fulfilling the requirements (e.g. language or 
integration tests, sufficient resources or income, fees). 
 
c. The authorities had too much power to “do whatever they wanted.” 
 
d. I did not understand the procedure/requirements.  
 
e. I had to give up my previous citizenship(s) before I could become a 
citizen of [country]. 
 





16. What happened to your citizenship application afterwards? Mark an “X” by 
one of the selections. 
 




c. Awaiting the response 
 
d. I refuse to answer this question 
 
e. Don’t Know 
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18. Which of the following reasons apply to why you do not want to become a 
citizen of [country]? Mark an “X” by the selections. Please choose all that 
apply. 
 
a. I cannot fulfill the requirements.  
 
b. I do not know if I fulfill the requirements. 
 
c. I do not want to go through the procedure (e.g. too hard, 
complicated, long, expensive). 
 
d. I do not think that I will settle in (country).  
 
e. I do not think that I can keep the citizenship of my home country if I 
become a citizen of [country]. 
 








19. Do you think that becoming a citizen or being a citizen helped/will help you 
personally to...?  Mark an “X” by the selections. Please choose all that apply. 
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a. Get a job or improve your job/business 
 
b. Get more education or training 
 
c. Get involved in your local community (school, associations, political 
activities)  
 
d. Feel settled in [country] 
 








20. Do you think having citizenship is necessary to improve your job/business 
opportunities, education or training, or community involvement? Mark an 
“X” by one of the selections. 
 
a. Yes, having citizenship is important in [country] to have access to 
these. 
 











21. Have you ever applied for a [permanent/long term residence permit] in 
[country]? Permanent/long-term residents do not need to regularly renew their 
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residence permit. They have a more secure residence and many of the same rights 
as (country) nationals. Mark an “X” by one of the selections. 
 
a. No [Go to Questions 30]  
 














22. In which year did you apply for [permanent/long term residence permit] in 
[country]?  If you have applied multiple times, put the year when you first 
applied. If you don’t know write in 9999. 
 
 
WRITE IN YEAR: 
Y Y Y Y 
 
 
23. Please tell me if any of the following potential problems that sometimes 
happen when people apply for a [permanent/long term residence permit] 
happened to you. Mark an “X” by the selections. Please choose all that apply. 
 
a. I had difficulties obtaining the documents that were required (e.g. 
identity documents, residence permits, proof of housing)  
 
b. I had problems fulfilling the requirements (e.g. language or 
integration tests, sufficient resources or income, fees)  
 
c. The authorities had too much power to “do whatever they wanted.” 
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   d. I did not understand the procedure/requirements.  
 
e. I had to give up my previous citizenship(s) before I could become a 
citizen of [country]. 
 




h. Don’t know 
 
 
24. What happened to your permanent/long term residence permit application 
afterwards? Mark an “X” by one selection. 
 




c. Awaiting the response 
 
d. I refuse to answer this question 
 




25. Do you think that becoming a permanent/long term residence helped you 
personally to...?  Mark an “X” by all that apply. 
 
a. Get a job or improve your job/business 
 
b. Get more education or training 
 
c. Get involved in your local community (school, associations, political 
activities)  
 
d. Feel settled in [country] 
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26. Do you want to become a permanent/long term residence of [country]? Mark 












27. Which of the following reasons apply to why you do not want to become a 
permanent/long term residence of [country]? Mark an “X” by all that apply. 
 
a. I cannot fulfill the requirements.  
 
b. I do not know if I fulfill the requirements. 
 
c. I do not want to go through the procedure (e.g. too hard, 
complicated, long, expensive). 
 
d. I do not think that I will settle in (country).  
 
e. I do not think that I can keep the citizenship of my home country if I 
become a citizen of [country]. 
 
f. I want to become a citizen. 
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28. Do you think that becoming a citizen or being a permanent/long term 
residence will help you personally to...?  Mark an “X” by all that apply. 
 
a. Get a job or improve your job/business 
 
b. Get more education or training 
 
c. Get involved in your local community (school, associations, political 
activities)  
 
d. Feel settled in [country] 
 








29. Do you think having permanent/long term residence is necessary to improve 
your job/business opportunities, education or training, or community 
involvement? Mark an X by one answer. 
 
a. Yes, having permanent/long term residence is important in [country] 
to have access to these. 
 





   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 





30. Including yourself, how many people—including children—live here 
regularly as members of this household? (Please include all people, relatives or 
non-relatives, who live with you at the same address as your only or main 
residence and share the living accommodation and/or share at least one main 
meal a day).  If you don’t know, write in 9999. 
 





31. Which of these descriptions best describe your current marital status? Mark 
an “X” by all that apply. 
 
a. Legally married or civil union 
 
b. Legally separated / divorced / Civil union dissolved [Skip to 
Question 34] 
 
c. Living with my partner (cohabiting) 
 
d. Widowed / Civil partner died 
 








32. What nationality/ies did your spouse/partner have when he or she was born? 
If you have been married many times, write for your most current spouse/partner. 
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Write stateless/or No Nationality if it applies. You can also write in “Don’t 















33. What nationality/ties does he or she have today? Includes nationality at birth. 
Write stateless/or No Nationality if it applies. You can also write in “Don’t 
















FAMILY MEMBERS: The next section of questions will ask you about your family. If 
you have a spouse/partner, this question is about your and spouse/partner's children, 
including adopted. The children could be any age, over or under 18, when you applied. 
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34. Since you moved to [country], did you ever have a/any your spouse/partner 












35. Have you ever applied for family reunion so that your spouse/partner or 
children could move to [country]? Family reunion means your right to sponsor 













36. In which year did apply? Write in 9999 if you don’t know. 
WRITE IN YEAR: 




37. What happened to their application afterwards? (If you applied more than 
once or for more than one person, please answer for the 1st time.) Mark an “X” 
by one selection. 
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e. Don’t Know 
 
Go to QUESTION 40. 
 
38. Would you like to apply for them/any of them to live here? Mark an “X” by 
one selection. 
 
a. Yes [Go to Question 40] 
 
b. No [Go to Question 39] 
 
c. It depends on their future situation (e.g. health, personal, financial) 
[Go to Question 40] 
 
d. Not applicable: Family bonds ended due to e.g. death, divorce, 
separation. [Go to Question 40] 
 
e. Refuse [Go to Question 40] 
 




39. Overall, which of the following reasons apply to why you do not want to 
apply for family reunion? Mark an “X” by all that apply. Go to the next section 
of questions beginning with Question 41 
 
a. I have close family members who do not want to come live with me 
in [country]. 
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b. I cannot fulfill the requirements. 
 
c. I do not know if I fulfill the requirements. 
 
d. I do not want to go through the procedure (e.g. too hard, 
complicated, long, expensive). 
 
e. I have close family members abroad who are already citizens of 
[country] or EU citizens. 
 




h. Don’t know 
 
Go to the next section of questions beginning with Question 41 
 
40. Did any of the following potential problems that sometimes happen when 
people apply to be reunited with their family members happened to you? 
Mark an “X” by all that apply. 
 
a. I had difficulties obtaining the documents that were required (e.g. 
identity documents, residence permits, proof of housing)  
 
b. I had problems fulfilling the requirements (e.g. language or 
integration tests, sufficient resources or income, fees)  
 
c. The authorities had too much power to “do whatever they wanted.” 
 
d. I did not understand the procedure/requirements.  
 
e. I had to give up my previous citizenship(s) before I could become a 
citizen of [country]. 
 
f. I had no problems applying. 
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h. Don’t know 
 





LANGUAGE AND INTEGRATION COURSES: 
 
41. What is/are your mother tongue(s), the main language(s) that were spoken in 
your family when you were a small child? Write in all the different languages 
















42. Which other language(s) do you speak well enough to be able to have a 






b.    
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43. Below is a list of different reasons that may discourage people from learning 
[country language]. Which, if any, of these would apply to you?  Mark an 
“X” by all that apply. 
 
a. I haven't time to study properly 
 
b. I am not motivated enough 
 
c. It is too expensive 
 
d. Poor teaching/boring methods/inadequate learning materials 
 
e. It's hard to find information about what's available 
 








44. Have you completed [a language/integration course provided OR funded by 




b. No [Go to question 46] 
 
c. Refuse 
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45. To what extent do you think this course helped you personally to do any of 
the following... Mark an “X” on all that apply. 
  
a. Learn basic [language] 
 




Learn the specific [language] vocabulary that I need for my job or 
 








LABOR MARKET MOBILITY 
 
46. Which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last 7 days)? 
Mark an “X” by one selection. 
 
a. in paid work or away temporarily (employee, self-employed, 
entrepreneur, working for your family business) 
 
b. in school (even if on vacation) 
 
c. unemployed and actively looking for a job 
 
d. unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job 
 
e. Permanently sick or disabled 
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   f. Retired 
 
g. doing housework, looking after children or other persons 
 












a. Public sector (education, health, state-owned enterprise, central or 
local government) 
 
b. A private firm 
 
c. Self-employed (including entrepreneur, family-owned business) 
 
d. Not-for-profit organization 
 










48. Do you think that your main job here in [country] uses all the skills that you 
obtained in your training and work life? Mark an “X” by one selection. 
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   a. My job matches my skills & training 
 
b. My job matches my skills but is not in the area for which I trained 
 








49. Thinking about yourself, do you think that for you to keep your job or find a 
job soon... Mark an “X” by all that apply. 
 
a. Your education and training to date is sufficient 
 
b. You need training/education but you cannot currently do this 
 




e. Don’t Know 
 






50. From the following list, what are the main reasons preventing you from 
taking part in a training course? Mark an “X” by all that apply. 
 
a. You cannot afford it  
 
b. Training conflicts with your work schedule 
 
c. You do not have time because of family responsibilities 
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d. You do not know about any training offers 
 
e. There is no course that meets my specific needs 
 
f. I have difficulties with [country language(s)] 
 








51. In total, how many years have you been in paid work? Count years in full or 
part-time work equally. For fractions of a year, if more than 6 months, count as 1 
year. If less than six months, count as zero. 
 
WRITE IN YEARS: 
 
 
a. In [country] 
 
b. In your country of birth   
 
c. In any other country where you lived 
 








POLITICAL AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION: 
 
52. Which, if any, do you belong to or do unpaid voluntary work for in 
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[country]? Mark an “X” by all that apply. 
 
a. Political party or groups in [country] politics 
 
b. Trade unions 
 
c. Immigrant/ethnic group organization (support or promotion of 
groups' social, cultural, or political interests) 
 






g. Don’t Know 
 
 
53. Do you know of a specific association run by immigrants or ethnic minorities 












54. Have you heard of the [Local, Regional, or National Immigrant Consultative 






   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   c. Refuse 
 




55. Would you vote if there was a general election tomorrow in [country]? If you 
are not a national citizen would you vote if you had the right to vote? Mark an 












56. Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in 
the last [country] NATIONAL election in [month/year]? If you do not have the 
right to vote, check NA. Mark an “X” by one selection. 
 












57.  Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in 
the last [country] LOCAL election in [month/year]? If you do not have the 
right to vote, check NA. Mark an “X” by one selection. 
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58. Which of the following reasons apply to why you did not vote in the last 
election? Mark an “X” by all that apply. 
 
a. I am not interested in [city] politics 
 
b. I am not interested in politics in general 
 
c. I do not feel close to a particular political party in [country] 
 
d. My vote would make no difference 
 
e. I do not want to go through the procedure (e.g. too hard, 
complicated, long, expensive). 
 








59. Would you say that we need more MPs with an immigrant background in the 
[country Parliament]? Mark an “X” by one selection. 
 
a. Yes, definitely 
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b. Yes, probably 
 
c. No, probably not 
 








60. Can you tell me if you agree with these statements about MPs with an 
immigrant background? Mark an “X” by one selection. 
 
a. It would be symbolically important for [country] to have more MPs 
with an immigrant background 
 
b. MPs with an immigrant background would better understand 
immigrants 
 
c. They would better represent immigrants' interests 
 
d. I would be more likely to vote for them 
 




g. Don’t Know 
 







   
   
   
   
   
61. Which of the descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your 
household’s income nowadays? Mark an “X” by all that apply. 
 
a. Living comfortably on present income 
 
b. Coping on present income 
 




e. Don’t Know 
 
 
62. Below are some aims people say [country] should concentrate on. If you had 
to choose among these six aims, which would be your first, second, 
third…choice? Please give numbers: 1 for your first choice, 2 for your second 




Environmental safety (air pollution) 
 




Lack of good jobs 
 







63. Which of the following do you feel is most responsible for recent outbreaks of 
violence in [country]? Mark an “X” by all that apply. 
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a. The way children are raised by parents 
 










g. Don’t Know 
 
h. Other (write-in)    
 
64. How happy are you in the community in which you live? Mark an “X” by one 
selection. 
 
a. Very satisfied 
 




f. Somewhat Dissatisfied 
 




i. Don’t Know 
 
 






APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
Ask Community Leaders Only: 
 




2. Where do most immigrants come from in [country]? Why do you believe people 
immigrate to this country? 
3. What services does the government provide that helps immigrants transition to 
life in [country]? Do you think these services are enough to help with this 
transition? What is integration according to this country? Is integration for new 
immigrants or for second generation immigrants to adjust to society? 
4. Who are considered immigrants in [country]? What happens when they are 
second-generation born in the country? Are they still considered immigrants? 
5. What is Integration? Do you think integration is a factor in why immigrants 
may/or may not become radicalization? If not, why? If so, why? 
6. Are immigrants successful in this country? What reasons prevent immigrants 
from succeeding in [country]? What helps them become successfully? Is it 
government’s responsibility to help immigrants succeed or is it the responsibility 
of the immigrant themselves? 
7. What is radicalization/extremism to you? Do you think immigrants are becoming 
more radicalized/extreme in Europe in general and more specifically in this 
country? 
 
a. If so, why do you think immigrants are becoming for radicalized in 
Europe, and more specifically, in [country]? What can government or the 
community do to stop this from happening? 
b. If not, why do you think the immigrants in this country are not becoming 
more radicalized? Is it the government or the community that is doing 
something to prevent radicalization, or is it something else? 
8. What government services are provided to immigrants that are not helping their 
situation? 
9. What government services are provided to immigrants that are a significant help 
to their situation? 
10. Do you think letting a lot of immigrants into the country is potentially dangerous 
for [country]? 
11. If you could change anything about the way immigrants are handled in this 
country, what would you change? 
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